People v. Brust

38 Citing cases

  1. People v. Love

    53 Cal.2d 843 (Cal. 1960)   Cited 122 times
    In Love, the jury saw a photograph of the murder victim lying dead on a hospital table; the photograph showed the expression of her face in death.

    [15] The remoteness in time of the events being proved, the availability of less inflammatory methods of imparting to the jury the same or substantially the same information, and the bearing of the evidence on the several objectives of punishment are among the many factors to be considered. (See People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 767-768 [ 306 P.2d 463]; People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 792 [ 306 P.2d 480].) [16] In the present case it is clear that the challenged evidence had no significant probative value.

  2. People v. Ireland

    70 Cal.2d 522 (Cal. 1969)   Cited 438 times
    In Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, our Supreme Court held that a felony-murder theory cannot be based on a felony that is an integral part of the homicide.

    It is clear at the outset that the declarant Ann's state of mind on the day of her death was not itself an issue in the case (cf. People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Convertible Coupe (1955) 45 Cal.2d 613, 620-622 [ 290 P.2d 538, 55 A.L.R.2d 1272]; Adkins v. Brett (1920) 184 Cal. 252, 255-256 [ 193 P. 251]) and that the hearsay statement was therefore not admissible under subdivision (a) (1) of section 1250 The People's reliance on People v. Brust (1957) 47 Cal.2d 776 [ 306 P.2d 480], in this regard is wholly misplaced. There the defense sought to introduce two statements made by the victim some months before the homicide, and one statement made the afternoon before the homicide, in order to support its theory "that a long-continued provocatory course of conduct of Mrs. Brust culminated in bringing defendant to a point where his capacity for cool deliberation was substantially impaired."

  3. People v. Arguello

    65 Cal.2d 768 (Cal. 1967)   Cited 23 times

    The evidence, however, was not objectionable as hearsay since it was admitted solely as evidence of the deceased's state of mind. ( People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 784-785 [ 306 P.2d 480]; see also People v. Atchley, 53 Cal.2d 160, 171-172 [ 346 P.2d 764]; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) p. 429; McCormick on Evidence, pp. 465-466, 567; 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1790.) The statements tended to show that the deceased was fearful especially of strangers, a matter relevant to the prosecution's theory that the murderer was not a stranger to her.

  4. People v. Wein

    50 Cal.2d 383 (Cal. 1958)   Cited 268 times
    In People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383 [ 326 P.2d 457], we applied Chessman to uphold the defendant's convictions of kidnapping for robbery, with infliction of bodily harm, for which he also had received the death penalty.

    Section 209, in committing this determination to the discretion of the jury, sets no limits. Rather, the language used in the instructions here seems entirely proper in the light of our decision in People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776 [ 306 P.2d 480]. In affirming the death penalty for multiple murders, we there held that the jurors had been correctly instructed and that they were to select the penalty on the basis of ". . . a thorough consideration of all the evidence.

  5. People v. Lyles

    B270897 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018)

    Appellant contends that the trial court excluded Okihiro's testimony that he heard Castaneda say he was going to kill appellant on the ground the statement was too remote in time, and because Okihiro's testimony was inadmissible hearsay. According to appellant, People v. Brust (1957) 47 Cal.2d 776 (Brust) establishes that the statement was neither too remote nor hearsay. Appellant's contention lacks merit because Castaneda's statement was offered for a hearsay purpose, and appellant failed to establish a hearsay exception.

  6. People v. Lyles

    B270897 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017)

    Appellant contends that the trial court excluded Okihiro's testimony that he heard Castaneda say he was going to kill appellant on the ground the statement was too remote in time, and because Okihiro's testimony was inadmissible hearsay. According to appellant, People v. Brust (1957) 47 Cal.2d 776 (Brust) establishes that the statement was neither too remote nor hearsay. Appellant's contention lacks merit because Castaneda's statement was offered for a hearsay purpose, and appellant failed to establish a hearsay exception.

  7. People v. Nieto Benitez

    4 Cal.4th 91 (Cal. 1992)   Cited 288 times
    Defining second-degree, implied malice murder

    Second degree murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without the additional elements — i.e., willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation — that would support a conviction of first degree murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189; People v. Jeter (1964) 60 Cal.2d 671, 675 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 323, 388 P.2d 355]; People v. Brust (1957) 47 Cal.2d 776, 783 [ 306 P.2d 480]; People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903-904 [ 156 P.2d 7]; 1 Witkin Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d. ed. 1988) Crimes Against the Person, § 486, pp. 548-549.) In contrast, manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.

