Opinion
D051227
6-6-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LARRY BRADFORD, Defendant and Appellant
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Larry Bradford appeals from his conviction for unlawfully possessing cocaine base. Bradford was arrested after a police officer who had stopped the vehicle in which Bradford was a passenger searched Bradford and found cocaine in his pocket. Bradford filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officer unlawfully stopped the vehicle. The trial court denied the motion, and Bradford pled guilty.
On appeal, Bradford challenges the legality of the traffic stop of the vehicle in which Bradford was riding, claiming that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code, based on the officers observation that one of two bulbs in the passenger side brake light assembly was burned out. According to Bradford, driving a vehicle that has one nonfunctioning bulb in a two-bulb brake light mechanism does not violate the Vehicle Code. Thus, Bradford maintains, the officer could not reasonably have suspected that having a burned out light bulb in the brake mechanism constituted a violation.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise specified.
We conclude that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code because he reasonably suspected that the cars passenger side brake light was not "in good working order," as the Vehicle Code requires. We therefore affirm the trial courts denial of Bradfords motion to suppress evidence.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
While on patrol, San Diego Police Officer Daniel Jimenez noticed a white 1981 Cadillac stopped at an intersection. Officer Jimenez observed that one of the right brake lights on the Cadillac was out. Specifically, Jimenez testified that there were two bulbs serving as the right brake light, and that one of the two bulbs was not working. Jimenez believed that this was a violation of the Vehicle Code, so he turned on his overhead lights and conducted a traffic stop of the Cadillac.
As Officer Jimenez approached the vehicle, he noticed Bradford, who was in the passenger seat, rummaging around in his lap and in the area of the seat. Jimenez approached the vehicle on the drivers side and asked both occupants to keep their hands in front of them on their laps. Jimenez asked the occupants if they were on probation or parole. Bradford told Jimenez that he was on parole and gave Jimenez his name.
After Officer Jimenez placed the driver in Jimenezs patrol vehicle, Jimenez asked Bradford to get out of the car. Jimenez saw a small piece of plastic baggie fall from Bradfords lap as Bradford got out of the vehicle. Jimenez also noticed small off-white particles, which he believed to be cocaine, on the passenger seat where Bradford had been sitting. Jimenez searched Bradford and found a larger piece of what he believed to be cocaine in Bradfords pants pocket. Jimenez then placed Bradford under arrest.
B. Procedural background
An information charged Bradford with one count of unlawfully possessing cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), with a special allegation that he had suffered prior Health & Safety Code violations (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370, subd. (a)). The information also alleged that Bradford had suffered five prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (a)), and one strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). Bradford filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the motion.
On May 1, 2007, Bradford pled guilty to possession of cocaine and admitted the special allegation and the prior conviction allegations.
The trial court sentenced Bradford on July 3, 2007. The court denied Bradfords request for probation and denied his motion to dismiss his prior strike. The trial court sentenced Bradford to the lower term, doubled, on count 1, for a total of two years eight months, and struck the prison prior allegations.
Bradford filed a timely notice of appeal on July 9, 2007.
III.
DISCUSSION
Bradford contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. According to Bradford, the original stop was unlawful because Jimenez could not have had a reasonable suspicion that the Cadillac was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code since, Bradford contends, the failure of one of two bulbs in a single brake light does not constitute a violation of the Vehicle Code.
A. Additional background
At the hearing on Bradfords motion to suppress, Officer Jimenez testified that he stopped the Cadillac because he noticed that one bulb in the brake light mechanism on the passenger side of the vehicle was not working. At the time, Jimenez believed that the failure of one of the brake bulbs constituted a violation of section 24603, subdivision (b). At the hearing, Jimenez testified that having a burned out bulb was also a violation of Vehicle Code section 24252.
Officer Jimenez stated, "There was a white Cadillac that was directly in front of me stopped at the stop sign of Skyline and Meadowbrook, and I noticed it had a brake light out. So as the light turned green, I proceeded to conduct a traffic stop." Officer Jimenez was asked a short time later, "And was the passenger brake light operating in a defective manner or was it completely out?" Jimenez responded, "Theres two bulbs on the passenger side, top and bottom, and the top passenger bulb was not working."
