Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC062408
Sepulveda, J.
Defendant was convicted by jury trial of being under the influence of an opiate (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)) and of possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)), both of which are misdemeanors. He was placed on probation and ordered to serve six months in county jail. On appeal he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, arguing that the detention of his vehicle based upon the condition of his taillight was unlawful. We disagree and affirm.
The jury found defendant not guilty of felony possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)).
Background
Menlo Park Police Officer Brad Schuler stopped defendant’s vehicle because one of the sections in defendant’s left taillight assembly was not functioning, which the officer testified was in violation of Vehicle Code section 24252, subdivision (a). Officer Schuler obtained defendant’s driver’s license and ran a records check, finding that defendant was on parole. Knowing that parolees have search conditions, he searched both defendant’s person and his vehicle. Officer Schuler found a pipe used for the inhalation of controlled substances, and an eye drop bottle containing a brown substance which he believed to be heroin. Defendant had constricted pupils and was sweating profusely, consistent with being under the influence of a controlled substance.
All further section references are to the Vehicle Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Daniel DeSantis, a defense investigator, testified that the left taillight assembly of defendant’s car measured 18 inches (45.72 centimeters) horizontally and 4 7/8 inches (12.38 centimeters) vertically. There were different compartments in the taillight assembly that were supposed to light up; the center was dimmer than the left and right sides of the left taillight. The dim section measured 5 inches wide and 4 7/8 inches tall. Approximately 72 percent of the left taillight was illuminated normally; the other 27 percent was dimly lit. The properly functioning area was 240.70 square centimeters. It took DeSantis an hour to calculate the cubic centimeters of the left taillight assembly that were functioning properly.
Discussion
Defendant contends that Officer Schuler improperly detained his vehicle, based upon the failure of one section of his left taillight assembly to function. Schuler testified that he stopped defendant’s car because it was not in compliance with section 24252, subdivision (a). That section provides in pertinent part: “All lighting equipment of a required type installed on a vehicle shall at all times be maintained in good working order.” Taillights are required equipment. (§ 24600.) Other provisions set forth specific requirements for taillights, including section 24600, subdivision (e) [taillights must be lighted during darkness, brake lights must be red in color, and must be plainly visible from all distances within 1,000 feet to the rear], and section 24252, subdivision (b) [voltage of any tail lamp, stop light, etc., shall not be less than 85 percent of the design voltage of the bulb]. Additionally, section 26103 and California Code of Regulations, title 13, section 621 provide that the federal government’s standards for certain rear lights govern in California. That standard requires that the luminous lens area of a single compartment stop lamp and a single compartment rear turn signal lamp shall not be less than 50 square centimeters (7 3/4 inches) and that multiple compartment stop and rear turn signal lamps must be at least 22 square centimeters (with a combined area of at least 50 square centimeters).
Based on the testimony of defense witness DeSantis, defendant argues that the portion of his left tail lamp that was fully illuminated far exceeded that required by the applicable federal regulation, and that Officer Schuler’s belief that defendant was in violation of section 24252 merely because one light section in the assembly was not functioning properly was a mistake of law. Relying upon People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 643-644) from Division Five of this court, he concludes that the detention of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment as “a suspicion founded on a mistake of law can[not] constitute the reasonable basis required for a lawful traffic stop.” We find defendant’s reasoning to be faulty for a number of reasons.
First, it is helpful to set forth those areas where the parties are in agreement regarding the law. Neither side contests that the stop of a vehicle for a traffic offense is a detention that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion on the officer’s part that a violation of the traffic laws has been committed. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1135; White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 641.) The officer must be able to point “to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Additionally, both sides appear to agree that an officer’s mistake as to the law may not constitute a reasonable basis for a traffic stop, as articulated in White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 643-644. However, if an officer makes a reasonable mistake as to the facts presented, that may form the basis of a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred (id. at p. 644), and “an officer’s reliance on the wrong statute does not render his actions unlawful if there is a right statute that applies to the defendant’s conduct.” (In re Justin K. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695, 700.) Nor is there any real dispute as to the facts in this case: the middle light in defendant’s left tail lamp was not lit properly and Officer Schuler believed that was a violation of section 24252, subdivision (a). The dispute in the present case lies in whether or not Officer Schuler, in fact, made a mistake of law.
