Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. BAF005230, Dennis A. McConaghy, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Law Offices of Mark J. Werksman, Mark J. Werksman and Kelly C. Quinn for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Teresa Torreblanca and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
Defendant and appellant Ian Brent Caldwell appeals from a trial court’s order denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the order.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because defendant pled guilty, the only documents discussing the underlying facts are defendant’s declaration filed in support of his motion to withdraw his plea and the prosecution’s opposition to defendant’s motion.
On October 20, 2006, passing motorists called 911 and reported seeing a man, later identified as defendant, repeatedly beating the victim on the ground. The victim sustained a fracture to her nose and pelvis during the altercation. According to defendant, the victim was intoxicated; the victim sustained her injuries during a struggle when defendant tried to get her to a safe place “where she could not hurt herself or others.”
On November 15, 2006, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging defendant with willfully and unlawfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon the victim on October 20, 2006, under Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) (count 1), and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury upon the victim on the same date under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2).
On February 15, 2007, defendant pled guilty to count 1 and was sentenced to three years’ formal probation on the condition that he spend 150 days in county jail to be served on weekends. It was agreed that, upon successful completion of probation, the district attorney’s office would not oppose a motion to reduce defendant’s conviction to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).
On March 13, 2007, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion on April 6, 2006.
On May 24, 2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and an application for a certificate of probable cause. On June 7, 2007, the trial court granted defendant a certificate of probable cause.
II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Penal Code section 1018. Defendant argues that the plea was not knowing and voluntary for two reasons: (1) the prosecutor threatened to file a kidnapping charge, which would have added three years in prison, if defendant did not accept the plea immediately; and (2) defendant’s counsel failed to inform defendant that he had a potentially meritorious defense of necessity. We disagree.
“A defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea may do so before judgment has been entered upon a showing of good cause. [Citations.] ‘Section 1018 provides that . . . “On application of the defendant at any time before judgment . . . the court may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” Good cause must be shown for such a withdrawal, based on clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘To establish good cause, it must be shown that defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of his free judgment. [Citations.] Other factors overcoming defendant’s free judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘The burden is on the defendant to present clear and convincing evidence the ends of justice would be subserved by permitting a change of plea to not guilty.’ [Citation.]
“‘When a defendant is represented by counsel, the grant or denial of an application to withdraw a plea is purely within the discretion of the trial court after consideration of all factors necessary to bring about a just result. [Citations.] On appeal, the trial court’s decision will be upheld unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 145-146.)
“Abuse of discretion is established if, considering all of the circumstances before it, the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. [Citation.] Of course, ‘[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied; action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Parmar (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 781, 792-793.)
In this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion.
A. Prosecutor’s Threat to File a Kidnapping Charge
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was concerned the prosecutor threatened to add a kidnapping charge unless defendant pled guilty.
At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified that his attorney informed defendant that the prosecutor had threatened to add a charge of kidnapping if defendant did not plead guilty. The kidnapping charge called for a three-year sentence.
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea, the trial court is not required to accept a defendant’s statements, even if uncontradicted, at face value. (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103.) Hence, the trial court was not required to accept defendant’s statement, even if uncontradicted, in ruling on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, in this case, defendant’s statement was contradicted by defendant’s own trial counsel.
Defendant’s trial counsel stated, “I did not state that there was a threat.” Instead, she advised defendant that there was the “possibility” the prosecutor could add a kidnapping charge. This advisement was based on counsel’s reading of the police report and discussions with her supervisor, not on any conversation she had with the prosecutor. Counsel further testified that she also advised defendant about the possibility of a great bodily injury enhancement being added, which would have added three years to defendant’s sentence, following the preliminary hearing.
Based on the above, we find that defendant was neither misled nor coerced into entering his plea. Contrary to defendant’s self-serving statement, defendant’s counsel never told defendant that the prosecutor threatened to add the kidnapping charge unless defendant agreed to plead guilty. Instead, she advised defendant that there was a possibility that the kidnapping charge and great bodily injury enhancement could be added based on the facts of his case. Thus, defendant was faced with the prospect of such a charge and enhancement if they could be proved at the preliminary hearing. Very often, a defendant’s decision to plead guilty is influenced by his appraisal of the prosecution’s case against him and by the likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. (People v. Hunt, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 103.) Being reluctant or unhappy with one’s choices is not the same as acting involuntarily. (Id. at p. 104.)
In conclusion, we find no evidence of coercion. Instead, we agree with the trial court that this was simply a case of “buyer’s remorse.” The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
B. Failure to Inform Defendant of a Meritorious Defense of Necessity
Defendant also contends that he established good cause to withdraw his guilty plea because his attorney failed to inform defendant that he had a potentially meritorious defense of necessity.
In defendant’s declaration, submitted in support of his motion, defendant stated that the victim was extremely intoxicated and unable to care for herself or drive herself home on the date at issue. He then claimed that the injuries suffered by the victim were the result of a struggle to get her to a place of safety, not an assault. Therefore, according to defendant, the defense of necessity was a viable defense, which defense counsel had an obligation to discuss with defendant. We disagree with defendant’s argument.
First, in direct contrast to defendant’s declaration, according to the prosecution’s opposition to defendant’s motion, the witnesses who called 911 observed defendant repeatedly beating the victim on the ground. Moreover, the victim suffered a fracture to her nose and her pelvis.
Second, according to defendant’s own declaration, defendant stated that he discussed with his trial counsel his version of what had transpired the evening in question, but his counsel felt that it did not amount to a potential defense. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, defendant’s trial counsel stated that she discussed some possible defenses with defendant. Although she did not remember specifically which defenses those were, she stated that “[w]e usually discuss how [the defenses] may play out before a jury. At least I approach the topic of the pros and cons, utilizing all the defenses that I utilize for them.”
Third, in defendant’s change of plea form, he initialed the box that provided, “I have had adequate time to discuss with my attorney . . . (3) any defenses I may have to the charges against me.” And, at the hearing, the court asked:
“Did your attorney thoroughly explain the forms to you before you signed and initialed them, to include the rights that you’d be waiving, that is, giving up, the consequences of the plea, terms of the plea agreement and discuss any possible defenses with you before you signed and initialed it?” (Italics added.)
Defendant replied, “Yes, sir.”
Based on the evidence cited above, we cannot find good cause for defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The evidence showed that defendant was fully advised of the possible defenses he had in this case. Therefore, we cannot discern an abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
III
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is affirmed.
We concur: HOLLENHORST Acting P. J., KING J.