Opinion
B305313
07-19-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAÚL JUAREZ CARRANZA, Defendant and Appellant.
Oscar A. Acosta, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, William H. Shin and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA474140, Henry J. Hall, Judge.
Oscar A. Acosta, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, William H. Shin and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FEUER, J.
Raul Juarez Carranza appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter. Carranza contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation and sentencing him to the middle term of four years in state prison. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Accident and Investigation
The facts are taken from testimony at the preliminary hearing and surveillance videos showing the accident.
On the morning of December 8, 2018 Carranza drove his pickup truck eastbound on Whittier Boulevard in Los Angeles. He pulled into the left lane to make a left turn onto Williamson Avenue. A surveillance video taken from a local business shows Maty Jimenez walking quickly across Whittier Boulevard at the intersection, heading toward the north side of the street. At 10:31 a.m. Jimenez can be seen in the surveillance video walking in front of Carranza's truck. Carranza continued to make a left turn, hitting Jimenez with the middle of his truck's front grill and knocking her down. Carranza continued to turn left, running over Jimenez with his truck. Jimenez can be seen in the video lying on the ground as Carranza's truck makes the left turn onto Williamson Avenue. Surveillance video from a local residence shows Carranza's truck continuing onto Williamson Avenue, then stopping near the corner for about 15 seconds. Carranza did not exit his vehicle. He then continued driving northbound on Williamson Avenue.
Shortly after the accident, California Highway Patrol Officer Mario Sencion responded to the scene. He spoke to a witness at the scene and later prepared a traffic collision report. Jimenez was taken to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead about an hour after the accident.
A week later, Officer Sencion identified Carranza as the truck's registered owner based on the license plates seen in the surveillance videos. On December 18, 2018 California Highway Patrol Officer Bailey and his partner detained Carranza, who was driving his truck. Officer Sencion responded to the location, where he interviewed Carranza. When asked about the accident, Carranza initially stated he believed he had hit a bag of trash. Carranza then changed his description of what he had hit, stating he believed it was a silver or gray three-foot-long object. Carranza stated that after the accident he pulled over and got out of his truck to see what he had hit. At this point, Officer Sencion arrested Carranza and brought him to the police station.
At the police station, Officer Sencion advised Carranza of his Miranda rights, and Carranza agreed to speak with him. After viewing the surveillance tapes, Carranza admitted he was the person driving the truck in the video. He stated he might have hit a dog and noted there was an animal hospital at the intersection where the accident occurred. Officer Sencion told Carranza it did not appear from the video that Carranza had exited his truck. Carranza responded that he had stopped his truck and looked, but he had not gotten out.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 471.
A restriction on Carranza's driver's license stated he was required to wear eyeglasses. Carranza admitted to Officer Sencion that he was not wearing his eyeglasses at the time of the accident. Officer Sencion conducted an informal vision test on Carranza where Carranza was detained. Officer Sencion stepped back 10, 20, then 30 steps from Carranza, held up his fingers, and asked Carranza to identify the number of fingers. Carranza correctly identified the number of fingers after 10 and 20 steps, but not after 30 steps. At the time of the accident, Carranza had a temporary driver's license because he was unable to pass the written driver's license test. Officer Sencion inspected Carranza's truck and observed there was a pair of eyeglasses wedged between the windshield wipers and the air vents of the truck.
B. The Negotiated Plea and Sentencing
Carranza was charged with hit and run driving resulting in death to another person (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 1) and vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1); count 2). On September 13, 2019 Carranza pleaded guilty to vehicular manslaughter. Prior to the plea, the prosecutor advised Carranza of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of the plea, which Carranza stated he understood. Carranza entered the plea pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, and his attorney stipulated to a factual basis for the plea. The trial court found Carranza's waivers and plea were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and there was a factual basis for the plea.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties agreed the trial court would impose a maximum “lid” of the middle term of four years on count 2. The parties also agreed and the court ordered Carranza to undergo a diagnostic evaluation under section 1203.03 by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to recommend an appropriate disposition of Carranza's case. Carranza agreed to continue the sentencing hearing for 90 days, at which time the court would dismiss count 1 for hit and run driving resulting in death or serious injury.
