Opinion
No. 353789
05-13-2021
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA LAMONT-TREDARIA BRADLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 19-006654-01-FH Before: MARKEY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions for first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(b), assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84(1)(a), and aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a(1). On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree home invasion, and that the trial court erroneously scored Offense Variable (OV) 3. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a series of assaults on Lonnie McClaster on May 5, 2019, by defendant and three other men. That morning, McClaster received a phone call from his son, Errick Wilcoxson, who asked to be picked up from his girlfriend's home because they had gotten into an argument. McClaster went to pick up Wilcoxson and, while there, spoke over the phone with the girlfriend's father, who was making threats. McClaster told Wilcoxson to get his things, and the two left for McClaster's house.
Once at McClaster's house, Wilcoxson went inside, while McClaster began working on his lawnmower outside. Around 10:30 a.m., a gray Dodge Durango pulled up and defendant and three other men—all family members of Wilcoxson's girlfriend—got out of the vehicle. All four men immediately began hitting, punching, and kicking McClaster, while asking where Wilcoxson was. At the time, Wilcoxson was hiding inside the house. The attackers eventually forced McClaster into his truck, and one of them got in with him, demanding that he drive to Wilcoxson's location.
To help his son evade the attackers, McClaster drove to a house in Detroit, owned by a friend, which McClaster knew was unoccupied and under construction. Before they could find out whether Wilcoxson was inside, the attackers received a phone call indicating that Wilcoxson was back at McClaster's house in Highland Park. Some of the attackers began assaulting McClaster again, before they forced him to drive back to his house.
Back outside McClaster's house, all four attackers began to hit, punch, and kick McClaster, knocking him to the ground, where they continued to beat him. They told McClaster to stay down while they went into the house. Someone opened the unlocked door to the house, and all four attackers went inside. The attackers were inside the house for about a minute and broke the lock to a bedroom door while inside.
Around the time they exited the house, the police and an ambulance arrived at the scene. Wilcoxson finally exited the house, in which he had been hiding, and he attempted to subdue one of the attackers. Defendant and another attacker fled in the Durango, but police arrested the other two attackers at the scene. McClaster testified that he was still conscious after the attack, but that he could not walk. After he was helped into the ambulance, he passed out and was unconscious for two days.
McClaster suffered significant injuries to his head and neck as a result of the repeated assaults. Because his throat was swelling closed, medical personnel cut a hole in his trachea and intubated him so that he could breathe. His jaw and orbital bone were broken, and his eye came out of its socket. During the two weeks that he spent in the hospital following the attack, McClaster underwent two surgeries to install titanium plates on his jaw and both sides of his face. McClaster testified that he could no longer wear his dentures, and that he had only been able to consume liquid and soft foods since the attack. Before the assault, McClaster was a truck driver, but he is no longer able to work as a result of his injuries sustained during the assault.
The jury convicted defendant as set forth above, but acquitted him of unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b, and malicious destruction of personal property (less than $200), MCL 750.377a(1)(d). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 28 months to 20 years in prison for the conviction of first-degree home invasion, 23 months to 10 years in prison for the AWIGBH conviction, and 365 days for the aggravated-assault conviction. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant first argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to prove that he participated in the home invasion. In the alternative, he argues that, under an aiding and abetting theory, he was merely present at the scene, and the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted the home invasion.
"This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence." People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 180; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). A reviewing court "must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact's conclusion that the evidence proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The evidence is viewed "in the light most favorable to the prosecution." People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 357; 886 NW2d 456 (2016). "Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof the elements of a crime." People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000) (cleaned up).
The first-degree home invasion statute provides, in pertinent part:
(2) A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, a person who enters a dwelling without permission with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or a person who breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a felony, larceny, or assault is guilty of home invasion in the first degree if at any time while the person is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling either of the following circumstances exists:
* * *
(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. [MCL 750.110a(2)(b).]
There are several theories under which a defendant can be charged to support a conviction for first-degree home invasion. People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 43; 780 NW2d 265 (2010). In Wilder, the Michigan Supreme Court set forth the elements for first-degree home invasion under which defendant in this case was convicted: (1) the defendant breaks and enters a dwelling; (2) the defendant intended upon entry to commit a felony, larceny, or assault; and (3) there was another person lawfully present in the dwelling. See id. (describing alternative elements for first-degree home invasion).
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence of the third element, that there was another person lawfully in the dwelling. This argument lacks merit because McClaster provided sufficient testimony to satisfy each element of first-degree home invasion.
