Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 050605121
Jones, P.J.
Appellant Luke Wayne Brockman appeals his conviction for receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) He contends: (1) the People did not establish the corpus delicti of the crime of receiving stolen property; (2) CALCRIM No. 376, the jury instruction regarding recently stolen property, was “erroneous, unconstitutional, and prejudicial;” and (3) CALCRIM No. 359, the jury instruction regarding corpus delicti, was “fatally confusing” and “did not permit conviction.”
Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year.”
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Benjamin Gledhill rebuilt his 1985 Toyota truck for “rock crawling,” a form of off-road driving where drivers traverse harsh terrain and take cars over “rugged, big rocks.” Gledhill customized several parts of the truck, including the wheels, body, and rear bumper. On November 22, 2004, he parked the truck in front of his house in El Sobrante. The next morning, he discovered that his truck was missing and called the police.
On November 24, 2004, Gledhill, his brother, Richard, and a friend went to the wooded area adjacent to Castro Ranch Road to look for Gledhill’s truck. When they arrived, Gledhill saw four trucks that had been flipped onto their sides and “stripped” of their valuable parts. One truck was hanging from a tree and was stripped “of pretty much everything you could strip on a truck.”
Gledhill’s friend suggested that Gledhill look for his truck in the wooded area near Castro Ranch Road because the friend’s stolen truck was found there. We refer to this wooded area as Castro Ranch Road.
Eventually, Gledhill found his truck. The tires were missing and the truck was “partially dismantled. Some of the axles and other parts were [sitting] right next to the truck and it was in the process of being stripped.” Gledhill noticed that the truck had been “jacked up” and that the ground underneath it had been removed to permit access to the parts on the truck’s undercarriage. The truck’s custom-made rear bumper was still attached, but the ignition had been “hot-wired” — wires were “hanging down from the ignition switch” so that someone could “touch a couple [of] wires together . . . and start the engine.” When Gledhill saw the parts next to his truck, he became “concerned” because he thought there “was obviously some thieving . . . going on.”
Neither the Pinole Police Department nor the California Highway Patrol were able to assist Gledhill, so he decided to “monitor the area” himself. He “raked out the dirt” at the entrance to Castro Ranch Road and “kept that area clean of any tire tracks.” Gledhill then checked the area periodically throughout the night to see if any cars entered the area. Gledhill did not see any tire tracks.
At approximately 7:30 a.m. the following morning, November 25, 2004, Gledhill and his nephew went to appellant’s house. Gledhill’s nephew knew appellant. When they arrived, Gledhill saw appellant and another man standing outside the house, next to a red Toyota 4x4 truck that belonged to appellant. It appeared as though appellant and the other man had been working on the truck: they were covered in grease and appellant told Gledhill that they were “doing a fuel injection conversion.” Before it was stolen, Gledhill’s truck had a custom exhaust header that “looked identical to the one that [appellant] had on [his] truck.”
Gledhill left appellant’s house and returned to Castro Ranch Road with his brother and his brother’s friend, Forest Evert. Gledhill went there to “check to make sure the truck was in the same condition [as] the night before” and to make sure that no one had “tamper[ed] with it.” The three men did not see any tire tracks. They took a few pictures and raked the area near the entrance so that Gledhill could “keep on the surveillance.” The men then left the area.
At approximately 11:30 a.m., Gledhill and Forest returned to Castro Ranch Road to monitor the tire tracks and to see if anyone left the area with the parts from Gledhill’s truck. They saw one set of tire tracks going into the area, but no tracks going out. Richard joined the two men about 30 minutes later. Gledhill and Forest waited in Gledhill’s truck at the entrance to Castro Ranch Road; Richard waited across the street in his truck. About two and a half hours later, Gledhill and Richard saw appellant driving a truck toward the exit of Castro Ranch Road. Gledhill noticed some of the parts from his truck — his boiler exhaust and his 35-inch tires — “sticking out over the bed” of appellant’s truck. When appellant saw Gledhill, he immediately drove away from Gledhill, out of Castro Ranch Road, and toward Pinole Valley Road.