The North Kern State Prison performed a diagnostic study and provided a recommendation to the trial court. A four-page psychological evaluation of Carranza by a clinical social worker concluded, “Mr. Carranza would appear to be a poor candidate for a grant of probation. Mr. Carranza was remorseful for his actions, [but] the fact that he took someone's life in an accident cannot be overlooked. He denied having been aware that he ran over someone, but did feel a jump on his vehicle. The death of the victim cannot be overlooked, and Mr. Carranza must be held responsible for his actions.” However, two correctional counselors concluded in a two-page report that Carranza “is viewed as a suitable candidate for probation.” The report explained, “It appears Mr. Carranza has taken responsibility, expressed remorse, and has a strong support system. This appears to be an isolated incident.... [I]t is believed if Mr. Carranza were granted probation and failed, he may not pose a threat to the community.” The warden in a cover letter to the court acknowledged the differing views of the correctional counselors and clinical social worker. The warden opined Carranza “has the potential to function successfully on probation and does not present a significant risk to the community.” The letter concluded Carranza was “a suitable candidate for a grant of probation.”
Carranza's attorney filed a sentencing memorandum requesting the court place Carranza on probation. Carranza also submitted 26 letters of support from family members and friends. At the sentencing hearing on January 31, 2020, the prosecutor argued that Carranza should be sentenced to four years in state prison based on Jimenez's vulnerability and Carranza's 1984 and 1986 convictions for driving under the influence (DUI). One of Jimenez's granddaughters testified about the impact of Jimenez's death on her family, and other family members submitted victim impact statements.
Carranza's attorney stated Carranza had “expressed his responsibility and beyond that said that he will accept any sentence that this court can impose upon him.” The attorney acknowledged Jimenez was “particularly vulnerable” and “had every reason to believe that she could cross the street and safely traverse that intersection and get to the other side.” But he urged the court to place Carranza on probation, stating Carranza “feels very, very sorry, very penitent in any event and is overcome by... the situation and by knowing that he took the life.” The attorney emphasized that Carranza had lived a law-abiding life except for the older convictions, had worked and taken care of his family, and had educated his children.
The trial court stated it had reviewed the diagnostic report, the probation report, and the defendant's sentencing memorandum and attachments. The court acknowledged Carranza's two DUI convictions were over 20 years old and added that Carranza's “performance on probation during those two offenses was adequate, certainly not stellar by any stretch of the imagination.” The court found Carranza was grossly negligent because he drove without his eyeglasses and with a temporary driver's license. The court emphasized all parties agreed Jimenez had a right to cross the street safely without the risk of being run over and killed by someone driving negligently. The court added, “This case in my mind was never a probation case.” The court referred to the probation report, in which Officer Sencion told the probation officer “[t]he defendant was nonchalant, unremorseful when I questioned him. The defendant never admitted to striking the victim with his vehicle and never asked how the victim was.” The court concluded the officer's statement in combination with “the tape of him hitting this woman, running over her, and fleeing the scene after kind of checking demonstrates a level of callousness to me that to my mind drives the imposition of the mid term in this case which is four years.” The court denied Carranza's request for probation and sentenced him to the middle term of four years in state prison.
Carranza timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“[S]ection 1203.1 et seq. gives trial courts broad discretion to determine whether to grant an eligible defendant probation, and if so, what terms of probation will promote rehabilitation and protect public safety.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 498; accord, People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 [“The sentencing court has broad discretion to determine whether an eligible defendant is suitable for probation and, if so, under what conditions.”].) In the absence of a showing the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary, “‘“the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”'” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377; accord, People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.) We review the trial court's decision whether to grant probation for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402; People v. Centeno (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 572, 579 [“‘The grant or denial of probation is within the trial court's discretion and the defendant bears a heavy burden when attempting to show an abuse of that discretion.'”].)
