Opinion
570012/21
10-12-2021
The People of the State of New York, Appellant v. Kareem Brown, Defendant-Respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
PRESENT: Edmead, P.J., Brigantti, Hagler, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The People appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Wanda L. Licitra, J.), dated July 9, 2020, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 30.30.
Order (Wanda L. Licitra, J.), dated July 9, 2020, reversed, on the law, defendant's speedy trial motion denied, and accusatory instrument reinstated.
Defendant was arraigned on the misdemeanor complaint on May 4, 2019 and, pursuant to CPL 30.30(1)(b), the People had 90 days to be ready for trial. The People concede on this appeal that they are properly chargeable with 56 days of delay up until May 4, 2019, an additional 10 days between January 24, 2020 and February 3, 2020, and 13 days from February 27, 2020 to March 11, 2020, for a total of 79 days of includable time. The People argue, however, that in granting defendant's CPL 30.30 motion, Criminal Court erroneously charged them with 23 days of delay for January 1, 2020 to January 24, 2020. We agree and, therefore, reverse.
As is relevant here, on November 25, 2019, the People answered ready but defense counsel was actually engaged. At defendant's request, the matter was adjourned to January 24, 2020. Thus, the entire adjournment period from November 25, 2019 to January 24, 2020 was excludable as an adjournment at defendant's request pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(b), notwithstanding that CPL 30.30(5) became effective on January 1, 2020. Contrary to the conclusion reached below, CPL 30.30(5), which requires that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of [CPL] section 245.20" (CPL 30.30[5]), did not retroactively vitiate the People's statement of readiness made on November 25, 2019 or affect the excludability of adjournments granted "on defense counsel's consent, or actual engagement on trial" (Matter of People ex rel. LaBrew v Vance, 192 A.D.3d 645 [2021]; see People v Freeman, 71 Misc.3d 138 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50470[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2021]; People v Jaquez, 71 Misc.3d 1110 [Sup Ct, NY County 2021]). When the period of January 1 to January 24 is excluded, the chargeable time is 79 days, which is under the statutory period of 90 days.
Defendant's argument that the court erred in failing to charge the People for the period between February 3, 2020 and February 27, 2020, is an unpreserved, alternate ground for affirmance, which we may not consider on the People's appeal (see CPL 470.15[1]; People v LaFontaine, 92 N.Y.2d 470, 474 [1998]; see also People v Concepcion, 17 N.Y.3d 192 [2011]).
I concur