Gledhill and Richard followed appellant in their respective vehicles. Appellant accelerated, forcing Gledhill and Richard to speed up to keep up with him. Appellant drove into a residential area, ran several stop signs, and turned the wrong way down a one-way street. Forest called the police several times; he finally reached the police as the cars approached Highway 80. All three cars stopped at a red light; Gledhill yelled at appellant, “pull over, you have half my fucking truck in the back of your truck.” Appellant drove away but was eventually stopped by several police cars on Pinole Valley Road near a police station. The area where the chase ended was approximately two miles from appellant’s house.
Appellant testified that Gledhill and Richard were trying to run him off of the road and were brandishing baseball bats.
That same afternoon, Pinole Police Officer Matthew Messier received a report that “a few subjects [were] following a Ford truck which was in possession of stolen vehicle parts.” He went to the area where the chase ended and arrested appellant. After being Mirandized, appellant told Messier that he found the truck in an area where his acquaintances dumped stolen cars. Appellant explained that “he believed the [truck] was stolen . . . but he was not sure that it was stolen.” He admitted to Messier “that he had been taking parts off [of] that truck to place onto his vehicle.” Appellant ended the conversation with Messier by saying, “I really fucked up this time.” Various parts from Gledhill’s truck were in the bed of appellant’s truck, including the fuel injection wiring harness, the starter, the instrument cluster, and the regulator. A toolbox, a screwdriver, and a folding tool similar to a Swiss Army Knife were also in appellant’s truck.
Later that day, Gledhill and Messier went to appellant’s house. On the street in front of the house, Gledhill and Messier saw appellant’s Toyota 4x4 truck. The exhaust header from Gledhill’s car was now bolted onto the truck and a few of Gledhill’s custom axle shackles were next to the truck “as if they were going to be placed on to it.” On the side of the house — behind the fence — Gledhill saw “a whole bunch more of [his] parts.” Gledhill knew that these parts belonged to him because they had unique identifying features. According to Gledhill, the parts at appellant’s house represented “basically the whole truck” that had been stolen.
After appellant’s arrest, Gledhill returned to Castro Ranch Road, where he noticed that his “truck was way more stripped down” than when he saw it in Castro Ranch Road before appellant was arrested.
At trial, appellant testified that he and his cousin went off-roading at Castro Ranch Road on the afternoon of November 24, 2004. He explained that there is a second entrance to the area, but he did not testify that he used that entrance. While they were off-roading, appellant saw “[m]iscellaneous” parts from a Toyota “scattered” on the ground throughout the area. Appellant was in the process of rebuilding his truck, so he and his cousin gathered parts as they drove through the area. The two men eventually returned to appellant’s house and installed one of the parts onto appellant’s truck. The two men dumped the rest of the parts in the yard next to appellant’s house.
The next morning, on November 25, 2004, appellant went back to Castro Ranch Road to look for additional parts. Appellant picked up wire harnesses, spark plugs, tires, and a bumper. Appellant testified that he did not remove any parts from Gledhill’s truck. He also denied telling Messier that there were stolen cars in Castro Ranch Road and that he believed Gledhill’s truck was stolen.
A jury convicted appellant of violating section 496, subdivision (a). The court sentenced appellant to two years’ probation and 120 days in jail.
DISCUSSION
As stated above, appellant challenges his conviction on three grounds. He contends that the People did not establish the corpus delicti of the crime of receiving stolen property. He also contends that two jury instructions — CALCRIM No. 376 and CALCRIM No. 359 — were erroneous and prejudicial.
Appellant’s Corpus Delicti Claim Fails
Appellant contends that the People did not prove the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property because there was no evidence — beyond appellant’s statements to Messier — that he knew the truck parts were stolen. The People argue that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a reasonable inference that appellant knew the truck parts were stolen. We agree.
