Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Nos. BF123437A, BF123437BKenneth C. Twisselman II, Judge.
Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Cynthia Lee Bemis.
Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Cynthia Valeria Trapani.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HILL, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted appellants Cynthia Lee Bemis (Bemis) and Cynthia Valeria Trapani (Trapani) of multiple counts of felony cruelty to animals (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)) based on their failure to provide proper food, drink, and shelter to animals, primarily dogs but also some cats, that were kept on rural property owned by Bemis in Mojave. The trial court placed both appellants on probation for five years under various terms and conditions including service of jail terms.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
On appeal, Trapani challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions on counts 12 through 16, claiming there was insufficient evidence that she had charge or custody of the dogs concerned in those counts during the relevant time frame. Trapani also contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of her trial counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.
Counts 12 through 16, on which both appellants were convicted, were originally numbered in the indictment as counts 13 through 17, and charged appellants with animal cruelty occurring between December 1, 2005, and April 13, 2006. Bemis was additionally charged and convicted of nine counts of cruelty to animals occurring in 2007 and 2008 (counts 1-6, 9-11) and Trapani was convicted of one count of cruelty to animals (count 7) and one count of resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 8) occurring on February 27, 2008.
Bemis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions but raises several issues, in which Trapani joins, concerning the trial court’s award of presentence conduct credits and imposition of probation costs and fees. Appellants also seek independent review of materials reviewed by the trial court at an in camera hearing pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). For reasons discussed below, we reject appellants’ assignments of error and affirm the judgment.
Because the only sufficiency of the evidence challenge on appeal is directed at Trapani’s convictions on counts 12 through 16, we have limited our recitation of facts to evidence relevant to those counts and will discuss other evidence when pertinent in the discussion section of the opinion.
Bemis owned property in the Mojave Desert where she lived and kept numerous dogs. Trapani and Vincent Rhoads also lived on the property and assisted Bemis in caring for the dogs. A pamphlet found in Bemis’s home “advertising the Brandy Foundation” indicated that she was running an adoption/foster program for dogs on her property.
In December 2005, Steve Eirich, a Kern County animal control officer, went to the Mojave property and spoke with Bemis. Bemis told Eirich she was in the process of “relocating her facility to San Bernardino County and obtaining all the legal permits to operate legally in that county.”
On April 5, 2006, Eirich returned to the Mojave property. Looking over the fence line, he saw approximately 10 dogs, which he described as “relatively few compared to the numbers before.” Eirich spoke with Bemis, who indicated to him that her “last load” of dogs was about to leave Kern County.
Five days later, on April 10, 2006, Eirich looked over the fence and saw over 100 dogs back on the property. Eirich issued Bemis an intent to seize notice, which gave her 48 hours to clean the property, and provide food, water, shelter, and veterinarian care to the dogs.
Eirich explained that, from what he could see over the fence, the dogs had skin conditions and were scratching themselves. Dog feces were also piled up throughout the yard. Although Bemis claimed the dogs were receiving veterinarian care for their conditions, she was unable to provide Eirich with any documentation of such care.
On April 12, 2006, Trapani called a kennel in Los Angeles owned by veterinarian Samir Sargious, and made arrangements to board the dogs from Bemis’s Mojave property at his kennel. In making these arrangements, Trapani represented that she was the owner of kennels that were being remodeled and wanted “to board for a very short period of time some dogs.” Dr. Sargious’s rate for boarding the Mojave dogs was seven dollars per day for each dog. Trapani did not ask for grooming services or veterinarian care.
Dr. Sargious was surprised when nearly 100 dogs were brought to the kennel. Using credit cards, Trapani made an upfront payment of approximately $4,000 to board the dogs. When Dr. Sargious told Trapani that a lot of the dogs needed medical treatment, she told him that she and Bemis already had medication for them. Dr. Sargious ended up treating, on an emergency basis, two dogs that were bleeding from bite wounds that needed stitches.
