Opinion
H050188
02-28-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ESMERELDA ALEXA CASTANADA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C2012457)
Greenwood, P. J.
Defendant Esmerelda Alexa Castanada appeals from the restitution order imposed after her no contest plea to a count of misdemeanor vandalism. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order.
I. Background
A. Procedural Background
On September 23, 2020, the Santa Clara County District Attorney issued a felony complaint in case No. C2012457 charging Castanada with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b)) and alleging an enhancement under section 12022.1, subdivision (b) for being out of custody on her own recognizance at the time of the charged offense.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In a consolidated plea hearing, Castanada pleaded no contest in this case (No. C2012457) to the burglary charge and admitted the own recognizance enhancement. Castanada also pleaded no contest to other charges and admitted allegations in two additional cases (Nos. C2009503 and C2007935). At the hearing the parties discussed a proposal to dismiss at sentencing, under a Harvey waiver, a misdemeanor vandalism case (No. C2010694) that was also pending against Castanada.
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (dismissed charges may not be used to impose sentencing consequences unless the defendant waives that right).
In a consolidated dispositional hearing, the court suspended imposition of sentence on the burglary charge and dismissed the own recognizance enhancement in this case. The court found that Castanada's presumption of ineligibility for probation had been overcome and imposed three years of formal probation. The court also granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor vandalism charge, with a Harvey waiver to attach victim restitution in that case to Castanada's disposition in the burglary case.
The court then conducted a separate hearing on the restitution in the attached misdemeanor case. It ordered Castanada to pay a total of $13,512.84 in restitution to the restitution claimant, with the award consisting of $12,562.84 for vehicle damage and $950 for lost wages.
Castanada filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the restitution order and requesting a certificate of probable cause. The court issued a certificate of probable cause.
B. Restitution Hearing for Vandalism
We limit our summary to the facts and procedure related to the vandalism charge and subsequent restitution hearing as appellant does not challenge any other aspect of the negotiated disposition or imposed sentence.
On June 27, 2020, Castanada used a metal scooter to smash out the front and rear driver's side windows and the rear window of a 2017 Dodge Journey parked in the driveway of a home in San Jose.
The restitution claimant in the case was A.R. The district attorney filed a memorandum seeking restitution for A.R. based on the value of the damaged vehicle, listed in the memorandum as $12,562.84. The district attorney attached as an exhibit a GEICO market valuation report for the car which listed A.R. as the insured party and owner of the vehicle. The GEICO report stated that the value of the car, after subtracting the $1,000 deductible, was $12,562.84. The district attorney stated in the memorandum that A.R.'s insurer, GEICO, had deemed the vehicle a total loss, and that instead of paying for it to be repaired, GEICO had paid the lien holder "the value of the vehicle." The district attorney asserted that while the usual consequence of this type of damage would not be a total loss of the vehicle, because here GEICO deemed it a total loss A.R. had been left without a car, and she therefore needed to be made whole by receiving restitution for the full value of the vehicle.
Castanada filed a memorandum arguing that the court should deny the request for restitution. The memorandum characterized the vehicle as "allegedly" belonging to A.R., the new girlfriend of J.R., Castanada's ex-boyfriend. A.R. had submitted a statement of loss questionnaire (SOLQ) to the district attorney with attached records showing that J.R. bought the vehicle in December 2017 for $24,285, with a financed amount of $22,409. Also attached to the SOLQ was a notice of waiver form which showed that GEICO paid $12,562.84 to the lien holder, Ally Financial, on behalf of J.R., and that Ally Financial had waived the remaining balance of $3,722.61 of J.R.'s car loan. A.R. also stated on the form that she had lost wages for five days (at a value of $950) because of lost access to the car and time spent working on the insurance claim.
Castanada argued in the memorandum that the court should not pay the requested restitution because A.R. did not own the vehicle or have an economic interest in it. Castanada additionally contended in her reply that this transaction amounted to the sale of the damaged property to GEICO and that it did not constitute an economic loss suffered by A.R., and therefore awarding restitution of $12,562.84 to her would constitute an impermissible windfall.
At the restitution hearing, the court acknowledged there was a dispute about who owned the car, noting that the SOLQ was submitted by A.R., while the "paperwork" was in the name of a different person. The court stated that its understanding of the incident was that Castanada vandalized a car that was reported to belong to her ex-boyfriend, J.R., and that some of the documents showed that it was J.R.'s vehicle, while the person named in the SOLQ was J.R.'s current girlfriend. The court said that its copy of the police report was redacted, but the district attorney stated that both parties had reviewed the unredacted police report and agreed that A.R. was identified there as the owner of the vehicle.
Castanada states in her reply brief that the unredacted police report identified A.R.'s current boyfriend as "A.H." and that the police report also stated that the car was parked at A.H.'s address-and not J.R.'s-when Castanada vandalized the vehicle. The record does not contain a copy of the unredacted police report, and there is nothing else in the record from which we can verify this assertion.
The court found that A.R. was entitled to the restitution as requested. It awarded $12,562.84 to A.R., citing section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), and stating that she was entitled to be made whole. The court also awarded $950 in lost wages, citing section 1202.4, subdivisions (f)(3)(D) and (f)(3)(E).
II. Analysis
Castanada argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the restitution amount to be paid to A.R. because there was not substantial evidence that her ownership interest in the car extended to its full value, and there was not substantial evidence that Castanada's conduct was a cause in fact or a proximate cause of damage equivalent to the amount of restitution ordered. The Attorney General contends that we should affirm the restitution order because the trial court employed a rational method in determining the restitution amount, and because A.R. made a prima facie case of her ownership of the car which Castanada did not adequately rebut.