“In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself — i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169.) The general rule is that the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying solely on the defendant’s “extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions.” (Id. at p. 1169.) The corpus delicti of receiving stolen property consists of two elements: the receipt of stolen property and the knowledge that the property was stolen. (People v. Barnes (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 744; People v. Riccio (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000-1001; see also People v. Hawkins (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 [“[f]or a variety of crimes, it is often held that the corpus delicti includes evidence of the defendant’s mental state”].)
On review, we examine the record for “some evidence” of the corpus delicti. (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) The evidence may be circumstantial, and “is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible.” (Id. at p. 1171; see also People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 553.) And once the prosecution has provided the “necessary quantum of independent evidence” to establish the corpus delicti, “the defendant’s extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues.” (Alvarez, supra, at p. 1171.)
Appellant does not cite any cases where the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property. Such cases are “rare” (Riccio, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000) because “[p]ossession of stolen property, accompanied by suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference that the property was received with knowledge that it had been stolen.” (Barnes, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 745; see also People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 696 [“[p]ossession of a stolen item . . . is a factor which could assist a reasonable person in formulating a strong suspicion that the recipient knew the item was stolen”].)
A number of courts have rejected the very argument appellant makes here — that there was insufficient evidence to establish the knowledge element of the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property. (See, e.g., Riccio, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1000-1001; People v. Wheeldin (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 744, 748 [prosecution satisfied corpus delicti of receiving stolen property where circumstantial evidence established defendant’s “guilty knowledge”]; People v. Putty (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 991, 997 [prosecution established corpus delicti of receiving stolen property; bulk sale of “highly valuable” tools under suspicious circumstances was sufficient to support an inference that appellant knowingly received stolen property]; Barnes, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 745 [evidence was sufficient to establish corpus delicti of receiving stolen property where defendant possessed garbage disposals and attempted to sell them for less than the wholesale price].) Riccio is instructive. There, the defendant argued that the prosecution did not establish one of the elements of the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property: that he knew the property was stolen. The court rejected this argument and explained that circumstantial evidence — including defendant’s effort to sell a unique and recently-stolen coin collection without proof of ownership — established “a reasonable inference of such knowledge.” (Riccio, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001, original italics.)
As in Riccio, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a “reasonable inference” that appellant knew the truck (and the parts on the truck) were stolen. First, appellant possessed recently stolen property: just two days after Gledhill discovered that his truck was stolen, the custom exhaust header from his truck was bolted on to appellant’s truck and parts from Gledhill’s truck were in the bed of appellant’s truck and in his yard. Second, there is sufficient evidence to create a reasonable inference that appellant took the parts off of Gledhill’s truck and did not, as he testified, find them “scattered” around the area. Two separate pieces of evidence support this inference: (1) the presence of a single set of tire tracks at the entrance to Castro Ranch Road; and (2) the stripped down state of Gledhill’s truck after appellant left the site. As noted above, Gledhill raked the entrance to the site before starting his surveillance. He monitored the entrance to Castro Ranch Road and observed only one set of tire tracks. A few hours later, as Gledhill waited at the entrance, he saw appellant’s truck driving toward the exit. Appellant’s testimony at trial does not render unreasonable the inference that appellant was the only person to visit Castro Ranch Road after Gledhill’s truck was stolen. Appellant testified that there were two entrances to Castro Ranch Road, but he did not testify that he used that entrance. Moreover, Gledhill’s truck was “way more stripped down” after appellant left Castro Ranch Road than when Gledhill saw his truck there for the first time. Together, this evidence creates a reasonable inference that appellant was the only person to visit Castro Ranch Road after Gledhill’s truck was stolen, and that he took the parts off of the truck.