Kennel employee, Rigo Aceves, observed that the Mojave dogs were in very bad condition when they were brought to the Los Angeles kennel. The skinny dogs were bleeding and had infections all over their skin. The dogs also appeared to be starving and thirsty. Aceves gave them a lot of food because he felt sorry for them. He also gave them “buckets and buckets of water over and over” because the dogs continued to drink up the water he gave them. The next day when he went to clean up the dogs’ kennels with his scoop, he found the dogs had excreted “nothing but sand and plastic and paper.”
On April 18, 2006, Los Angeles County animal control officers seized 93 of the dogs brought to the Los Angeles kennel from the Mojave property. Counts 12 through 16 concern five of those dogs, including a female Doberman Pinscher, a female brindle Great Dane, a male Shepherd mix, a female German Shepherd, and a female Pit Bull Terrier mix. The dogs were examined by Josefina Zabala, the senior veterinarian for the County of Los Angeles Animal Care and Control. Dr. Zabala described the deteriorated health condition of each dog and rendered the opinion that the painful ailments they presented- including, inter alia, emaciation, dehydration, mange, swollen paws, oozing abscesses, and infected wounds-were long-standing, preventable, and resulted from the lack of adequate food, water, and veterinarian care.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficient evidence supports Trapani’s convictions on counts 12 through 16.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine “the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104, citations omitted.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict, we will not reverse merely because the evidence might reasonably support a contrary finding. (Ibid.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
To establish a violation of section 597, subdivision (b), the People must prove: (1) the defendant owned or otherwise had the charge or custody of an animal; (2) the defendant deprived or caused an animal to be deprived of necessary sustenance, drink or shelter, or subjected an animal to needless suffering in a criminally negligent manner; and (3) such acts or omissions caused danger to the animal’s life. (People v. Speegle (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1412-1413; People v. Youngblood (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 66, 70-72.)
Section 597, subdivision (b) specifically provides, in relevant part: “[W]hoever, having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects any animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the animal, or in any manner abuses any animal, or fails to provide the animal with proper food, drink, or shelter or protection from the weather, .… is, for every such offense, guilty of a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or as a felony.…”
Trapani contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the first element set forth above with respect to counts 12 through 16. She relies on the alleged absence of evidence that she was actually residing on the Mojave property during the time the subject dogs were deprived of adequate care resulting in the health conditions with which they presented at the Los Angeles kennel.
We disagree with Trapani’s contention and conclude there was ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer she had charge or custody of the dogs prior to their transfer to Los Angeles from the Mojave property. Trapani does not dispute that the evidence presented at trial showed she personally contacted the Los Angeles kennel and made arrangements to board the dogs, she physically helped to transport the dogs from Mojave to Los Angeles, and that she made an upfront payment of a large sum of money (approximately $4,000) to board all the dogs for a period of five or six days. It is also undisputed that in making arrangements to board the dogs, Trapani represented that she was the owner of kennels that were being remodeled to explain why she needed to board the dogs. Trapani’s own statements thus implied that she had charge or custody of the dogs and that when the boarding period expired, she would be taking them back into her custody. Trapani declined veterinarian care for the dogs, claiming she and Bemis already had medication for them, providing further support for the inference she had been involved in caring for the dogs prior to their arrival in Los Angeles.
In any event, notwithstanding her contrary assertion, there was evidence indicating that Trapani lived or spent considerable amounts of time on Bemis’s property during all the relevant time frames in this case. As respondent correctly notes, the fact Trapani lived on Bemis’s property or that she undertook to help care for the dogs living on the property was not an issue that was disputed by the defense. Indeed, defense witness Vince Rhoads testified on behalf of both appellants at their trial in May 2009, that he had lived on Bemis’s property for sevenyears and described the property as “the same place they are at[, ]” referring to Bemis and Trapani. (Italics added.) He further testified that, on a daily basis, both appellants administered medication to the dogs and helped him clean up after the dogs. Similarly, before describing his conversations with Bemis in December 2005 and April 2006, animal control officer Eirich testified generally that he was familiar with Bemis’s property and “the three occupants” of the property, whom he identified as Bemis, Trapani, and Rhoads. Later, in describing an inspection of the Mojave property on February 27, 2008, Officer Eirich testified: “I recall that all three residents were on the property, Mr. Rhodes, Vince Rhodes, Ms. Trapani and Ms. Bemis were all present.” (Italics added.) The record simply belies Trapani’s claim that there was no evidence she lived on the Mojave property or was involved in caring for the dogs prior to helping move them to the Los Angeles kennel in April 2006.
