The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial due to the Supreme Court's admission into evidence of testimony, pursuant to People v Molineux (168 NY 264), about an incident that led to the issuance of an order of protection against the defendant and in favor of the complainant is without merit. "Evidence of a crime or bad act may be admissible as evidence in the People's case-in-chief in the trial of another crime when it tends to establish a defendant's (1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, (4) common scheme or plan, or (5) identity" (People v Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264; People v Espinal-Ramos, 225 A.D.3d 621, 621-622), or to provide a complete "narrative of the events charged in the indictment" as well as "necessary background information" (People v Jones, 206 A.D.3d 671, 673 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bonich, 208 A.D.3d 679, 680; People v Martinez, 201 A.D.3d 658, 659). "If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose-other than to show criminal propensity-for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence" (People v Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d at 621 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
[1, 2] The defendant’s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial due to the Supreme Court’s admission into evidence of testimony, pursuant to People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, about an incident that led to the issuance of an order of protection against the defendant and in favor of the complainant is without merit. "Evidence of a crime or bad act may be admissible as evidence in the People’s case-in-chief in the trial of another crime when it tends to establish a defendant’s (1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, (4) common scheme or plan, or (5) identity" (People v. Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621, 195 N.Y.S.3d 47 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286; People v. Espinal–Ramos, 225 A.D.3d 621, 621–622, 206 N.Y.S.3d 388), or to provide a complete "narrative of the events charged in the indictment" as well as "necessary background information" (People v. Jones, 206 A.D.3d 671, 673, 168 N.Y.S.3d 532 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Bonich, 208 A.D.3d 679, 680, 171 N.Y.S.3d 910; People v. Martinez, 201 A.D.3d 658, 659, 159 N.Y.S.3d 140). "If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose—other than to show criminal propensity—for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence" (People v. Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d at 621, 195 N.Y.S.3d 47 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The defendant contends that she was deprived of a fair trial due to the Supreme Court's admission pursuant to People v Molineux (168 NY 264) of testimony about an incident that occurred in Russia approximately two years before the subject poisoning and another incident that took place in Brooklyn approximately two months before the poisoning. "Evidence of a crime or bad act may be admissible as evidence in the People's case-in-chief in the trial of another crime when it tends to establish a defendant's (1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, (4) common scheme or plan, or (5) identity" (People v Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Weinstein, ____ A.D.3d ____, 2024 NY Slip Op 02222; People v Espinal-Ramos, 225A.D.3d 621, 621-622), or to provide a complete "narrative of the events charged in the indictment," as well as "necessary background information" (People v Jones, 206 A.D.3d 671, 673 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bonich, 208 A.D.3d 679, 680; People v Martinez, 201 A.D.3d 658, 659). "If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose-other than to show criminal propensity-for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence" (People v Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d at 621 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Telfair, 41 N.Y.3d 107).
[1, 2] The defendant contends that she was deprived of a fair trial due to the Supreme Court’s admission pursuant to (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286) of testimony about an incident that occurred in Russia approximately two years before the subject poisoning and another incident that took place in Brooklyn approximately two months before the poisoning. "Evidence of a crime or bad act may be admissible as evidence in the People’s case-in-chief in the trial of another crime when it tends to establish a defendant’s (1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, (4) common scheme or plan, or (5) identity" (People v. Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621, 195 N.Y.S.3d 47 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Weinstein, — A.D.3d ——, — N.E.3d ——, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 02222; People v. Espinal–Ramos, 225 A.D.3d 621, 621–622, 206 N.Y.S.3d 388), or to provide a complete "narrative of the events charged in the indictment," as well as "necessary background information" (People v. Jones, 206 A.D.3d 671, 673, 168 N.Y.S.3d 532 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bonich, 208 A.D.3d 679, 680, 171 N.Y.S.3d 910; People v Martinez, 201 A.D.3d 658, 659, 159 N.Y.S.3d 140). "If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose—other than to show criminal propensity—for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence" (People v. Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d at 621, 195 N.Y.S.3d 47 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Telfair, 41 N.Y.3d 107, 207 N.Y.S.3d 439, 231 N.E.3d 385).
"Evidence of [prior] uncharged crimes … may be admissible … where it is relevant to a material issue in the case such as intent, motive, knowledge, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, or identity, or if it provides necessary background information" (Peoplev. Delacruz, 207 A.D.3d 652, 653–654, 171 N.Y.S.3d 575 [citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted]; seePeoplev. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d 588, 594, 976 N.Y.S.2d 682, 999 N.E.2d 160). "If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose—other than to show criminal propensity—for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence" (Peoplev. Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621, 195 N.Y.S.3d 47 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seePeoplev. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553, 560, 942 N.Y.S.2d 416, 965 N.E.2d 918). Here, the challenged testimony provided necessary background information on the defendant’s response to the police immediately prior to being taken into custody, as a precursor to his later voluntary interactions with the police (see Peoplev. Delacruz, 207 A.D.3d at 654, 171 N.Y.S.3d 575; Peoplev. Davidson, 144 A.D.3d 938, 939, 41 N.Y.S.3d 553).
"If the evidence has substantial probative value and is directly relevant to the purpose-other than to show criminal propensity-for which it is offered, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of prejudice and the court may admit the evidence" (People v Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553, 560). Here, the challenged testimony provided necessary background information on the defendant's response to the police immediately prior to being taken into custody, as a precursor to his later voluntary interactions with the police (see People v Delacruz, 207 A.D.3d at 654; People v Davidson, 144 A.D.3d 938, 939).