Opinion
2d Crim. No. B298697
08-27-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ELIZABETH BLANCO, Defendant and Appellant.
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 2018035267)
(Ventura County)
Elizabeth Blanco appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted her of attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 664). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true an allegation that appellant had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)). The court also found that the attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle constituted a violation of appellant's probation in another case in which she was convicted of residential burglary (§ 459) and resisting an officer in the performance of his duties (§ 69). The court sentenced appellant to five years and four months in state prison, suspended execution of the sentence, and ordered her to spend six months in an inpatient drug treatment facility. After appellant admitted violating the terms of her suspended sentence by failing to report to her treatment facility, the previously imposed sentence of five years and four months was executed.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Appellant contends the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense of which she was convicted. She also contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements to law enforcement on the ground they were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights. We affirm.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). --------
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mohammad Jebelli is the owner of an automobile service station on Moorpark Road in Thousand Oaks. At about 8:00 a.m. on October 10, 2018, Jebelli arrived at the station and saw appellant sitting in the driver's seat of a Ford Mustang. The driver's door was open and appellant's left leg was on the ground. A man was talking to appellant while sitting on a bicycle nearby. Appellant "had her head down" and appeared to be "looking for something" in the center console of the vehicle.
Jebelli assumed that appellant was bringing the Mustang to the station for servicing, so he approached her and asked if she needed any assistance. Appellant replied, "No, I'm fine." Jebelli went inside the station, where an employee told him that appellant and the man with the bicycle had been "hanging around for some time now."
When Jebelli went back outside, appellant was walking away from the Mustang. Jebelli told appellant "[y]ou cannot just leave your vehicle" and asked, "Is there something I can do for you?" Appellant responded, "No, this car belongs to my baby's father and we are going to get it towed away." Jebelli replied, "You can't just do that. You need to leave me a phone number. You need to leave me the keys. You need to have some kind of information on you before you can leave the vehicle, even if it's [for] a short period of time."
Appellant gave Jebelli what she claimed was her baby's father's cellphone number. Jebelli called the number but no one answered and he could not leave a voicemail. At that point, Jebelli saw the keys and repair order for the Mustang and realized that the vehicle had been brought in the prior night for repair of the front passenger window, which did not close all the way. By then, appellant had left the station. Jebelli called the police.
Ventura County Sheriff's Deputy Mitchell Peterson responded to the scene. Jebelli told the deputy what had happened and gave him a description of appellant. Deputy Peterson subsequently contacted appellant as she was walking on Moorpark Road about a half-mile from the station. When asked about the Mustang, appellant said the vehicle belonged to her child's father and that he had given her permission to drive it. Deputy Peterson reviewed the text and call history on appellant's cellphone and called the father of appellant's child, who said he did not own a Mustang and did not give appellant permission to drive any of his cars.
After Deputy Peterson conveyed this information to appellant, she admitted knowing that the Mustang did not belong to her child's father. She claimed that she entered the vehicle with the intent to lock the doors because she was concerned that the man on the bicycle was going to steal it. Appellant eventually admitted that she entered the Mustang to look for the keys and that if she had found them she would have taken the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
Corpus Delicti
Appellant contends that her conviction for attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle must be reversed because the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense. We disagree.
"In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause." (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168 (Alvarez).) The prosecution must establish the corpus delicti independent from the admissions of the defendant, thus assuring that the accused does not admit to a crime which did not occur. (Id. at p. 1169.) "The independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible. [Citations.] There is no requirement of independent evidence 'of every physical act constituting an element of an offense,' so long as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency." (Id. at p. 1171.) Moreover, "the corpus delicti rule applies to inculpatory extrajudicial statements such as confessions [citations] and admissions [citation], not to exculpatory statements." (People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1431.)
"The amount of independent proof of a crime required for this purpose is quite small; we have described this quantum of evidence as 'slight' [citation] or 'minimal' [citation]. The People need make only a prima facie showing '"permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed."' [Citations.] The inference need not be 'the only, or even the most compelling, one . . . [but need only be] a reasonable one.'" (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301-302, italics omitted.) "In every case, once the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant's extrajudicial statements may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
Appellant was charged with unlawfully attempting to take or drive a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The evidence at trial showed that she entered a vehicle that did not belong to her and began "looking for something" in the center console of the vehicle. When asked what she was doing, appellant attempted to exculpate herself by stating "this car belongs to my baby's father and we are going to get it towed away." This evidence is sufficient to prove the corpus delicti of the offense. Contrary to appellant's claim, the prosecution was not required to offer evidence "that appellant made an attempt to start the car's engine, or drive the car away" or that she "had tools to hotwire a car." The prosecution merely had to offer only "slight" or "minimal" evidence that she attempted to take or drive the vehicle. (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) That quantum of proof was plainly met here.
Miranda Motion
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the pre- and post-arrest statements she made to Deputy Peterson on the ground they were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights. We are not persuaded.