II. Trapani has not shown she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Trapani next contends that she received ineffective of counsel as a result of her trial counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Finding no misconduct, we reject appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ineffective assistance is established by showing “that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 688, 687.) “[D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.)
Trapani claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by “deliberately urg[ing] the jury to use evidence admitted on the prosecutor’s motion only against [Bemis], to infer [Trapani] had charge or custody of the codefendant’s dogs.” The record does not support Trapani’s claim. At one point during closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
“Now, the defendants would want you to believe that these large groups and large hordes of animals just showed up on their property in the Mojave Desert, despite the fact that when Ms. Bemis called Sheri Koenig -- and she called Sheri Koenig. So she knew what she wanted to tell her, and she was going to have a conversation and let her know what the facts were. And we heard all about that conversation. But when she called Sheri Koenig, what did she tell her? All these animals were left out here on my property and I don’t know what to do? No, not a mention of it. What she says if I adopt animals, I get them from everywhere.” (Italics added.)
Trapani is correct that the trial court ruled (and admonished the jury) that the referenced telephone call by Bemis on April 20, 2006, to Sheri Koenig, the manager of the Los Angeles County Department of Animal Control and Care, was admitted against Bemis only and could not be considered as evidence against Trapani. But we do not view the remarks of prosecutors in isolation. We must view them “in context” of the complete argument or point being stressed and whether they were responding to defense arguments. (People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 247.)
Viewing the complained of remarks in context of the prosecutor’s overall argument, we find no misconduct. The reporter’s transcript reflects that the prosecutor’s argument was very lengthy, as she had to address numerous counts against two different defendants. Sometimes she would speak in general terms, and then delve into the specific evidence against each individual defendant. This is what she appears to have done in this argument identified by Trapani. In remarking that “the defendants would would want you to believe that these large groups and large hordes of animals just showed up on their property in the Mojave Desert[, ]” the prosecutor reasonably anticipated the defense argument that appellants were trying their best to care for the dogs but simply became overwhelmed by the large numbers of dogs that were allegedly abandoned on the Mojave property. The prosecutor then went on to discuss in greater detail the evidence against Bemis that refuted such argument. She never argued that Bemis’s conversation with Sheri Koenig could be used against Trapani. The quoted remarks show that, in delving into this particular evidence, the prosecutor switched from the use of the plural defendants to referring solely to Bemis. No reasonable juror would have interpreted the prosecutor’s argument as an invitation to ignore the trial court’s admonishment that the evidence could be considered against Bemis only.
For example, Rhoads testified, on behalf of both appellants, that during the seven years he lived on the Mojave property, dogs would get “dumped” on the property two or three times a month, and that these abandoned dogs would already be in ill health, suffering from mange, scratches, and bite wounds.
We have reviewed the other brief remarks cited by Trapani and find none support her claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor made no remarks that were “so unfair” they denied Trapani a fair trial nor did she engage in “deceptive or reprehensible methods” to persuade the jury. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 167-168.) On this record, Trapani’s trial counsel cannot be said to have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the prosecutor’s proper argument.
III. Appellants are not entitled to additional presentence conduct credits.
Under section 2900.5, a person sentenced to state prison for criminal conduct is entitled to credit against the term of imprisonment for all days spent in custody before sentencing. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) In addition, section 4019 provides that a criminal defendant may earn additional presentence credit against his or her sentence for willingness to perform assigned labor (§ 4019, subd. (b)) and compliance with rules and regulations (§ 4019, subd. (c)). These forms of section 4019 presentence credit are called, collectively, conduct credit. (People v. Dieck (2009) 46 Cal.4th 934, 939, fn. 3.)