If the facts as the officer believes them to be would not constitute a violation of law, the officer has made a mistake of law which cannot constitute a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred. If on the other hand, the officer does not misapprehend the law, but rather mistakenly believes that the facts are one way, when in fact they are not, that is a mistake of fact which if reasonable, may support a temporary detention. For example, if an officer mistakenly believes that the Vehicle Code prohibits hanging any item object on a vehicle’s rear view mirror, and therefore stops a car because it has a small air freshener hanging from such a mirror, the officer has made a mistake of law, and even if the officer acted in good faith, the detention is improper. If, on the other hand, the officer knows that hanging an item from a rear view mirror is illegal if it blocks the driver’s view, and he mistakenly (but reasonably) believes that the item hanging from a driver’s rear view mirror does block his view, the detention of the vehicle would be proper. And if the facts, as reasonably perceived by the officer, support a detention under a different code section from the one the officer relied upon, the detention will also be upheld. Thus, as the court explained in White, “the distinction between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law is crucial to determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to effect a traffic stop. [Citation.]” (People v. White, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 644.)
Defendant’s argument that Officer Schuler made a mistake of law is lacking. First, the section of defendant’s left taillight that Schuler indicated was not lighted was in violation of section 24252, subdivision (b), as its voltage would be less than 85 percent of the design voltage. As explained above, even if the officer was incorrect regarding which Vehicle Code section was violated, that would not invalidate the detention of the car. (In re Justin K., supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 700.) The trial court thus could have properly denied the motion to suppress on this basis alone.
Schuler testified that the middle section was not illuminated; defense witness DeSantis testified that it was dim. To the extent that this distinction is of any significance to the issues before us, we presume the trial court resolved the conflict in the evidence in the People’s favor. (People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 692-693.)
Additionally, the unilluminated taillight was clearly not in “good working order,” which did constitute a violation of the Vehicle Code section relied upon by the officer (§ 24252, subd. (a)). Officer Schuler did not misread the law; a taillight that has a bulb that is not functioning is not in “good working order.” The fact that the light may otherwise comply (or not) with other requirements under the Vehicle Code does not make this any less so. Section 24552, subdivision (a) is a general requirement that lights be kept in good working order. Nowhere does it indicate that its reference in that regard is to the required size of the light. Indeed, from the inclusion of subdivision (b), which specifically indicates the voltage required of such lamps, the reasonable inference is that subdivision (a) is referencing the mechanical workings of the light, not its physical size.
Additionally, as respondent argues, subsection S5.1.1.26(a)(b) of part 571.108 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations solely references the size of rear turn signal lamp compartments and stop or brake light compartments; nothing in the regulation indicates its applicability to taillight assemblies apart from those components. Even more importantly, however, nothing in this federal regulation would indicate that the term “good working order” in section 24252, subdivision (a) refers to the required physical size of the light or its components. To carry defendant’s position to its logical extreme, a vehicle’s taillights would be considered to be in good working order under section 24252, subdivision (a), so long as the properly lit portions of the assembly met the minimum physical measurements of the federal regulation, even if the brake component (or turn signal component) were totally burned out. This result, of course, would be absurd.
It appears that the prosecutor below assumed that the federal regulation did indeed have to be read in conjunction with section 24252, subdivision (a). However, the issue here is purely one of law and the general rule prohibiting the prosecution from changing on appeal its theories regarding the admissibility of evidence is not applicable, as defendant was not prevented from presenting evidence or cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses on the theory. (Higgason v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 929, 941-942.)
Further, if we were to read the interplay of the federal size requirements into section 24252, subdivision (a) as suggested by defendant, it does not logically invalidate the detention. Officer Schuler observed that one section of defendant’s taillight assembly was not functioning; that fact would give him a reasonable suspicion that the federal size requirements were not met and would at least give him grounds to detain the vehicle to further investigate the issue. Even defendant’s own witness, investigator DeSantis, testified that it took him an hour to make the calculations of the square centimeter size of the various components of defendant’s taillight. An interpretation of the relevant law that would anticipate that officers in the field could, or should, have to make these calculations before detaining the vehicle for investigation is equally absurd.
For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J., Reardon, J.