Opinion
A156878
12-20-2019
In re C. F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C. F., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. J43924)
C.F. appeals from the juvenile court's March 22, 2019 dispositional order committing him to juvenile hall for two years with transfer to county jail on his 19th birthday. He maintains the court imposed an unauthorized sentence, to the extent it directly committed him to county jail (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (e)), and otherwise abused its discretion. We agree on the former point and affirm the dispositional order in all other respects.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
BACKGROUND
When C.F. was 16, he punched another student in the face while his coparticipant approached from behind. The coparticipant then struck the victim in the back of the head, and the two took the victim's backpack and wallet. The Solano County District attorney filed a section 602 petition alleging C.F. committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). C.F. later admitted amended allegations that he committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and was an accessory after the fact (id., § 32 [a felony]). The robbery count was dismissed. The Solano County Probation Department (the Department) recommended releasing C.F. to his parents on formal probation, observing that unresolved substance abuse and trauma may well be influencing C.F.'s criminal behavior. Consistent with that recommendation, in October 2017, C.F. was declared a ward of the juvenile court, placed on probation, and released to his parents' custody on various terms and conditions, including that he attend school regularly; abstain from using alcohol, marijuana, and illegal drugs; submit to drug testing; and abide by a curfew.
Two months later, the Department alleged C.F. violated the conditions of his probation by failing to attend school, failing to submit to drug testing, failing to obey the court-ordered curfew, and failing to follow his probation officer's directions. C.F. admitted violating probation by failing to drug test in exchange for dismissal of the remaining allegations and imposition of electronic monitoring.
Two weeks later, while he remained subject to electronic monitoring, the Solano County District Attorney filed a second wardship petition, alleging C.F. committed two new felonies: second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and attempted second degree robbery (id., §§ 211, 664). C.F. admitted the attempted robbery — during which he pointed a B.B. gun (that appeared to be a handgun) at the victim to unsuccessfully demand money — and acknowledged the juvenile court could impose up to three years and 10 months punishment. In exchange for dismissal of the robbery charge and continuation of probation, C.F. agreed to placement at Challenge Academy and to restitution. The juvenile court continued C.F.'s wardship probation and ordered him removed from his parents' custody.
Six months later, C.F. was terminated from Challenge Academy for noncompliance, including insubordination, multiple physical and verbal altercations with his peers, and attempting to sneak in Trazadone pills. He admitted another violation of his probation. At disposition, in November 2018, the juvenile court continued C.F.'s wardship, continued his probation, ordered him committed to juvenile hall for a stayed term of two years, and placed him on electronic monitoring for 90 days.
Four months later, C.F., who was then 18 years old, smoked marijuana and used cocaine. He was alleged to have violated the terms of his probation. C.F. admitted the violation and again acknowledged the juvenile court could impose up to three years and 10 months punishment. The probation report noted C.F. recently enrolled in substance abuse counseling and had been working as well as attending therapy. The Department recommended continued probation supervision in C.F.'s parents' home with electronic monitoring and court-ordered substance abuse treatment.
At a contested disposition hearing, in March 2019, the People argued for a "lengthy jail sentence." C.F.'s counsel argued for community supervision. The juvenile court continued C.F.'s wardship, committed him to juvenile hall for two years (with credit for 456 days served), and ordered that, after his 19th birthday, the remainder of his confinement would be in county jail. The court further ordered probation terminate on C.F.'s completion of the two-year term, which (with credits) was calculated to end on December 21, 2019.
DISCUSSION
A.
C.F. maintains the juvenile court's disposition order is unauthorized to the extent it directly ordered his confinement in county jail. The People concede the disposition must be modified. We agree.
It is settled that a juvenile court cannot directly commit an 18-year-old ward to county jail. (In re Ramon M. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 665, 674; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 618 (Charles G.); In re Kenny A. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) The rule flows from section 202, subdivision (e), which does not permit commitment of a ward to county jail. (Charles G., supra, at p. 618; Ramon M., supra, at p. 674.) Section 208.5 does permit housing a ward in county jail under certain circumstances. But, as the People admit ~(RB 11)~, only after a ward turns 19 can a juvenile court order the ward to be confined in a juvenile facility with the understanding that, upon the recommendation of the probation officer, he or she will be transferred to county jail. (§ 208.5, subd. (a); Charles G., supra, at pp. 612, 618-619; cf., In re R.E. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 373, 378, 381.)