A. Applicable Legal Principles
"A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious." (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 (Gemelli).) "No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered." (Ibid.) "A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed." (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500.)
Under section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1), "a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides that "in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) Subdivision (f)(3) of section 1202.4 specifies further that restitution "shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)
At a restitution hearing, the party seeking restitution must establish the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.) "Section 1202.4 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof. However, the trial court is entitled to consider the probation report, and, as prima facie evidence of loss, may accept a property owner's statement made in the probation report about the value of stolen or damaged property." (Id. at p.1543; see also People v. Grandpierre (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 111, 115 (Grandpierre) ["[a] victim's statement of economic loss is prima facie evidence of loss"].) "Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim." (Gemelli, at p 1543.) The rebuttal process requires the defendant to come forward with contrary information to challenge the amount of the victim's loss. (People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 947, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 238-245.)
Courts have "expansively interpret[ed] the meaning of 'economic loss.' " (Grandpierre, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) "There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the lossin which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action." (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)
B. Discussion
Castanada first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding restitution to A.R. because she did not make a prima facie showing that she owned the interest in the car toward which GEICO's payment was made. In support of this, Castanada points to documents in the record indicating that J.R. was the sole purchaser and sole obligor of the note that funded the car's purchase. We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court did not err in granting A.R.'s request for restitution because she made a prima facie showing of ownership which Castanada failed to rebut.
For purposes of restitution, a victim is a person who is the object of the crime. (People v. Moloy (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 257, 260.) "At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim's testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss." (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26 (Millard).) A victim's statement of loss, such as the one submitted by A.R. in this case, is prima facie evidence of loss. (Grandpierre, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.)
Here, A.R. presented evidence showing that she was user of the vehicle that was the object of the crime. A.R. was named in the police report as the victim of the vandalism to the damaged Dodge Journey, and she was listed in the GEICO valuation report both as the person who insured the vehicle and as its owner. The court also reviewed documents attached to the SOLQ which showed that J.R. was the purchaser of the vehicle and the person who took out the car loan. It was reasonable for the court to determine from this record that A.R. was the primary user of the car and the person who needed to be made whole under the restitution statute. (See Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26 [a court may use "any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole"].) Castanada did not offer any contrary evidence to rebut this prima facie showing. Accordingly, we determine that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that A.R. should be awarded restitution for the vandalism to the vehicle.
Castanada next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded $12,562.84 to A.R. for the car because her offense conduct was not a cause in fact or proximate cause of damage to the car in that amount. The Attorney General counters that the trial court's method of determining A.R.'s loss was not arbitrary and capricious, and therefore we should affirm the restitution order.
" 'An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event.' " (People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 425 (Jones), quoting PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 315.) Here, Castanada does not dispute that her vandalism was a cause in fact of the damage to the car's windows, but she argues that there is not substantial evidence that her vandalism caused $12,562.84 in damage to the car, because the cost of repairing the damaged window would likely have been less than that amount.
We disagree with this contention. Castanada's conduct was a cause in fact of the loss amount imposed by the court because A.R. was left without a car due to Castanada's vandalism. A trial court's restitution award is not limited to the lesser of the replacement cost of the victim's damaged property or the actual cost of repairing the property. Instead, the restitution statute leaves that choice to the trial court. (People v. Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th 734, 738.) Moreover, "[t]here is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable." (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 27.) Finally, the record does not contain information about the cost of repairing the windows, so the trial court was not presented with evidence to support Castanada's assertion that her offense conduct did not directly cause damage in the amount of $12,562.84.
In addition to assessments of cause in fact, proximate causation principles also apply to victim restitution in criminal cases. (Jones, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 425.) The court in Jones explained that the law imposes limitations on responsibility for victim restitution other than direct causality such that certain intervening causes relieve a defendant of liability for victim restitution. (Id. at p. 427.) Proximate cause imposes limitations on liability beyond simple causality based upon public policy considerations. (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353.) This operates to " 'relieve the defendant whose conduct is a cause in fact of the injury, where it would be considered unjust to hold him or her legally responsible.' " (Ibid., quoting 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1184, p. 553.) California courts have adopted the "substantial factor" test in analyzing proximate cause. (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1321 (Holmberg).) This " ' 'relatively broad' ' " test requires only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical. (Ibid.)
Castanada asserts that her vandalism was not the proximate cause of $12,562.84 of damage because GEICO's decision to total the car was an intervening cause that exonerated her from paying restitution beyond the cost of repairing the windows. Invoking the policy considerations inherent in proximate cause analysis, Castanada additionally contends that the restitution amount ordered here is unfair because it exceeds the damage caused by her wrongful conduct.
In Holmberg, we applied the substantial factor test and held that there was a sufficient nexus between defendant's crime of concealing computer equipment stolen by someone else and the victim's losses to warrant restitution. (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.) The court noted that had the defendant contacted the police about the stolen goods when he received them, the victim business would not have had to replace the computer equipment or lost business during the time without the computers. (Ibid.) Our decision in Holmberg supports the conclusion that Castanada's vandalism was a substantial factor in the victim's loss of her car. Here, the connection between Castanada's conduct and the victim's loss was even more direct than what we addressed in Holmberg because Castanada actively caused the damage to the vehicle, which in turn led to GEICO's appraisal of the damaged car and its subsequent decision to total it. Accordingly, we reject Castanada's argument that her criminal conduct was not a proximate cause of the loss amount for which she was ordered to make restitution.
Therefore, we will affirm the trial court's restitution order.
III. Disposition
The June 13, 2022 restitution order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Grover, J. Lie, J.