Opinion
641 KA 11-00414
06-12-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Albert BURNICE, Defendant–Appellant.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Mary P. Davison of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nancy Gilligan of Counsel), for Respondent.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Mary P. Davison of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nancy Gilligan of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND DeJOSEPH, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty to two counts of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2] ). We agree with defendant that the waiver of the right to appeal was not valid inasmuch as it is not evident from the record that County Court (Keenan, J.) determined that defendant understood the consequences of that waiver (see People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264–265, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645 ; People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ). Furthermore, the court did not advise defendant that the waiver included a challenge to the severity of the sentence (see People v. Maracle, 19 N.Y.3d 925, 928, 950 N.Y.S.2d 498, 973 N.E.2d 1272 ; People v. Pimentel, 108 A.D.3d 861, 862, 969 N.Y.S.2d 574, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1076, 974 N.Y.S.2d 325, 997 N.E.2d 150 ). In any event, we conclude that defendant's challenge to the negotiated sentence as unduly harsh and severe is without merit.
We reject defendant's further contention that the court abused its discretion by refusing to accept defendant's initial plea to one count of the indictment after defendant stated that the court threatened and pressured him into accepting the plea (see People v. Mercado, 226 A.D.2d 1125, 1125, 642 N.Y.S.2d 135, lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 968, 647 N.Y.S.2d 722, 670 N.E.2d 1354 ). We also reject defendant's contention that County Court (Argento, J.) misapprehended its authority when it failed to issue a “violent felony override” upon the retirement of the judge who had reserved on defendant's request for such an override at the time of sentencing. Judge Argento properly noted that there is no procedure for the issuance of such a document. Indeed, “no regulation or statute provides for such a document” (People v. Ellis, 123 A.D.3d 1054, 1054, 997 N.Y.S.2d 317 ; see generally People v. Massey, 111 A.D.3d 1359, 1359, 974 N.Y.S.2d 838 ). To the extent that the provisions of 7 NYCRR 1900.4(c)(1)(iii) are utilized by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in determining whether certain inmates are eligible for institutional programming (see generally People v. Dozier, 109 A.D.3d 838, 840, 971 N.Y.S.2d 128, lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1040, 981 N.Y.S.2d 374, 4 N.E.3d 386 ; Matter of Clow v. Coughlin, 222 A.D.2d 781, 781–782, 634 N.Y.S.2d 823 ), we note that defendant was not prevented by the court from obtaining documentation from the court or the District Attorney indicating that no weapons were used in these offenses and that no person sustained a serious injury.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.