Opinion
C093434
04-07-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD ALONZO BRIDGEWATER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 106278
HOCH, J.In 1991, a jury found defendant Richard Alonzo Bridgewater guilty of two counts of first degree murder, but found he was not the actual killer. It found true the special circumstance allegation defendant committed multiple murders. Defendant appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 arguing the trial court erred when it found he failed to make a prima facie case. The Attorney General concedes the error. We will reverse and remand.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Statement of Facts
We take the facts from our prior opinion. (People v. Bridgewater (Mar. 24, 1993, C012683) [nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant and his codefendant Alford Lee Coker killed the Brush Creek Bar bartender David Lewis and a bar patron Richard Haley.
The evening of the murder, Coker got into an argument with Lewis. Lewis threw defendant and Coker out of the bar. Coker responded by shaking his fist and saying," 'We'll be back. We'll get you. You can count on it.' "
True to Coker's word, the pair returned the bar later that night. Defendant brought two shotguns and Coker brought a handgun. When defendant entered the bar, he ordered everyone on the floor. A bar patron saw Coker draw his handgun and say," 'Don't reach for the gun, Dave.'" After several shots rang out, Lewis was found dead on the floor behind the bar. Haley was found dead in the parking lot. Both victims suffered multiple gunshots from Coker's handgun.
Defendant did not deny his involvement in the crimes but claimed he was coerced and afraid of Coker. Defendant claimed to be scared for his life and if he did not do what Coker said, he believed Coker would kill him.
The information charged defendant in count 1 with the first degree murder of Haley and in count 2 with the first degree murder of Lewis. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The information also alleged the enhancement defendant personally used a firearm under section 12022.5. Further, the information charged defendant with the multiple-murder special-circumstance enhancement under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3).
The trial court instructed the jury on the theory of aiding and abetting liability using CALJIC No. 3.00. Further, it instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as set forth in CALJIC No. 3.02 as follows: "One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any criminal act that he knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted. You must determine whether the defendant is guilty of the crime originally contemplated, and, if so, whether the crime charged in counts [1] and/or [2] was a natural and probable consequence of such originally contemplated crime."
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder on both counts and found true the allegations defendant personally used a firearm in the murders. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5.) The jury found, however, defendant was not the actual killer.
As to the special circumstances allegation, the court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows: "Having found the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must now determine if the following special circumstance is true or not true: Multiple Murder. [¶] . . . [¶] If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was an aider or abettor, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant with the intent to kill aided and abetted an actor in the commission of at least one of the murders in the first degree, in order to find the special circumstance to be true."
The jury found the multiple-murder special circumstance to be true. The court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole on each count plus a term of four years on one of the firearm enhancements.
On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's conviction.
II. Petition for Resentencing Under Section 1170.95
In 2019, defendant sent a letter to his public defender stating he was found guilty of felony murder and asking if there was any "hope for [him]" under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) for resentencing. Defendant's public defender filed the letter with the court and requested defendant be appointed a public defender on this issue. The trial court considered the letter a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 and appointed counsel for defendant.
The prosecution filed a brief in response to the petition arguing the prosecution did not proceed to trial under the natural and probable circumstances theory. Further, the prosecution contended the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding barred resentencing. Finally, the prosecution pointed to our prior decision's conclusion defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting the murder as grounds for denying the petition.
The trial court denied the petition finding defendant failed to demonstrate a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief under section 1170.95 for the reasons outlined in the prosecution's brief.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it found he did not establish a prima facie case entitling him to relief under section 1170.95. The Attorney General concedes the case should be remanded because the record of conviction does not demonstrate defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. We accept the Attorney General's concession and shall reverse and remand the case.
Unless otherwise indicated, references in this opinion to section 1170.95 refer to the version in effect at the time the trial court ruled on this petition. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The Legislature further amended section 1170.95 effective January 1, 2022, under Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). This amendment to section 1170.95 has no impact on the issues raised by this appeal.
Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted "to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The bill amended section 188 by adding a requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e), all principals to murder must act with express or implied malice to be convicted of that crime. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; § 188, subd. (a)(3).) It amended section 189 by adding a requirement to the felony-murder theory defendants who were not the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to murder must have been a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; § 189, subd. (e).)
As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1170.95, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder premised on either a felony-murder or natural and probable consequences theory can petition for resentencing, if they could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 by the bill. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; § 1170.95, subd. (a).)
Upon receipt of the petition, the trial court must appoint defendant counsel if requested, take briefing from the parties, and then determine whether the petitioner makes a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960-961 (Lewis).) In performing this initial screening, the court should accept the petitioner's allegations as true and "should not make credibility determinations or engage in 'factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.'" (Lewis, at p. 974.) Courts, however, may "rely on the record of conviction in determining whether that single prima facie showing is made." (Id. at p. 970.) Thus, if the record of conviction establishes the petition lacks merit as a matter of law, the trial court may deny the petition without conducting further proceedings. (Id. at p. 971.) If, accepting the facts asserted in the petition as true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief because he or she has met the requirements of section 1170.95, subdivision (a), then the trial court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c); Lewis, at p. 971.)
Here, the trial court considered defendant's letter a petition for resentencing and appointed counsel. The record of conviction demonstrates: (1) defendant has been convicted of murder; (2) the jury found defendant was not the actual killer; and (3) the trial court instructed the jury on the natural and probable circumstances doctrine.
As properly conceded by the Attorney General, our prior opinion's discussion of malice is inapplicable to the analysis here. Our discussion was in the context of the defense of imperfect duress and does not act as a bar to this resentencing petition as a matter of law. As instructed by our Supreme Court in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 972, "the probative value of an appellate opinion is case specific, and 'it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.'" In our prior opinion, we concluded the requested instruction was not required because the jury found defendant was not the actual killer but relied on an aiding and abetting theory to convict him of murder. Our reference to aiding and abetting in this context did not establish the jury could not have relied on the natural and probable consequences theory in convicting defendant of murder.
At this stage of the petition review process under section 1170.95, subdivision (c), the trial court should not have engaged in any factfinding or made any factual inferences about whether defendant could theoretically have been found guilty on a now-valid ground. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815-816.) Assuming the facts asserted in defendant's petition are true, as the court was required to do, defendant fulfilled the eligibility requirements listed in section 1170.95, subdivision (a). (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Thus, the trial court should have issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 971.) We, therefore, reverse the trial court's order denying the petition and remand with directions to issue an order to show cause under amended section 1170.95, subdivision (c), and hold a hearing under amended section 1170.95, subdivision (d). (§ 1170.95, as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) We express no opinion about whether defendant is entitled to relief following the hearing.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying the petition for resentencing is reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether defendant is entitled to relief under amended section 1170.95.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.