Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF116856A, Jerold L. Turner, Judge.
Richard Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Christina Hitomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Dawson, J.
Appellant, Vincent Edward Britt, pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and was placed on Proposition 36 probation. On appeal, Britt contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress. We will reverse.
FACTS
On October 19, 2006, Britt arrived at a residence where Kern County Sheriff deputies were conducting a probation search. After Britt used the bathroom at the house, a deputy found a plastic baggie containing 1.59 grams of methamphetamine floating in the toilet bowl.
On January 17, 2007, Britt filed a motion to suppress arguing that the methamphetamine should be suppressed because it was the product of an unlawful detention. On January 30, 2007, the People filed their opposition contending that Britt was not detained.
At the February 1, 2007, hearing on the motion, Kern County Sheriff’s Detective J.R. Rodriguez testified that on October 19, 2006, he and another deputy arrived in plain clothes at a house in Kern County to locate two “warrant suspects.” After speaking with a female probationer, the deputies conducted a probation search at the house. During the search, Britt walked in the front door and asked Deputy Rodriguez what was going on. Deputy Rodriguez explained that they were conducting a probation search and asked him and two people who arrived with Britt if they minded having a seat in the living room area. Britt complied without hesitation and a short time later asked Deputy Rodriguez if he could use the bathroom. After Deputy Rodriguez replied, “Yes,” they both walked to a bathroom at the back of the house. Deputy Rodriguez conducted a cursory search of the bathroom and then stood at the entrance. Britt pulled his pants down, sat on the toilet bowl, and attempted to close the door. Deputy Rodriguez told Britt he preferred the door remain open. Britt replied, “[I]f you want to see me [have a bowel movement] go ahead.” Deputy Rodriguez replied he preferred the door remain open for their mutual safety. Deputy Rodriguez did not pat search Britt or ask him for identification.
DISCUSSION
Britt contends he was unlawfully detained when he arrived at the house and was told to sit in the living room or at the point when Deputy Rodriguez followed him to the bathroom and did not let him close the door while he used it. Respondent contends no detention occurred because the encounter was consensual at all times. We agree with Britt.
“[When] the evidence is uncontradicted, we must independently determine whether the facts support the court’s conclusion. [Citation.] Under Proposition 8 we apply federal constitutional law, but utilize state law where it does not conflict with federal law. [Citation.]” (People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 555.)
“Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual's liberty.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) To justify a detention, police must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual detained is engaged in criminal activity. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 20.)
“‘[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ [Citation.] This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation. [Citation.] Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. [Citations.] The officer’s uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred.” (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)
In Brendlin v. California (2007) __ U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 2400], the United States Supreme Court held that a passenger in a vehicle that is stopped by police has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In so holding the court stated, “An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and a sensible person would not expect a police officer to allow people to come and go freely from the physical focal point of an investigation into faulty behavior or wrongdoing.” (Id. at p. 2407, italics added.) The court also stated, “It is also reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Here, Britt entered a home where deputies were conducting a probation search and was asked by Deputy Rodriguez if he minded sitting down, which he did. When Britt asked Deputy Rodriguez if he could use the bathroom, Rodriguez approved the request and escorted Britt to the bathroom which he searched prior to allowing Britt to use it. Deputy Rodriguez then stood by the entrance to the bathroom and when Britt attempted to close the door he made it clear to Britt that Britt needed to keep the door open for their mutual safety. Although Deputy Rodriguez never verbally exercised authority over Britt, we conclude Rodriguez detained Britt because Rodriguez’s conduct would have conveyed to a reasonable person that Rodriguez was concerned with Britt’s presence at the house and that Britt was not free to roam about the house while the officers conducted the probation search. Our conclusion is reinforced by Brendlin. As noted earlier, the Brendlin court stated that it is reasonable for a vehicle passenger to expect that officers “at the scene of a crime, arrest or investigation,” will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize the officers’ safety and that their attempting to leave would meet with the officers’ objection. The Supreme Court did not purport to limit these statements to crime scenes, arrests, investigations, or officer safety concerns that arise from the stopping of a vehicle and its reasoning applies equally to a person who arrives at the scene of a probation search being conducted in a house. Accordingly, since the People did not proffer any theory justifying the detention, we further conclude that the court erred when it denied Britt’s motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.