The trial court found that the traffic stop of the vehicle in which Bradford was riding was lawful, and denied Bradfords motion to exclude the evidence Jimenez found. The court concluded that, based on the burned out bulb, Jimenez had reasonable suspicion that the Cadillac was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code. In making its ruling, the trial court interpreted section 24252 as requiring that "all of the brake lights that are installed by the manufacturer be in good working order." The trial court stated, "I think that its reasonable for the Legislature to feel that if you have situations where you have required lighting and three quarters of it is not working properly, that it may be misleading to other drivers, its in the dark, its in lighting that may make a car appear to be different in configuration than if all of the lighting is properly working."
The trial court appears to have given an example that is the reverse of what occurred in this situation (i.e., only one quarter of the brake assembly lighting was not working). However, the courts reasoning would apply to either situation.
B. Standard of review
In considering a trial courts determination on a motion to suppress, an appellate court applies a mixed standard of review. We review the trial courts factual findings to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support them (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640), and we do not question the trial courts judgments regarding witness credibility. (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505.) However, we review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, such as the one at issue here. (People v. Whaley (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779, 792.)
C. Analysis
The main issue in this case is whether Officer Jimenezs traffic stop of the Cadillac was lawful. Specifically, the question is whether Officer Jimenezs suspicion that the car in which Bradford was a passenger was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code was reasonable. (See People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 ["[A] police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citations.]"].)
Bradford contends that having one bulb of a two bulb brake light assembly not functioning does not constitute a violation of the Vehicle Code. If having one of two lights bulbs out in a single brake light is not a violation of the Vehicle Code, then Jimenez could not have had a reasonable suspicion that the Cadillac was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code, and the traffic stop would be unlawful. (See In re Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 700 ["`If an officer simply does not know the law, and makes a stop based upon objective facts that cannot constitute a violation, his suspicions cannot be reasonable"], citing United States v. Wallace (2000) 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 [noting the invalidation of traffic stops when "the defendants conduct [that the officer suspects is unlawful] does not in any way, shape or form constitute a crime"].) We must therefore examine the language of the Vehicle Code to determine whether the failure of a single bulb in a two-bulb brake assembly does or does not constitute a violation of the Code.
Under the Vehicle Code, brake lights are referred to as "stoplamps." Every car manufactured after 1958 must have two stoplamps. (§ 24603, subd. (b).) The stoplamps are to be mounted on the left and right sides of the vehicle "at the same level." (§ 24603, subd. (d).) Further, the Vehicle Code requires that, "[a]ll lighting equipment of a required type installed on a vehicle shall at all times be maintained in good working order." (§ 24252, subd. (a).)
Section 24603 provides in pertinent part: "Every motor vehicle which is not in combination with any other vehicle and every vehicle at the end of a combination of vehicles shall at all times be equipped with stoplamps mounted on the rear as follows:
"(a) Every such vehicle shall be equipped with one or more stoplamps.
"(b) Every such vehicle, other than a motorcycle, manufactured and first registered on or after January 1, 1958, shall be equipped with two stoplamps, except that trailers and semitrailers manufactured after July 23, 1973, which are less than 30 inches wide, may be equipped with one stoplamp which shall be mounted at or near the vertical centerline of the trailer. If such vehicle is equipped with two stoplamps, they shall be mounted as specified in subdivision (d).
"(c) Except as provided in subdivision (h), stoplamps on vehicles manufactured on or after January 1, 1969, shall be mounted not lower than 15 inches nor higher than 72 inches, except that a tow truck, in addition to being equipped with the required stoplamps, may also be equipped with two stoplamps which may be mounted not lower than 15 inches nor higher than the maximum allowable vehicle height and as far forward as the rearmost portion of the drivers seat in the rearmost position.
"(d) Where two stoplamps are required, at least one shall be mounted at the left and one at the right side, respectively, at the same level.
