Opinion
January 25, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Friedmann, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction for unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's conviction of the crime of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, however, must be reversed and the sentence imposed thereon vacated pursuant to the merger doctrine. The merger doctrine is applicable when "any restriction of the victim's movements was wholly incidental to the simultaneous commission of [another substantive] crime" (People v. Geaslen, 54 N.Y.2d 510, 517; People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146; People v. Major, 142 A.D.2d 603, 604). Here, the imprisonment was limited, brief, and incidental to the attempted rape and assault. Thus, the count of unlawful imprisonment merged with the attempted rape and assault counts (see, People v. Major, supra).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find that they do not warrant reversal. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.