“‘All defendants are eligible for probation, in the discretion of the sentencing court [citation], unless a statute provides otherwise.'” (People v. Centeno, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 579-580.) It is undisputed that Carranza was eligible for probation. In deciding whether to grant or deny probation, the court is required to consider factors relating to the crime, including “(1) The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the crime as compared to other instances of the same crime; [¶]... [¶] (3) The vulnerability of the victim; [¶] (4) Whether the defendant inflicted physical or emotional injury; [¶]... [¶] (6) Whether the defendant was an active or a passive participant; [and] [¶] (7) Whether the crime was committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as great provocation, which is unlikely to recur.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(a).) In addition, the court must consider factors relating to the defendant, including “(1) Prior record of criminal conduct, ... including the recency and frequency of prior crimes; and whether the prior record indicates a pattern of regular or increasingly serious criminal conduct; [¶] (2) Prior performance and present status on probation...; [¶] (3) Willingness to comply with the terms of probation; [¶] (4) Ability to comply with reasonable terms of probation...; [¶] (5) The likely effect of imprisonment on the defendant and his or her dependents; [¶] (6) The adverse collateral consequences on the defendant's life resulting from the felony conviction; [¶] (7) Whether the defendant is remorseful; and [¶] (8) The likelihood that if not imprisoned the defendant will be a danger to others.” (Rule 4.414(b).)
All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
Unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise, a trial court will be deemed to have considered the relevant factors. (Rule 4.409.) The trial court also has discretion in making a sentencing decision to consider other criteria “reasonably related to the decision.” (Rule 4.408(a).) The court may consider aggravating or mitigating factors, including as an aggravating factor whether the defendant's conduct discloses “a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” (Rule 4.421(a)(1).)
A trial court is generally required to state its reasons for denying probation. (Rule 4.406(b)(2); People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1157; see People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 851 [“the court must ‘state in simple language the primary factor or factors that support the exercise of discretion'” in sentencing].) However, “‘[t]his obligation to state reasons is satisfied by an explanation of why probation has been rejected in favor of imprisonment. [Citations.]' [Citations.] For instance, the ‘nature and seriousness of the offense' is sufficient.” (Mehserle, at p. 1158.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Probation
Carranza contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation because the court failed to apply properly the factors set forth in rule 4.414, did not adequately state its reasons for denial, and improperly considered hearsay statements in the probation report. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
We reject the People's argument Carranza forfeited his objection to the trial court's sentencing decision by not objecting to the denial of probation after the court stated the sentence it intended to impose. Carranza's attorney filed a sentencing memorandum requesting probation and argued at the hearing why probation should be granted. No further objection was necessary to preserve his contentions for appeal.
The court properly considered the diagnostic report, the probation report, Carranza's sentencing memorandum, the arguments of counsel, the letters from Carranza's family and friends, and the testimony and victim impact statements from Jimenez's family. The court considered Carranza's prior DUI convictions, but it did not give them any weight because they were over 20 years old. The court found Carranza was grossly negligent because he drove without his eyeglasses although he was required to wear them as a condition of his driver's license. In addition, the trial court found Carranza was callous because the video showed he struck Jimenez with his truck, ran her over, and fled the scene. He never stopped to check on Jimenez, only “kind of checking.” Although Carranza stopped for about 15 seconds on Williamson Avenue, he never exited his truck. And Carranza hit Jimenez as she crossed the intersection with the expectation of safely reaching the other side. Carranza's attorney acknowledged Jimenez was therefore “particularly vulnerable.”
In addition, as the trial court found, Carranza never admitted to striking Jimenez, and at the time of the accident was not remorseful. Carranza initially stated he had run over a bag of trash, then changed his statement to hitting a three-foot-long object, then suggested he may have hit a dog. Certainly had he exited his truck to see what he had hit, he would have realized he had run over a person who needed medical attention. These were appropriate factors for the trial court to consider under rule 4.414(a)(1) (seriousness of crime), (3) (vulnerability of the victim), and (4) (infliction of physical injury); rule 4.414(b)(1) (prior criminal record), (2) (prior performance on probation), (5) (family-related factors), and (7) (remorsefulness); and rule 4.421(a)(1) (callousness). Moreover, the trial court properly stated its reasons for denying probation. (Rule 4.406(b)(2).)
Because the trial court considered the appropriate factors in making its sentencing decision, Carranza's contention he was denied due process lacks merit. Carranza also contends he was deprived of his right to a fair sentencing hearing because the trial court stated the case “was never a probation case.” Although the trial court made this observation at the sentencing hearing, it did consider probation, reviewing the diagnostic report from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the probation report, and the numerous letters from Carranza's family, and it evaluated the factors relevant to probation under rule 4.414.