When appellants were sentenced in July 2009, the court calculated their conduct credit in accord with the version of section 4019 then in effect, which provided that conduct credit could be accrued at the rate of two days for every four days of actual presentence custody. (Former § 4019.) However, the Legislature amended section 4019 effective January 25, 2010, to provide that any person who is not required to register as a sex offender and is not being committed to prison for, or has not suffered a prior conviction of, a serious felony as defined in section 1192.7 or a violent felony as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c), may accrue conduct credit at the rate of four days for every four days of presentence custody. Applying this amendment retroactively, appellants argue they are entitled to additional days of conduct credit. We disagree and conclude the amendment applies prospectively only.
We decide this case according to our opinion in People v. Rodriguez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1, review granted June 9, 2010, S181808, which is currently before the California Supreme Court, along with its companion case, People v. Brown (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1354, review granted June 9, 2010, S181963.
Under section 3, it is presumed that a statute does not operate retroactively “‘absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended [retroactive application]. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753.) The Legislature neither expressly declared, nor does it appear by “‘clear and compelling implication’” from any other factor(s), that it intended the amendment operate retroactively. (Id. at p. 754.) Therefore, the amendment applies prospectively only.
We recognize that in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, our Supreme Court held that the amendatory statute at issue in that case, which reduced the punishment for a particular offense, applied retroactively. However, the factors upon which the court based its conclusion that the section 3 presumption was rebutted in that case do not apply to the amendment to section 4019.
We further conclude that prospective-only application of the amendment does not violate appellants’ equal protection rights. People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 is inapposite because it involved a prior version of section 4019 that allowed presentence conduct credits to misdemeanants, but not felons. (Sage, at p. 508.) The California Supreme Court found that there was neither “a rational basis for, much less a compelling state interest in, denying presentence conduct credit to detainee/felons.” (Ibid.) The purported equal protection violation at issue here is temporal, rather than based on defendant’s status as a misdemeanant or felon.
One of section 4019’s principal purposes, both as formerly written and as amended, is to motivate good conduct. Appellants and those like them who were sentenced prior to the effective date of the amendment cannot be further enticed to behave themselves during their presentence custody. The fact that a defendant’s conduct cannot be influenced retroactively provides a rational basis for the Legislature’s implicit intent that the amendment only apply prospectively.
Because (1) the amendment evinces a legislative intent to increase the incentive for good conduct during presentence confinement and (2) it is impossible for such an incentive to affect behavior that has already occurred, prospective-only application is reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [legislative classification not touching on suspect class or fundamental right does not violate equal protection guarantee if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose].)
IV. Appellants forfeited their challenge to the imposition of probation costs and fees.
Appellants contend the trial court erred in ordering them to pay probation-related costs and fees without first holding a hearing to determine their ability to pay. Respondent argues, and we agree, appellants’ claim is subject to forfeiture on appeal.
Section 1203.1b, subdivision (a) provides that the trial court may order a defendant to pay the cost of the presentence report and costs associated with probation supervision. It directs the probation officer to make a determination of the ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the reasonable cost of supervision, investigation, and reporting. The officer is also directed to inform the defendant that the defendant is entitled to a hearing, that includes the right to counsel, in which the court shall make a determination of the defendant’s ability to pay and the payment amount. Subdivision (b) of section 1203.1b states that, if the defendant does not waive his right to a hearing, the probation officer is to refer the matter to the court for the scheduling of a hearing to determine the amount of payment and the manner in which the payment shall be made.
Appellants acknowledge that People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066 (Valtakis) holds that a defendant’s failure to object to fees in the lower court waives the error on appeal but contend that Valtakis does not apply to them because the Valtakis opinion is mistaken and because they did not have a meaningful opportunity to object to the court’s order.
The court in Valtakis interpreted the antiwaiver language in the statute requiring the defendant to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his or her right to a determination by the court of an ability to pay. (Valtakis, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1073-1075.) Valtakis found that the antiwaiver language in the statute did not speak to appellate review and that counsel still needs to preserve claims for appellate review by lodging an appropriate objection. (Id. at p. 1075.)