  8. People v. Mabry

    71 Cal.2d 430 (Cal. 1969)   Cited 32 times

    ere with that determination since it has "no power to substitute its judgment as to choice of penalty for that of the trier of fact." ( In re Anderson and Saterfield, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, 623; People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal.2d 307, 327 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 608, 425 P.2d 208]; People v. Mitchell, 63 Cal.2d 805, 821 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211]; People v. Welch, 58 Cal.2d 271, 275 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 363, 373 P.2d 427]; People v. Love,supra, 56 Cal.2d 720, 728; People v. Howk, 56 Cal.2d 687, 700 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426]; People v. Lindsey, 56 Cal.2d 324, 328 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 678, 363 P.2d 910]; People v. Monk, 56 Cal.2d 288, 300 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865]; People v. Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 734-735 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645]; People v. Moore, supra, 53 Cal.2d 451, 454; People v. Cash, 52 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 345 P.2d 462]; People v. Linden, 52 Cal.2d 1, 26-27 [ 338 P.2d 397]; People v. Feldkamp, 51 Cal.2d 237, 241 [ 331 P.2d 632]; People v. Borchers, 50 Cal.2d 321 [ 325 P.2d 97]; People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 792 [ 306 P.2d 480]; People v. Green, 47 Cal.2d 209, 235 [ 302 P.2d 307]; People v. Carmen, 43 Cal.2d 342, 351 [ 273 P.2d 521]; People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 200, 213 [ 266 P.2d 505]; People v. Ortega, 41 Cal.2d 621, 622 [ 262 P.2d 2]; People v. Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 493 [ 261 P.2d 241]; People v. Harrison, 41 Cal.2d 216, 219 [ 258 P.2d 1016]; People v. Dessauer, 38 Cal.2d 547, 555 [ 241 P.2d 238]; cf. People v. Talbot, 64 Cal.2d 691, 712 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 417, 414 P.2d 633]; People v. Ashley, 59 Cal.2d 339, 365 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 16, 379 P.2d 496].) Although none of these cases purports to derive this rule from the language of subdivision 7 of section 1181, the majority would apparently nonetheless hold that subdivision 7 has been construed by reiteration and, since some of the later cases refer to the power of the trial court under subdivision 7, by implication.

  9. People v. Lew

    68 Cal.2d 774 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 61 times
    In Lew, although the court determined that the murder victim's out-of-court statements that the defendant had threatened to kill her were relevant to an issue raised by the defense, the evidence was deemed inadmissible, in part, because the statements referred to the defendant's past acts, rather than threats of future conduct.

    Although "declarations directly asserting the existence of a mental condition on the part of the decedent-declarant, and not including a description of the past conduct of a third person that may have caused that mental condition, are and should be admissible, they should be admitted only where there is at least circumstantial evidence that they are probably trustworthy and credible. As was said by this court in People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 785 [ 306 P.2d 480], in quoting from People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401, 421 [ 164 P.2d 753], such declarations are `admissible only if there appears to be a necessity for that type of evidence and a circumstantial probability of its trustworthiness (V Wigmore, p. 202, § 1420). . . . The death of the declarant creates the necessity for resort to hearsay and the declarations, being those of a present existing state of mind, made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion, carry the probability of truthworthiness [ sic]. (VI Wigmore, § 1725, p. 80.)' (See also McCormick. Evidence (1954), § 268, p. 568.) Wigmore also has stated that such declarations are admissible only when they are `made at a time when there was no motive to deceive.'

  10. People v. Howk

    56 Cal.2d 687 (Cal. 1961)   Cited 39 times

    In evaluating the evidence the jury was bound by the instructions given as to the limited purpose for which certain evidence was admitted, but beyond that it could draw its own inferences, determine the probative weight of evidence, and select the appropriate penalty on the basis of its evaluation of the evidence. ( People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776, 787-790 [ 306 P.2d 480]; People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 767-768 [ 306 P.2d 463].)" Counsel for Abdullah argues that the Purvis case, and the cases upon which it relies, were wrongly decided.