The home invasion occurred after the third and final assault on McClaster. McClaster testified that the attackers told him to lay where they left him after the assault, and they then opened a closed door and all four, including defendant, entered McClaster's house. There is no evidence that they had permission to do so. "Under Michigan law, any amount of force used to open a door or window to enter the building, no matter how slight, is sufficient to constitute a breaking." People v Smith, 318 Mich App 281, 288; 897 NW2d 743 (2016) (cleaned up). There is a breaking when one uses physical force to open the door to a property he does not have permission to enter. Id. Therefore, the element of breaking and entering was satisfied in this case by the attackers opening the closed door and entering McClaster's house without permission.
Next, the attackers' intent to commit an assault while inside the dwelling can be inferred from the series of assaults on McClaster. This Court has held that, "because it can be difficult to prove a defendant's state of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant's state of mind, which can be inferred from all the evidence presented." People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 622; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). The attackers, including defendant, hit, punched, and kicked McClaster while asking where his son was, and his son was the person they were looking for in the first place. From this, a reasonable jury could infer defendant intended to assault Wilcoxson once inside McClaster's house.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence of the third element, that there was someone lawfully present in the dwelling. McClaster's testimony provided sufficient evidence. He testified that when he and Wilcoxson first arrived at the home, Wilcoxson went inside the house. McClaster also testified that Wilcoxson was hiding inside the house when the attackers arrived for the first time. While the attackers were in Detroit with McClaster looking for Wilcoxson, they received a phone call indicating that Wilcoxson was back at McClaster's house. Wilcoxson was not present when the attackers arrived back outside McClaster's house and the third beating took place. The attackers entered the house, and the prosecutor presented evidence that they broke the lock on a bedroom door. McClaster testified that Wilcoxson exited the house around the time emergency personnel arrived at the scene, and Wilcoxson attempted to detain one of the attackers. There is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence that Wilcoxson successfully hid from the attackers inside the house until he perceived that it was safe to come out. This is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that that Wilcoxson was lawfully inside the home during the home invasion.
Because the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for first-degree home invasion based on defendant's entry of the occupied home, it is unnecessary to address his alternative argument that he did not aid and abet the home invasion.
B. SENTENCING
Next, defendant argues that McClaster did not suffer a life-threating or permanently incapacitating injury as a result of the assaults. Therefore, defendant argues that the trial court erred in assessing 25 points for OV 3 and that he is entitled to resentencing.
"Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence." People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 111; 933 NW2d 314 (2019) (cleaned up). "Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo." Id. "The trial court may rely on reasonable inferences arising from the record evidence to sustain the scoring of an offense variable." People v Earl, 297 Mich App 104, 109; 822 NW2d 271 (2012).
Offense variable 3 involves "physical injury to a victim." MCL 777.33(1). A trial court should assess 10 points for OV 3 when a victim suffers a bodily injury requiring medical treatment, MCL 777.33(1)(d), but should assess 25 points for OV 3 when a victim suffers a life-threating or permanently incapacitating injury, MCL 777.33(1)(c). MCL 777.33(1)(c) does not consider "whether a defendant's actions were life-threatening," but considers "whether a victim's injuries were life-threatening." People v Rosa, 322 Mich App 726, 746; 913 NW2d 392 (2018). This Court has recognized the ordinary meaning of "life-threatening" for purposes of OV 3 as "capable of causing death: potentially fatal." People v Chaney, 327 Mich App 586, 589; 935 NW2d 66 (2019) (cleaned up).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that McClaster suffered a life-threatening injury simply because he was intubated. Defendant argues that intubation alone is not life-threatening, and that the trial court was permitted to assess only 10 points for bodily injuries requiring medical treatment.
Defendant's argument ignores the evidence that McClaster's life was at risk. McClaster testified that while he was at the hospital, a hole was cut in his trachea and a tube inserted so that he could breathe because of the severe swelling in his throat. This supports the trial court's inference that McClaster's life was in danger from his injuries absent medical intervention. The trial court based its scoring on the fact that McClaster's injuries were life-threatening, not simply on what procedures were performed. The trial court properly scored OV 3 at 25 points because the victim received life-threatening injuries.
Additionally, the evidence supports a conclusion that McClaster suffered permanently incapacitating injuries, which would also result in OV 3 being scored at 25 points. As a result of the assaults, McClaster had titanium plates installed on the sides of his face and under his jaw. McClaster testified that he can no longer wear his dentures, that he had only been able to consume liquid and soft foods since the assaults, and he can no longer take his diabetes medication orally. Due to the effects of his injuries, McClaster can no longer work. As such, OV 3 could have also been properly scored at 25 points for permanently incapacitating injury to the victim.
Because the trial court properly scored OV 3, defendant is not entitled to resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle