Opinion
No. 2013–434 RO CR.
10-29-2014
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David BRAUN, Appellant.
Opinion
Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Village of New Square, Rockland County (Stuart Sales, J.), rendered May 21, 2012. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of failing to stop at a stop sign and failing to signal when turning, respectively.
ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, the accusatory instruments are dismissed, and the fines, if paid, are remitted.
On January 20, 2010, the People charged defendant, in separate simplified traffic informations, with failing to stop at a stop sign (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1172[a] ) and failing to signal before turning (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163[d] ), respectively. At the outset of the nonjury trial, which commenced on May 21, 2012, defendant orally moved to dismiss the accusatory instruments on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated (see CPL 30.20 ; People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 [1975] ; People v. Bonacorso, 26 Misc.3d 134[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 50131 [U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010] ). The Justice Court denied the motion on the ground that it had to be in writing and on reasonable notice to the People (see CPL 170.30, 170.45 ). Following the trial, the court convicted defendant of both offenses.
The unexplained 28–month delay in bringing to trial these relatively minor charges, which require little preparation and proof to prosecute, establishes a constitutional speedy trial violation (see People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d at 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 ; e.g. People v. Matera, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op 51180[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003] ; cf. People v. Bonacorso, 26 Misc.3d 134[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 50131[U] ). While the Justice Court properly invoked the rule that such a motion should be in writing, given defendant's pro se status and the constitutional issue involved, we reach the merits in the interest of justice and reverse the judgments of conviction (People v. Thorpe, 160 Misc.2d 558, 559, 613 N.Y.S.2d 795 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1994] ). Were we to hold otherwise, reversal would still be required based upon the absence of any indication in the record that defendant was advised of his right to be represented by counsel and to an adjournment to obtain counsel (People v. Schonfeld, 26 Misc.3d 74, 76, 895 N.Y.S.2d 762 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009] ).
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed, the accusatory instruments dismissed, and the fines, if paid, are remitted.
IANNACCI, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ., concur.