Opinion
15639 Ind. No. 3201/16 Case No. 2017–2574
03-31-2022
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Melik BULLOCK, Defendant–Appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (De´sire´e Sheridan of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Michael D. Tarbutton of counsel), for responde
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (De´sire´e Sheridan of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Michael D. Tarbutton of counsel), for responde
Renwick, J.P., Gesmer, Singh, Rodriguez, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert M. Stolz, J.), rendered March 29, 2017, as amended August 2 and 3, 2017, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of five years, consecutive to a sentence imposed in Bronx County, unanimously modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of vacating the surcharge and fees imposed at sentencing, and otherwise affirmed. The court lawfully resentenced defendant. Ten days after defendant pleaded guilty under three indictments in Bronx County to first-degree robbery and attempted robbery in three separate incidents, defendant committed the instant attempted robbery in Manhattan. Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree robbery in exchange for a promised sentence of five years, to run consecutively to the sentences that would be imposed for the Bronx crimes, with all parties expecting that the Bronx sentence would be imposed first. The court adjourned the proceedings for sentencing after the anticipated sentencing date in the Bronx. After an additional adjournment, the court imposed the promised consecutive sentence, under the factually mistaken belief that defendant had already been sentenced in Bronx County. The New York County sentence was illegal, only because a court may not impose a sentence to run consecutively to a sentence in another case where the defendant has not yet been sentenced (see Penal Law 70.25[1] ; People v. Clapper, 133 A.D.3d 1036, 1036–1037, 19 N.Y.S.3d 194 [3d Dept. 2015] ). However, the promised consecutive sentence would have been within the court's lawful authority had the facts been as the court mistakenly believed, that is, that the Bronx sentence had been imposed first (compare People v. Barthel, 199 A.D.3d 32, 38–44, 153 N.Y.S.3d 382 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1058, 154 N.Y.S.3d 628, 176 N.E.3d 664 [2021] ).
Accordingly, the court had the inherent authority to correct the error that rendered the sentence unlawful (see People v. DeValle, 94 N.Y.2d 870, 871–872, 704 N.Y.S.2d 924, 726 N.E.2d 476 [2000] ). When the court set aside its illegal consecutive sentence, the Bronx court had already imposed sentence on the Bronx robberies. Thus, New York County Supreme Court was "the last judge in the sentencing chain" and had the discretion to reimpose consecutive sentences ( Matter of Murray v. Goord, 1 N.Y.3d 29, 32, 769 N.Y.S.2d 165, 801 N.E.2d 385 [2003] ). Even where the judge is last in the chain because the first sentence in the chain was vacated and then reimposed, the last judge's choice of concurrent or consecutive sentences controls ( Murray, 1 N.Y.3d at 32, 769 N.Y.S.2d 165, 801 N.E.2d 385 ; see People v. Clapper, 153 A.D.3d 1452, 1453, 59 N.Y.S.3d 719 [3d Dept. 2017] ).
Further, CPL 430.10 does not prevent a court from exercising its "inherent authority to correct illegal sentences" (see People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 212, 899 N.Y.S.2d 76, 925 N.E.2d 878 [2010], cert denied 562 U.S. 947, 131 S.Ct. 125, 178 L.Ed.2d 242 [2010] ). While CPL 430.10 prohibits a judge from changing a sentence once a defendant has begun serving it, the statute applies only where "such sentence is in accordance with law." Finally, even if the court could have rendered its sentence lawful by simply resentencing defendant to a term that was concurrent with the Bronx sentence, it was under no obligation to do so.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.
Based on our own interest of justice powers and the People's consent, we vacate the surcharge and fees imposed at sentencing (see People v. Chirinos, 190 A.D.3d 434, 135 N.Y.S.3d 641 [1st Dept. 2021] ).