"(e) Stoplamps on vehicles manufactured on or after January 1, 1979, shall emit a red light. Stoplamps on vehicles manufactured before January 1, 1979, shall emit a red or yellow light. All stoplamps shall be plainly visible and understandable from a distance of 300 feet to the rear both during normal sunlight and at nighttime, except that stoplamps on a vehicle of a size required to be equipped with clearance lamps shall be visible from a distance of 500 feet during such times.
"(f) Stoplamps shall be activated upon application of the service (foot) brake and the hand control head for air, vacuum, or electric brakes. In addition, all stoplamps may be activated by a mechanical device designed to function only upon sudden release of the accelerator while the vehicle is in motion. Stoplamps on vehicles equipped with a manual transmission may be manually activated by a mechanical device when the vehicle is downshifted if the device is automatically rendered inoperative while the vehicle is accelerating."
Section 24252 provides:
"(a) All lighting equipment of a required type installed on a vehicle shall at all times be maintained in good working order. Lamps shall be equipped with bulbs of the correct voltage rating corresponding to the nominal voltage at the lamp socket.
"(b) The voltage at any tail, stop, license plate, side marker or clearance lamp socket on a vehicle shall not be less than 85 percent of the design voltage of the bulb. Voltage tests shall be conducted with the engine operating.
"(c) Two or more lamp or reflector functions may be combined, provided each function subject to requirements established by the department meets such requirements.
"(1) No turn signal lamp may be combined optically with a stoplamp unless the stoplamp is extinguished when the turn signal is flashing.
"(2) No clearance lamp may be combined optically with any taillamp or identification lamp."
Bradford argues that Officer Jimenez could not have had a reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven in violation of the Vehicle Code because the car had "at least one taillamp" on each side that was in good working order. According to Bradford, a single working bulb in the passenger side brake light assembly is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Vehicle Code. Bradfords logic is as follows: "[B]oth the `general statute (§ 24600) under Article 3 and the more specific statute under Article 3 (§ 24603) require `one or more taillamps. Here, it is undisputed that appellant had two bulbs in each taillamp; one bulb on one taillamp had burned out. Thus, appellant still had one taillamp on each side of the vehicle as was required by sections 24600 and 24603."
Although the lighting equipment at issue in this case is a brake light, which is known in the Vehicle Code as a "stoplamp," Bradford relies on section 24600 to assert that the Vehicle Code requires "one or more taillamps" (italics added.). Bradford suggests that section 24600, which refers to "taillamps," is the "general" statute, and section 24603, which refers to "stoplamps" (i.e., brake lights), is the more "specific" statute. Bradford thereby implies that a "stoplamp" is simply a type of "taillamp." A "taillamp," however, is separate and distinct from a "stoplamp," and both types of lighting equipment are required by statute. (Compare § 24600 with § 24603.) The nonfunctioning bulb at issue in this case was part of a stoplamp assembly. It is unclear why Bradford relies on the provisions of section 24600 in his argument.
Although we quote from Bradfords brief in which he refers to "taillamps," we will nevertheless analyze the issue with regard to the lighting apparatus at issue in this case, i.e., the stoplamp.
Section 24252, subdivision (a) requires that "[a]ll lighting equipment of a required type installed on a vehicle shall at all times be maintained in good working order." Because stoplamps are required lighting equipment (see sections 375 and 24603), a vehicles stoplamps "shall at all times be maintained in good working order." The most reasonable interpretation of this language is that the stoplamp as a whole must be in good working order. It would be unreasonable to believe that something could be deemed in good working order if it is not functioning as intended. Thus, when a stoplamp is designed to function using two light bulbs, both of those bulbs must be working for the stoplamp to be said to be in good working order.
Bradford has cited no authority that would suggest that each bulb constitutes a separate and independent stoplamp, in and of itself. Rather, the Vehicle Code treats bulbs as components of lamps. It is undisputed that one of the bulbs in the two-bulb stoplamp was not working. Officer Jimenezs belief that the passenger side stoplamp on the Cadillac was not in good working order, as required by section 24252, subdivision (a), was thus reasonable. The traffic stop was therefore lawful.
The Vehicle Code distinguishes between lighting equipment such as stoplamps or taillamps and the bulbs used in the lamps. For example, section 24252, subdivision (a) states that "[l]amps" are to "be equipped with bulbs."
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.