Miranda dictates that a person questioned by law enforcement after being "taken into custody" must first be warned that he or she has the right to remain silent, that any statements that he or she makes may be used against the person, and that he or she has a right to the presence of retained or appointed counsel. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) For the Miranda rule to apply, there must be an interrogation by the police while the suspect is in police custody. (Id. at p. 478.)
Whether a person is in custody "depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323 .) "The question whether [the] defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact." (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) "[A]n appellate court must 'apply a deferential substantial evidence standard' [citation] to the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, 'a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave' [citation]." (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400.)
"To determine whether an interrogation is custodial we consider a number of circumstances, including: 'whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; where the interview took place; whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person's conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there were restrictions on the person's freedom of movement during the interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police officers participated; whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.'" (People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172-173.)
Deputy Peterson testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. After speaking to Jebelli at the service station, Deputy Peterson got into his patrol vehicle and located appellant walking less than a mile away. The deputy asked appellant if she would speak to him and she agreed. After appellant said the Mustang at Jebelli's station belonged to her child's father, she agreed to return to the station with Deputy Peterson. The tone of the exchange was "conversational" and appellant did not hesitate to speak.
After Deputy Peterson spoke to the father of appellant's child and discovered that the Mustang did not belong to him, the deputy activated his body camera and recorded the rest of his encounter with appellant. For his safety, the deputy told appellant to sit on the bumper of his patrol vehicle. Although appellant exhibited signs of being under the influence of methamphetamine, she appeared lucid and gave appropriate responses to the deputy's questions.
Upon further questioning, appellant admitted that she had entered the Mustang with the intent to find the keys and drive the vehicle away. After she was placed under arrest, she waived her Miranda rights and reiterated her admission that she had entered the Mustang with the intent to steal it. After she was transported to jail, she again admitted that she had lied about receiving permission to take the vehicle. She also admitted that the man on the bicycle, whom she had met in jail, had told her to check and see if the keys were inside the Mustang.
At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant's attorney argued that appellant's pre-arrest statements should be excluded because they were made while she was in custody and without Miranda warning. Although appellant's post-arrest admissions were preceded by Miranda advisements, counsel asserted that the advisements were invalid because appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine.
The court found that Deputy Peterson detained appellant when he directed her to sit on the bumper of his patrol car. The court recognized, however, that "a detention in and of itself does not necessarily equate to an arrest requiring Miranda if there's no one going to be questioning related to the suspected crime. The investigatory investigations take place all the time. He's clearly asking her questions about what he just learned that happened at the gas station. She's answering his questions. Her responses are coherent to the questions being asked, they're responsive. I don't believe that based on the totality, considering the testimony I heard, the video I watched, the arguments from counsel that the detention rose to the level of an arrest requiring Miranda. Once she was arrested, she was provided her Miranda advisement. She waived, and I don't find either prior or after being Mirandized that the deputy's conduct was unduly coercive. And . . . [appellant] did not acquiesce to [the] show [of] authority. She voluntarily provided the information that the deputy was asking. And she appropriately waived her Miranda rights. So I don't find a [Miranda] violation."
The court did not err. "A custodial interrogation does not occur where an officer detains a suspect for investigation and the questioning is limited to the purpose of identifying a suspect or 'to obtain [sufficient] information containing or dispelling the officer's suspicions. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970.) Deputy Peterson's initial encounter with appellant was consensual and appellant voluntarily agreed to talk to him and return to Jebelli's station for further questioning. The court did not err in concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation such that Miranda advisements were not required.
In any event, even assuming that appellant's pre-arrest statements were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights, her post-arrest statements were not. "Where a prior custodial statement, though obtained without Miranda warnings, was otherwise uncoerced, any taint upon a second statement is dissipated by a determination that the second statement was itself voluntary and obtained without a Miranda violation. [Citation.]" (People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1030.)
"Moreover, a later statement obtained in compliance with Miranda, and without coercive methods of interrogation, is not to be presumed involuntary simply because the suspect has already incriminated himself." (People v. Storm, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1030.) "'When neither the initial nor the subsequent admission is coerced, little justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence of a voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder. [¶] There is a vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a "guilty secret" freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question . . . .' [Citation.] [¶] Under such circumstances, 'absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 1030-1031.)
In seeking to exclude appellant's post-arrest statements, defense counsel made no claim that Deputy Peterson resorted to "deliberately coercive or improper tactics" in his questioning of appellant; instead, counsel merely contended that her post-arrest waiver of her Miranda rights was invalid because she was under the influence of methamphetamine. This contention is not reiterated on appeal.
In any event, we have reviewed the video footage of Deputy Peterson's questioning of appellant both before and after her arrest. Like the trial court, we discern no evidence that appellant was subjected to deliberately coercive police activity or that her post-arrest admissions were other than voluntary. (See People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107, quoting In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 534, internal citations omitted [recognizing that "[c]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession was involuntary under both the federal and state Constitutions"].) Because appellant's post-arrest admissions were admissible, any error in admitting her virtually identical pre-arrest admissions and related statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Delgado, at p. 1109.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN, J. We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
TANGEMAN, J.
Gilbert A. Romero, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.