Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County BA297685 Patricia M. Schnegg, Judge.
Cynthia A. Thomas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillete, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
After a court trial, defendant and appellant William A. Bradford was found guilty of one count of filing a false or forged instrument and three counts of forgery. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment on any of the counts. Although the People concede that there is insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on count 5 for forgery, we find that the evidence is insufficient as to all three forgery counts. Therefore, we affirm the judgment as to count 1, but reverse it as to counts 3, 5, and 6.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual background.
A. The prosecution’s case.
Willie Bradford had two sons, one of whom is defendant, William Bradford. To avoid confusion, we refer to the son as defendant. Willie Bradford and defendant did not get along; their animosity dated to the 1960’s.
In 2001, Willie Bradford married Luista Breaux. They lived together for about two and one-half years at 2745 West View Street in Los Angeles. After Luista and Willie Bradford separated, she moved out of the house.
Willie Bradford died in December 2003. His estate included a bank account. Before Willie Bradford died, he mailed a copy of his will to his sister, Lucille Bradford. He left each of his two sons, including defendant, $1 and left the residue of his estate to his two sisters. Lucille found the original will at the house. Defendant’s cousin, who was at the house, read the will while defendant stood behind her, also reading it. Thereafter, at Willie Bradford’s funeral, defendant and his cousin talked about the fact that Lucille Bradford was named the estate’s executor and what she was going to do. Defendant’s cousin also told defendant not to worry about the $1 his father had left him.
After Willie Bradford died, defendant asked Luista Breaux if he could live in the house, because he was homeless. Breaux said she would ask Lucille Bradford, who said defendant could stay at the house for about two and one-half months. Defendant then moved into the house.
Brian Cerroni met defendant through a mutual friend. Defendant told Cerroni he was selling the house he was living in. Cerroni agreed to buy the house for $310,000. Of that amount, $165,427 paid off an existing mortgage, $62,663.55 went to defendant, $1,056 went to pay title insurance, $58,000 went to C & H Property Management Company for “upgrades and repairs to the property,” $6,000 went to certified contractors, $3,746 went to Terminix, and an additional $1,898.98 went to Cerroni, the buyer. C & H Management Company is Cerroni’s “dba” or, in Cerroni’s word, it is a “bank account” he opened. A real estate agent was not involved in the sale. Cerroni received a grant deed conveying the property to him. Defendant signed the grant deed “William Bradford.”
Lucille Bradford, William Bradford’s sister and executor of the estate, asked a real estate broker friend to sell the house. When the broker went to the house in May 2004 to inform the tenant the house would be sold, she was told it had already been sold. Lucille Bradford never gave permission to defendant to sell the house.
On October 12, 2004, defendant withdrew all funds totaling $2,036.23 from his father’s bank account at OneUnited Bank. To withdraw the funds, defendant signed an affidavit stating that there was no proceeding in California concerning administration of his father’s estate, that he was his father’s successor, and that no other person had a superior right to his father’s bank account. Lucille Bradford never gave permission to defendant to close the account.
B. Defense case.
In the late 1980’s, Willie Bradford’s second wife, Thelma Bradford, told defendant that the house was in his name and that he was the beneficiary of an insurance policy. Defendant thus believed that when his father died, the house belonged to him. He also believed this because his name, William Bradford, was on the deed. Defendant’s father was known as Willie Bradford. Defendant said he never saw a deed of trust concerning the property stating it was owned by “William Bradford and Louisa Bradford, husband and wife.”
II. Procedural background.
An information alleged the following counts: count 1, attempt to file a false or forged instrument (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a)); count 2, grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a)); count 3, forgery by signing the name of another person to a check endorsement in the amount of $62,663.55 (§ 470, subd. (a)); count 5, forgery by signing the name of another person to an affidavit for withdrawal of account or personal property (§ 470, subd. (a)); and count 6, forgery by signing the name of another person to escrow instructions in the amount of $58,000 (§ 470, subd. (a)).
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
At the preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed count 4, forgery by signing the name of another person to an affidavit for withdrawal of account or personal property.
Defendant waived trial by a jury. On June 12, 2007, the trial court found defendant guilty of counts 1, 3, 5, and 6, but acquitted defendant of count 2. That same day, the court sentenced defendant to the low term of 16 months on count 1. The court also sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 16 months each on counts 3 and 5. The court imposed an additional 16-month term on count 6, but stayed it under section 654.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the evidence to sustain counts 1, 3, 5, and 6.
Defendant makes two arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction on these counts. First, as to count 1 for attempting to file a false or forged instrument, the grant deed, he contends that the evidence is insufficient because the prosecution failed to prove he did not own the property. Second, as to counts 3, 5, and 6 for forgery, he contends there is no evidence he intended his signature on the pertinent documents to be accepted or relied on as that of his father.
Under a sufficiency of the evidence standard of review, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide “ ‘whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496.) “We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640.) Reversal is not warranted unless it appears “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “We apply the same standard to convictions based largely on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Ferraez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 925, 930.)
