Opinion
A168275
04-08-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HERBERT BRADLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 21-CR-001459)
This appeal may appropriately be resolved by Memorandum Opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
Banke, Acting P.J.
In 2021 defendant Herbert Bradley was convicted of three charges: corporal injury to a child (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)), exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)), and giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). He appealed. While his appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to establish a presumptive low term sentence when certain mitigating factors (including childhood or psychological trauma) contributed to the commission of the crime. We affirmed the convictions, but reversed his sentence and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion consistent with the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We observed the new statutory provision under section 1170, subdivision (b) established" 'a presumption of the lower term if' the circumstances set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)" applied, but also noted the "presumption can be overcome if' "the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. . . ."' "
At the resentencing hearing, defendant's counsel urged the trial court to impose a low term sentence under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), arguing defendant's childhood trauma was a contributing factor to the commission of the offenses. The prosecutor maintained there was no evidence of a connection between the trauma and the crime, and even if there was, the aggravating circumstances, including the defendant's three prior convictions, outweighed any mitigating factors.
The trial court seemingly found defendant suffered childhood or psychological trauma within the meaning of the statute and therefore focused on whether the trauma was a "contributing factor" in the commission of the offense. During an extended colloquy with counsel the court explored whether "contributing factor" under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) had a meaning similar to the term "connected to" in section 1385. The court concluded it did, found there was not sufficient evidence connecting the trauma to the offense, and ruled the low term presumption did not apply. Specifically, the court stated: "Borrowing from [section] 1385, the connected to definition [for] lack of other guidance, I find this record is devoid of sufficient information for the Court to conclude that the issues you've brought up about drug abuse and psychological trauma substantially contributed to this crime." Accordingly, the court imposed the midterm sentence of four years, doubled to eight years due to the defendant's most recent prior strike.
It is unclear from the arguments of the parties, the evidence in the record, and the trial court's ruling whether defendant experienced childhood trauma, psychological trauma, or both.
The trial court also exercised its discretion under section 1385 to strike defendant's two older prior strikes.
In the instant appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in construing and applying section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). We agree, and reverse and remand for resentencing.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) provides: "unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence." (Italics added.) (See Couzens, et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶12:7 [noting statute does not define" 'contributing factor'" but "Likely it will be necessary for the court to find the factor had some connection, however slight, in the commission or circumstances of the crime"].)
Section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) in 2021, in turn, requires trial courts, in considering whether to strike a sentencing enhancement, to "afford great weight to evidence" offered by defendants of certain mitigating circumstances, including evidence that a current offense is "connected to . . . childhood trauma." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E); Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) That statute provides: "A court may conclude that a defendant's childhood trauma was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence . . . the court concludes that the defendant's childhood trauma substantially contributed to the defendant's involvement in the commission of the offense." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(6)(A), italics added.)
As is clear from the plain language of these two statutes, section 1170 and section 1385 utilize different language in setting forth the standards for whether childhood trauma contributed to an offense, with section 1385 applying a more rigorous standard. (See Couzens, supra, Sentencing California Crimes, ¶ 12:7 ["It seems clear the Legislature's use of 'contributing factor' [in § 1170, subd. (b)(6)] implies a factor far less significant than one which 'substantially contributed' to the crime [under § 1385]."].)
" 'When the Legislature uses different words as part of the same statutory scheme, those words are presumed to have different meanings.'" (People v. Wimer (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 113, 132; Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 872, 879 [" 'Ordinarily, where the Legislature uses a different word or phrase in one part of a statute than it does in other sections or in a similar statute concerning a related subject, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning.' "].) This principle reinforces that the differing terminology-"contributing factor" and "substantially contributed"-signify different levels of causation, with the Legislature's choice of words suggesting a lesser degree of connection for "contributing factor" than for actions that "substantially contributed" to a crime. This is particularly relevant considering that section 1170 and section 1385 were amended in the same legislative session. The choice to use "substantially contributed" in section 1385, as opposed to the absence of such phraseology in section 1170, underscores a conscious legislative decision to create distinct levels of causation required by each statute, thereby mandating a discerning approach in their judicial application.
" 'An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard.'" (People v. Nakano (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 623, 635.) There is no question here that the trial court employed the standard applicable to section 1385, rather than the lesser causation standard set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).
Nor can we, on this record, conclude the error was harmless. Although the Attorney General contends the trial court properly relied on defendant's criminal history to impose the middle term based on certified records showing he had suffered three prior convictions, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) mandates imposition of the low term where childhood or psychological trauma contributed to the offense unless the court finds the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Because the trial court based its decision solely on the wrong legal standard in determining the presumption did not apply and did not weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, we must remand for the court to exercise its discretion under the correct legal standard. (See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [remand for resentencing is appropriate unless record" 'clearly indicate[s]'" trial court would have reached same conclusion had it been aware of its discretion]; People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 158 [remanding for trial court to reconsider new trial order under correct legal standards].)
Neither party raised any issues with respect to sentencing on defendant's misdemeanor counts, so we do not address them.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion consistent with section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). Following resentencing, the trial court clerk shall prepare an amended abstract of judgement and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Langhorne Wilson, J. Castro, J. [*]
[*]Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.