[9] Evidence which merely establishes facts from which the falsity of an alleged perjured statement may or may not be inferred does not meet the requirement of the direct evidence rule applicable to perjury cases. ( People v. Maxwell, supra, 118 Cal. 50, 54; People v. O'Donnell, supra, 132 Cal.App.2d 840, 846-849; People v. Burcham, supra, 69 Cal.App. 614, 616-619; People v. Burcham, 62 Cal.App. 649, 656 [ 217 P. 558].) [8b] In the case at bar the testimony just related was supplemented by that of three handwriting experts who testified that, in their opinion, the defendant wrote the questioned endorsement "Rita Burney"; based their opinions upon a comparison of this endorsement with the handwriting exemplars of the defendant which were admitted in evidence; and detailed their reasons therefor, pointing out areas of similarity between the endorsement signature and the handwriting exemplars.
His testimony was therefore of a different character but to the same point as that of Mrs. Whitehouse, viz., that Homotoff was not at a Los Angeles theatre with defendant herein, as testified to by her, and that her testimony in that regard was therefore false. The cases of People v. Burcham, 62 Cal.App. 649 [ 217 P. 558], and People v. Layman, 117 Cal.App. 476 [ 4 P.2d 244], cited and relied upon by appellant are not therefore applicable to the facts here present. Even though it be conceded that the composite testimony of Taube and Mrs. Whitehouse must be regarded as the equivalent only of the testimony of one witness, there remains the corroborative testimony of Mary Lacey that the company by which she was employed printed the programs for the Mayan Theatre in Los Angeles and that the program that defendant testified she received at the theatre in Los Angeles on the evening of July 23, 1941, was not printed until after August 27, 1941.
None of the street-cars in charge of the motormen had been in an accident, according to their testimony. This composite testimony of the motormen is, of course, the equivalent of that of but one witness to the fact that no accident had taken place ( People v. Burcham, (1923) 62 Cal.App. 649 [ 217 P. 558]), and the law requires another witness or proof of corroborating circumstances. (Sec. 1103a, Pen. Code; sec. 1968, Code Civ. Proc.) [2] This proof we do not find, as respondent suggests we may, in the failure of appellant to produce testimony.
The judgment in that case was reversed. ( People v. Burcham, 62 Cal.App. 649 [ 217 P. 558].) The opinion therein contains a comprehensive statement of the facts which show the materiality of the alleged false testimony charged in that action and in this, and no general restatement of such facts is necessary here.