A. There is sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for violating section 115 as alleged in count 1.
Defendant was found guilty of count 1 for violating section 115, subdivision (a), which provides, “Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.” Deeds are among the class of instruments within section 115’s purview. (Generes v. Justice Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 683.) Thus, if a person has no legally cognizable interest in the subject property, then procuring or offering to be recorded a grant deed purporting to convey the land is a public offense under section 115. (Id. at p. 681.)
The instrument at issue is the grant deed which defendant caused to be recorded. The grant deed provides that “William Bradford, a married man, as his sole and separate property,” grants the property to Brian Cerroni. Defendant signed the grant deed “William Bradford.” (People’s Ex. 2.) Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for violating section 115 by causing the grant deed to be recorded because the People failed to prove he “did not own the house since the prosecution never provided any evidence as to who actually owned the house.” We disagree that the People had to prove who in fact owned the house to meet its burden of proving that defendant did not own it.
There was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant did not own the house, regardless of who in fact owned it. Defendant and his father did not have a good relationship. Given that they did not have a good relationship, it is a reasonable inference that Willie Bradford would not leave his house to defendant, an inference that is buttressed by Willie Bradford’s will, which left $1 to defendant and the residue of the estate to defendant’s aunts. There was also evidence that defendant knew about these provisions in his father’s will. Defendant’s cousin testified she read the will with defendant standing behind her reading along, and that they later discussed the will and the $1.
Moreover, the People introduced a deed of trust stating “William Bradford and Louista Bradford” owned the property. Although defendant’s father was called “Willie” Bradford, defendant does not argue he is the “William Bradford” referred to in the deed of trust.
Also, after his father’s death, defendant did not behave as if he owned the house. Instead of asserting any ownership rights to the house, he asked his former stepmother, Luista Breaux, for permission to stay at the house. She told defendant he could stay there for a couple of months. If defendant believed he owned the house, it is unclear why he would ask to stay there and why he would accept any conditions on his stay.
Details concerning defendant’s subsequent sale of the house also supports a conclusion he did not own the house. He did not put the house up for a public sale. He instead privately sold the house without using a real estate agent and without informing his aunt, although he inferentially knew that she had been named executor of his father’s estate. Defendant sold the house for $310,000, but the buyer got $58,000 from escrow for unspecified repairs. The trial judge noted it is “odd that the new buyer would be getting a $58,000 kickback.” These facts support the conclusion that defendant knew he did not own the property; hence, he quickly and quietly sold it to a seller, who received a windfall from the transaction.
The trial judge characterized details about the sale as “smell[ing] to high heaven.”
Defendant is therefore not entitled to a reversal of his conviction on count 1.
B. There is insufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for forgery as alleged in counts 3, 5 and 6.
Defendant was also found guilty of three counts of forgery. Section 470, subdivision (a), provides, “Every person who, with the intent to defraud, knowing that he or she has no authority to do so, signs the name of another person or of a fictitious person to any of the items listed in subdivision (d) is guilty of forgery.” Subdivision (d) lists, among other items, checks. (§ 470, subd. (d).) Forgery thus has three elements: a writing, the false making of the writing, and an intent to defraud. (People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741.) The false writing must have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon it as if it were genuine. (Id. at p. 742.)
The writing at issue in count 3 is the $62,663.55 escrow check representing the sale proceeds defendant received. Defendant endorsed that check. The writing at issue in count 6 is the escrow instructions defendant signed releasing $58,000 to C & H Management Company, a “dba” of the property’s buyer, Brian Cerroni. With respect to these documents, defendant argues he did not commit forgery because he signed his own name to the documents, not his father’s name. The People respond that defendant, although sharing a name with his father, signed his father’s name to the documents; hence, defendant is guilty of forgery.
We agree with the defendant that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for forgery as to counts 3 and 6, but we employ a different analysis than defendant. The evidence does not show that defendant, in endorsing the $62,663.55 check and signing the escrow documents, was holding himself out to be his father. The evidence shows that defendant was holding himself out to be his father’s lawful successor to the property or, in other words, the lawful owner of the property. When defendant endorsed the $62,663.55 check, he put his own birth date of November 11, 1953 on it, not his father’s birth date, which was June 12, 1921. The teller who cashed the check for defendant said that he would have had to present a driver’s license or a California identification number to get the money. Defendant produced an identification number. Defendant also prepared a statement of information, which is a form prepared during the course of escrow by the property owner. On that form, defendant wrote his—not his father’s—date of birth and driver’s license number.
Therefore, defendant’s scheme was not, as the People argue, to hold himself out as his father by, for example, signing documents in his father’s name. Defendant’s scheme was to hold himself out as his father’s successor to the property. Thus, although defendant may be guilty of a crime in connection with this scheme, forgery simply does not appear to be apt under these circumstances.
Moreover, based on similar facts, the People concede that the evidence is insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for forgery as to count 5. That count concerns forgery in connection with documents defendant submitted to close out his father’s bank account, which had $2,036.23 in it. The evidence shows that defendant did not represent he was his father. To the contrary, defendant submitted, among other things, an affidavit stating that his father had died, defendant’s own driver’s license, and his father’s death certificate. Therefore, although defendant may have committed a crime by representing he was the person entitled to the money in his father’s bank account, he did not commit forgery under section 470, subdivision (a), by representing he was someone else.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to counts 3, 5, and 6. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.