Opinion
February 24, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Rosato, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, we find that the hearing court did not err in denying suppression of the in-court identification of the defendant by the complainants. It is well settled that even where an identification is the product of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure, a witness will nonetheless be permitted to identify a defendant in-court if that identification is based on an independent source (see, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218; see also, People v. Reid, 175 A.D.2d 815). Here, an independent source supported the incourt identification of the defendant by the complainants (see, People v. Smalls, 112 A.D.2d 173, 174). At the suppression hearing, both complainants testified that they had two occasions to observe the defendant for a few minutes at close range under very good lighting conditions. The record, therefore, supports the suppression court's determination that an independent source existed to support the complainants' in-court identifications.
The defendant also contends that his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt in view of discrepancies between and among the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88).
The defendant maintains that the court's charge with regard to identification and reasonable doubt contained prejudicial errors. However, we find that, as a whole, the charge correctly conveyed the elements to be weighed when assessing the accuracy and veracity of identification testimony (see, People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273; People v. Beard, 157 A.D.2d 788, 789; People v Sorrentino, 138 A.D.2d 760; People v. Robertson, 128 A.D.2d 815, 816; People v. Daniels, 88 A.D.2d 392, 400-401), as well as the correct standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, thus permitting the jury to apply the correct rules in arriving at its verdict (see, 1 CJI[NY] 6.20; People v. Phelps, 168 A.D.2d 693; see also, People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 300, cert denied 459 U.S. 847; People v. Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 227; People v. Kuey, 155 A.D.2d 481, 482).
We further find that the sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Copertino, JJ., concur.