Here, C.F. was 18 at the time of the challenged dispositional order and the probation officer had not recommended transfer to county jail. Accordingly, as the People concede, we must order the disposition order modified to strike the language committing C.F. to "County Jail" and ordering C.F. placed "at County Jail upon his 19th birthday."
B.
C.F. also contends the court abused its discretion in ordering him committed to juvenile hall for two years. He insists the lengthy disposition was punitive and not grounded in a legitimate purpose under juvenile court law.
1.
Our role is limited. We review a juvenile court's dispositional order for abuse of discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.) " ' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
The purposes of the juvenile delinquency laws are twofold: "(1) to serve the 'best interests' of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and 'enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,' and (2) to 'provide for the protection and safety of the public.' " (In re Charles G., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 614.) "Permissible sanctions" for a ward include, among other things, "[c]ommitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch." (§ 202, subd. (e)(4), italics added.)
2.
First, we consider the People's suggestion that C.F. forfeited any challenge to the length of his juvenile hall commitment by failing to object below. We agree. When he admitted both the attempted robbery and the final probation violation, C.F. acknowledged the juvenile court could impose up to three years and 10 months confinement. At disposition, other than objecting to the Department's calculation of credits, which was corrected, C.F. never objected to the length of his commitment.
On appeal, C.F. is not arguing that the term of his commitment was unauthorized. (See § 726, subd. (d)). He is merely arguing that the juvenile court's exercise of discretion resulted in a term that was so lengthy as to be punitive. When a ward fails to object to a discretionary dispositional choice in the juvenile court, the argument is forfeited on appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881, 885; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351, 353.) We conclude C.F. forfeited his challenge to the length of his juvenile hall commitment.
3.
Even if we assume the forfeiture can be excused because an objection to the length of the commitment would have been futile, C.F.'s contention is unpersuasive on its merits.
We agree with C.F. that "juvenile proceedings are primarily 'rehabilitative' [citation], and punishment in the form of 'retribution' is disallowed [citation]." (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507; accord, § 202.) But we do not read the record, as C.F. does, to suggest the juvenile court committed him to juvenile hall for a determinate term of two years as retribution. Instead, the court considered the current circumstances and explained its reasoning: "[C.F.] has not availed himself of the opportunities that the probation department has given him and . . . in this last instance, I . . . [¶] . . . made it very clear to him that he was exhausting all the opportunities that were available to him . . . in juvenile court. [¶] . . . [¶] And I allowed him to be released as probation recommended [with respect to the prior probation violation]. And he violated the terms and conditions of his probation in less than one month. . . . [¶] . . . I don't have the authority to sentence him to the Division of Juvenile Facilities but if I did, I would. Because . . . his record at this point in time and his performance on probation is horrible and he has exhausted all the available programs that are here. [¶] So the only thing that I can do to both protect the community . . . and still try to reform [C.F.]'s behavior before he is lost for all purposes is make it more painful for him than it is to go out and continue to use cocaine, marijuana, ignore rules and pretend that that the orders that I made are recommendations."
Given C.F.'s age, his history of committing violent offenses (even after juvenile court intervention), his repeated violation of probation conditions, and his prior failed attempts at rehabilitation in less restrictive settings, the juvenile court understandably believed it had limited remaining options. The governing law explicitly acknowledges that punishment can aid a ward's rehabilitation by holding him or her accountable. (§ 202, subd. (b).) The record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that the ordered disposition would protect public safety, hold C.F. accountable, and serve C.F.'s interest in avoiding a future state prison term. (See In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1207 [minimum term of confinement in camp serves rehabilitation by emphasizing seriousness of minor's conduct]; In re Ricardo M. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 744, 749.) C.F. has not shown the juvenile court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional language committing C.F. to "County Jail" and ordering C.F. placed "at County Jail upon his 19th birthday" is stricken. In all other respects, the dispositional order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BURNS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
JONES, P. J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.