Third, the stripped down state of Gledhill’s truck suggests that appellant knew the truck was stolen. Gledhill’s truck was hoisted high in the air and positioned so that parts from the truck’s undercarriage could be removed. It was also hotwired, suggesting that it had been taken and driven without the owner’s permission. Even ignoring the evidence that appellant knew the truck itself was stolen, circumstantial evidence supports an inference that he knew the customized components he possessed were stolen. On the afternoon of November 25, 2004, Gledhill observed appellant at Castro Ranch Road with several custom parts that had previously been bolted to Gledhill’s truck. When appellant saw Gledhill and his companions, appellant turned away from them and fled.
Taken together, this evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable inference — independent of appellant’s out-of-court statements — that appellant knowingly possessed stolen property. To satisfy the corpus delicti rule, the “quantum of evidence” required is “quite modest” and need only create a reasonable inference that the crime occurred. (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 367-368 [for purposes of the corpus delicti rule, the evidence need not create “the only, or even the most compelling,” inference that the crime has occurred].) Accordingly, the prosecution established the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property, and appellant’s argument to the contrary fails.
The Court Did Not Err By Instructing the Jury with CALCRIM No. 376
Appellant next contends that the giving of CALCRIM No. 376 — which instructed the jury on possession of recently stolen property as evidence of a crime — was “erroneous, unconstitutional, and prejudicial.” “An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.) To assess appellant’s “claim of error, we consider the entire charge to the jury and not simply the asserted deficiencies in the challenged instruction.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 649.)
Over defense counsel’s objection, the court gave the jury CALCRIM No. 376, which provides: “If you conclude that the defendant knew he possessed property and you conclude that the property had in fact been recently stolen, you may not convict the defendant of Receiving Stolen Property based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove his guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove he committed the crime of Receiving Stolen Property. [¶] The supporting evidence need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, where, and when the defendant possessed the property, along with any other relevant circumstances tending to prove his guilt of Receiving Stolen Property. [¶] Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Appellant’s principal argument is that the jury could have been misled by the statement that the corroborating evidence “need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to prove guilt.” Following appellant’s logic, the jury could have used appellant’s out-of-court statements as corroborating evidence which, in turn, would violate the corpus delicti rule. We disagree. The jury had already been instructed that appellant could not be convicted based solely on his out-of-court statements. We presume the jury followed the instructions it was given. (People v. Felix (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 865, review den. June 11, 2008.)
As discussed above, the prosecution established the knowledge element of the corpus delicti of receiving stolen property. The suspicious circumstances surrounding appellant’s possession of the stolen truck parts and his flight from Castro Ranch Road create a reasonable inference that appellant knew the truck was stolen. And once the prosecution established the corpus delicti, appellant’s out-of-court statements were admissible “to strengthen the case on all issues.” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) Accordingly, the jury could properly rely on appellant’s out-of-court statements as supporting evidence tending to prove appellant’s guilt.
But even without appellant’s out-of-court statements, the corroborating evidence was more than “slight” (CALCRIM No. 376) and “naturally and reasonably support an inference of guilt” when considered with appellant’s possession of recently-stolen truck parts. (O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1576.) The circumstances of appellant’s possession tend to prove that appellant knew the truck — and the parts on the truck — were stolen. Gledhill’s truck was stripped and located in a remote area, surrounded by other vehicles that had been stripped. The truck was hoisted high in the air and positioned so that parts from the truck’s undercarriage could be removed. The truck was also hotwired. The evidence also suggested that appellant was the only person to visit Castro Ranch Road after Gledhill’s truck was stolen: appellant did not deny using the main entrance to the area, and Gledhill saw a single set of tire tracks at the entrance and appellant leaving. Finally, appellant fled after he saw Gledhill at the entrance to the site, suggesting an awareness of guilt.