Carranza argues the trial court abused its discretion by relying excessively on Jimenez's vulnerability, citing People v. McNiece (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1058-1059 (McNiece), disapproved on another ground in People v. McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, 805, and People v. Bloom (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 310, 322 (Bloom). In both cases, the defendants were convicted of vehicular manslaughter caused while driving under the influence of alcohol. (McNiece, at p. 1053; Bloom, at p. 310.) The defendant in Bloom challenged the trial court's imposition of the upper term, arguing the court improperly considered the victim to be “particularly vulnerable” under the predecessor rule to rule 4.421(a)(3). (Bloom, at p. 321.) The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in relying on this factor, explaining, “All victims of drunk drivers are ‘vulnerable victims,' but it is precisely because they are all vulnerable that [the victim] cannot be considered to be vulnerable ‘in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.'” (Id. at p. 322.) However, the court found the error was not prejudicial because the trial court had relied on two other proper factors for imposing the upper term. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal in McNiece relied on Bloom and reversed the trial court's denial of probation under rule 4.414(a)(3) based on the victim's particular vulnerability, where the only vulnerability was that the victim was killed by a drunk driver. (McNiece, at pp. 1058-1059.)
McNiece and Bloom are distinguishable because in both cases the only vulnerability of the victims was that they were killed by drunk drivers. Here, Jimenez was vulnerable because she walked across the intersection with the expectation of a safe crossing and could not anticipate that Carranza, not wearing his eyeglasses, would run over her. People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, disapproved on other ground in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939, is directly on point. There, a driver and passenger were hit by a drunk driver who drove into oncoming traffic. (Weaver, at p. 1308.) The drunk driver did not have his headlights on, and the victims had no time to react and avoid the collision. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of probation, explaining the court reasonably concluded the victims were vulnerable (which it defined as “‘defenseless'” and “‘unprotected'”) because they had no advance warning or ability to avoid the defendant's approaching car. (Id. at p. 1314; see People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1169, 1182 [victim of car accident resulting from defendant texting while driving and crashing into victim's car at 80 miles per hour was “‘particularly vulnerable'” because she had no advance warning or ability to avoid a car crash].)
Moreover, rule 4.414(a)(3), which applies to the decision whether to grant probation, refers to the “vulnerability of the victim, ” whereas rule 4.421(a)(3) (at issue in Bloom) refers to whether the victim was “particularly vulnerable” in deciding the appropriate state prison term to impose. As the Court of Appeal explained in Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at page 1316, footnote 15, “[T]he omission in rule 4.414(a)(3) of any requirement that a victim be ‘particularly' vulnerable effectively (and, in our opinion, appropriately) makes a victim's vulnerability more frequently applicable in a trial court's weighing whether to grant or deny probation than when a trial court, having denied probation, considers whether to impose a lower, middle, or upper term.”
Finally, Carranza argues the trial court improperly relied on double hearsay contained in the probation report. Trial courts may “rely upon hearsay statements contained in a presentence report to determine whether to place a defendant on probation, and to evaluate his level of culpability when selecting an appropriate sentence.” (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 212; see People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 [a sentencing judge may consider “‘responsible unsworn or “‘out-of-court'” information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person's life and characteristics'”].) “Reliability of the information considered by the court is the key issue in determining fundamental fairness.” (Arbuckle, at pp. 754-755; accord, People v. Lamb (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 664, 683 [“Fundamental fairness, however, requires that there be a substantial basis for believing the information is reliable.”].) A probation report “has inherent reliability because it was made pursuant to a court order by expert, objective government personnel in pursuit of their official duties.” (Arbuckle, at p. 755; accord, People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1096-1097 [hearsay statements in probation report prepared by probation officer were “sufficiently reliable hearsay to be admissible”].) “On appeal, the test is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the hearsay statements in the probation report are sufficiently reliable to be admissible.” (People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 838-839.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Officer Sencion's statements recounted in the probation report that Carranza was “nonchalant” and “unremorseful” when questioned and that Carranza never admitted to striking Jimenez and did not ask about her. Carranza did not object to consideration of the probation report, and the probation officer was performing his official duties by including the views of the arresting officer. (People v. Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 755; People v. Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096-1097.) Further, there was a substantial basis for believing the reliability of Officer Sencion's statements. He testified at the preliminary hearing that Carranza provided shifting opinions as to what he had hit, from a bag of trash, to a three-foot-long object, to a dog. Carranza never admitted he struck Jimenez with his truck, nor did the video show him getting out of his truck to check on the victim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., McCORMICK, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.