A cause of action alleging fraud must be commenced within six years after the date on which the cause of action accrued or within two years after the time the plaintiff could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the alleged fraud, whichever is later ( see CPLR 213[8]; Espie v. Murphy, 35 A.D.3d 346, 347, 825 N.Y.S.2d 537). “The test as to when a plaintiff, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered an alleged fraud is an objective one” ( Prand Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 62 A.D.3d 681, 682, 878 N.Y.S.2d 198;see Prestandrea v. Stein, 262 A.D.2d 621, 622, 692 N.Y.S.2d 689;TMG–II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d 21, 22–23, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6). Here, the plaintiff did not commence the instant action until more than six years after the date on which the fraud cause of action accrued and more than two years after he, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the alleged fraud ( see Mizuno v. Barak, 113 A.D.3d 825, 980 N.Y.S.2d 473;Prand Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 62 A.D.3d at 682, 878 N.Y.S.2d 198;Espie v. Murphy, 35 A.D.3d at 347, 825 N.Y.S.2d 537;TMG–II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d at 22–23, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6).

The court correctly dismissed the action as time-barred. Actions based upon fraud must be commenced within the greater of “six years from the date the cause of action accrued” or “two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213[8]; see Saphir Intl., SA v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 25 A.D.3d 315, 807 N.Y.S.2d 58 [1st Dept.2006]; TMG–II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d 21, 22, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6 [1st Dept.1991], lv. denied79 N.Y.2d 752, 580 N.Y.S.2d 199, 588 N.E.2d 97 [1992] ).

New York Courts also grant summary judgment based on the same clear principle that if a plaintiff is on inquiry notice and fails to make any investigation for two years, the plaintiff's action will be time-barred under the two-year discovery rule. See, e.g., Marasa v. Andrews, 69 A.D.3d 584, 892 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (2010); TMG–II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d 21, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1991) (holding that, based on published news reports detailing a lawsuit filed against the defendant, “the underlying facts of the fraud claim against [the defendant], to the extent that they were not already known, could have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence more than two years before the action was commenced”), leave to appeal denied,79 N.Y.2d 752, 580 N.Y.S.2d 199, 588 N.E.2d 97 (1992).

Similarly, the Partnerships, as well as N.V. and GSI, received commissions not for trading in securities but rather "for the fraudulent documentation" of "more than $350 million in false interest expenses."TMG II v. Price Waterhouse Co., ___ A.D.2d ___, ___, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1991) (noting that Price Waterhouse withdrew "after TMG was unable to document to Price Waterhouse's satisfaction that the transactions [recorded in TMG's books] were bona fide, and actually occurred").

The trial court denied their motions. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the convictions of the two codefendants (People v Timmons, 175 A.D.2d 10, lv dismissed 78 N.Y.2d 975; People v Bolden, 175 A.D.2d 21, lv dismissed 78 N.Y.2d 962), but affirmed defendant's conviction ( 178 A.D.2d 303). Under CPL 330.30 (2), a motion to set aside a verdict may be granted when it is shown that improper conduct by a juror "may have affected a substantial right of the defendant".

The record amply supports a finding that, with due diligence, defendant could have discovered the fraud more than two years before it brought its fraud counterclaims (see CPLR 213[8] ; Ghandour v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 213 A.D.2d 304, 624 N.Y.S.2d 390 [1st Dept.1995], lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 710, 635 N.Y.S.2d 947, 659 N.E.2d 770 [1995] ). We reject defendant's contention that it did not know of the fraud, since “[i]t is knowledge of facts not legal theories that commences the running of the two-year limitations period” (TMG–II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d 21, 23, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6 [1st Dept.1991], lv. denied 79 N.Y.2d 752, 580 N.Y.S.2d 199, 588 N.E.2d 97 [1992] ). In particular, the November 2002 letter from defendant's own resident engineer indicated that plaintiff had provided “ ‘contrived paperwork in an effort to prove higher DBE [Disadvantaged Business Enterprises] participation’ ” to qualify for the municipal contract.

Even if, arguendo, plaintiffs had pleaded a fraudulent conveyance claim based on actual fraud, they had a duty of inquiry which arose in 1999, when they learned that defendant had been sold ( see generally Gutkin v. Siegal, 85 A.D.3d 687, 688, 926 N.Y.S.2d 485 [1st Dept. 2011]; TMG–II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d 21, 22–23, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6 [1st Dept. 1991], lv. denied79 N.Y.2d 752, 580 N.Y.S.2d 199, 588 N.E.2d 97 [1992] ).

For her part, the potential witness admitted owning a telephone capable of carrying three-way calls and speaking with defendant and the juror during the trial, but denied trying to help defendant "through" the juror, and invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when asked questions that might have validated the co-defendant's allegations. The trial court credited the juror's hearing testimony and sustained the verdicts against all three defendants, but this court, on the prior appeals of the two co-defendants, found that critical parts of the juror's testimony were incredible, and ordered a new trial as to those defendants (People v Timmons, 175 A.D.2d 10, lv dismissed 78 N.Y.2d 975; People v Bolden, 175 A.D.2d 21, lv dismissed 78 N.Y.2d 962). Seizing on this court's prior determination that the juror's impartiality had been impugned, defendant urges that he, too, is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.

Plaintiffs admittedly discovered the Rating Agencies' intentional wrongdoing on October 22, 2008 thus their claim expired on October 22, 2010 prior to the commencement of this action in 2013. TMG-II v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 A.D.2d 21, 22, 572 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (1st Dep't 1991).

( Watts v Exxon Corp., 188 AD2d 74, 76, 594 NYS2d 443, 444 [internal quotation marks omitted]). By February 2007, irrespective of whether she failed to appreciate the legal significance of the attorney's assertion or whether she had not yet confirmed its accuracy, it is clear that she possessed knowledge of the facts necessary to commence the running of two-year limitations period ( seeOggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 848 NYS2d 245; TMG-II v Price Waterltouse Co., 175 AD2d 21, 572 NYS2d 6 lv denied 79 NY2d 752, 580 NYS2d 199). Nor does Carolyn's subsequent discovery of the alleged forgery avail her.