We also reject appellant’s other complaints regarding CALCRIM No. 376. The instruction correctly informed the jury that possession of stolen property, by itself, is insufficient to convict a defendant under section 496, subdivision (a). It also accurately stated the law “regarding mental state inferences to be drawn from possession of stolen property” and instructed the jury that the prosecution must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577.) Contrary to appellant’s argument, the instruction does permit the jury to consider appellant’s explanation for his possession of the truck parts. As the O’Dell court explained, “allowing the jury to disbelieve a defendant’s version of events is not the same as permitting the jury to disregard his or her explanation. CALCRIM No. 376 does not suggest that the jury may ignore a defendant’s evidence.” (O’Dell, supra, at p. 1576, original italics.)
As a result, we conclude that CALCRIM No. 376 correctly states the law and that giving the jury that instruction was not erroneous. (O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577; People v. Solórzano (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1033-1036.)
The Court Properly Instructed the Jury Regarding Corpus Delicti
Finally, appellant contends that CALCRIM No. 359, the jury instruction pertaining to corpus delicti, was “fatally confusing” and did not “permit conviction.” Although appellant did not object to the instruction in the court below, we will nevertheless consider the merits of his argument on appeal. (§ 1259.) We apply the same standard of review as stated above.
The court instructed the jury as follows: “The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on his out-of-court statements alone. Unless you conclude that other evidence shows someone committed the charged crime, you may not rely on any out-of-court statements by the defendant to convict him. [¶] The other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that someone’s criminal conduct caused an injury, loss, or harm. The other evidence does not have to be prove [sic] beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged crime actually was committed. [¶] The identity of the person who committed the crime may be proved by the defendant’s statements alone. [¶] You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Original italics.)
According to appellant, the word “someone” in the jury instruction confused the jury into thinking that appellant could be convicted of the crime even if someone other than appellant was the only one who knew the truck was stolen. The problem with this argument is that there is no indication in the record that the jury was confused. The jury was repeatedly instructed that it could not convict appellant unless the prosecution proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It found appellant guilty of receiving stolen property. To do so, the jury must have determined that the prosecution established that appellant received stolen property and that he knew the property had been stolen.
In his reply brief, appellant contends that his “objection is greater than the concern about identity. . .” According to appellant, CALCRIM No. 359 allowed the jury to rely on appellant’s out-of-court statements. But CALCRIM Nos. 359 and 376 represent two different rules. CALCRIM No. 359 informs the jury that the prosecution must present at least slight evidence of all elements of the crime, independent of the defendant’s out-of-court statements. CALCRIM No. 376 states a different rule: possession of recently stolen property is not sufficient to establish guilt of receiving stolen property, i.e. possession of recently stolen property does not necessarily establish that the defendant knew the property was stolen. The rule goes on to explain that additional proof of knowledge need only be slight and may be circumstantial. However, before the jury can find a defendant guilty, it must be satisfied of all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, appellant’s strained analysis conflates the two rules. We have no reason to believe the jury did the same. The instructions were proper and the evidence supports the verdict and conforms to the rules represented by the instructions.
Appellant also contends that CALCRIM No. 359 misstates the law of corpus delicti. In People v. Reyes (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1498, the court rejected a similar contention. The Reyes court explained: “Under CALCRIM No. 359, a jury may not consider a defendant’s out-of-court statement unless the jury concludes that ‘other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was committed.’ A crime consists of specified elements; if evidence of any of the requisite elements is lacking, a defendant has not committed a crime. There is no difference between an instruction that cautions that there must be evidence on each element of the charged crime and one that cautions that there must be evidence that a crime was committed. These phrases describe the same set of requirements. There was no error.” (Reyes, supra, at p. 1498.) Here as in Reyes, CALCRIM No. 359 accurately instructed the jury that it could not consider appellant’s out-of-court statements unless it had already determined that there was evidence that the charged crime was committed, i.e., that there was evidence of each element of the crime. As a result, there was no danger that the jury would improperly rely on appellant’s out-of-court statements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Needham, J., Reardon, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise specified.