The court in Valtakis further held that a defendant’s failure to object at the sentencing hearing to noncompliance with the probation fee procedures of section 1203.1b constitutes a waiver of the claim on appeal, consistent with the general waiver rules discussed in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 (Welch) and People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott). Relying on Scott, [defendant may not challenge trial court’s discretionary sentencing choices on appeal if he or she did not object at the time of sentencing], the Valtakis court reasoned:
“[T]o construe the language [in the statute] as abrogating Welch and Scott … would work results horribly at odds with the overarching cost conservation policy of the section. ‘Statutes should be construed to produce a reasonable result consistent with the legislative purpose. [Citation.] The object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented are prime considerations in determining legislative intent.’ [Citation.] If needed to avoid absurd consequences, the intent of an enactment prevails over the letter and the letter will, if possible, be read so as to conform to the spirit of the act. [Citation.] Here the antiwaiver language that helps shield defendants against fees beyond their ability to pay subserves a greater purpose of conserving the public fisc [citations], a purpose that would be sacrificed if we adopted Valtakis’s reading. Criminal defendants often lack the means to pay high recoupment fees, and so the amounts imposed are relatively modest in most of the cases we see. To allow a defendant and his counsel to stand silently by as the court imposes a $250 fee, as here, and then contest this for the first time on an appeal that drains the public fisc of many thousands of dollars in court and appointed counsel costs, would be hideously counterproductive. It would also be completely unnecessary, for the Legislature has provided mechanisms in section 1203.1b for adjusting fees and reevaluating ability to pay without an appeal anytime during the probationary period [citation] or the pendency of any judgment [citation].” (Valtakis, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1075-1076, original italics.)
We agree with the reasoning of Valtakis that a defendant’s failure to object at sentencing to noncompliance with the probation fee procedures of section 1203.1b forfeits the defendant’s claim on appeal. (See Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235 [rule foreclosing appellate review of claims not raised in trial court helps discourage imposition of invalid probation conditions and reduce number of costly appeals brought on that basis].)
Appellants contend they did not have a meaningful opportunity to object to the court’s order for payment of these fees. It is true that the forfeiture rule does not apply unless there is a meaningful opportunity to object. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356; People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752.) Here, Bemis was advised in the probation officer’s report that she would have to pay the $401 cost of preparing the probation report and $40 per month for supervision costs. Similarly, Trapani was advised in the probation officer’s report that she would have to pay $40 per month for supervision costs. Appellants’ attorneys failed to raise the issue of ability to pay during the sentencing hearing either before or after the trial court made its ruling. The trial court could have made the appropriate factual findings at the sentencing hearing concerning appellants’ ability to pay the fee if counsel had raised the issue. There was no reason why appellants could not have raised these same objections to the court’s noncompliance with the probation fee procedures of section 1203.1b at the conclusion of sentencing, rather than standing by silently as the court imposed the fees, and then contesting this for the first time on appeal, a practice that the Valtakis court described as “hideously counterproductive” and “unnecessary.” (Valtakis, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1076.)
Trapani was not ordered to pay the cost of preparing the probation report because, as the probation report reflects, the probation officer determined she did not have the ability to pay such cost and had no appreciable assets. The probation officer, however, found she did have the ability to pay costs for probation supervision because she was able-bodied and had a history of employment. Bemis’s probation report, on the other hand, reflects that she refused to provide the probation officer with any information regarding her finances. The trial court addressed these circumstances at sentencing. Thus, at the sentencing hearing, the court asked the probation officer: “Is there some reason why you are not requesting reimbursement of the cost of preparing the pre-sentence investigation report on [Trapani’s] case.” The probation officer responded: “Yes, your Honor. With Ms. Bemis, she was unwilling to interview. She we were not able to assess her financial ability to pay. But with Ms. Trapani, she was.” Despite the issue being so directly discussed on the record, neither defense counsel requested that the court hold a hearing into appellants’ ability to pay the recommended probation fees and costs.
Appellants rely on People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 705, 712-714 (Adams), for the proposition that when the trial court fails to conduct a hearing before finding that the defendant had the ability to pay the costs of probation and the presentence investigation/report, there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of an ability to pay these costs. (Ibid.) The Adams case was decided before our Supreme Court elaborated on forfeiture principles in Scott and Welch. If it was important for appellants to have a determination concerning their ability to pay, they should not have waited until this appeal to raise the issue. We therefore find Valtakis to be the better reasoned decision and apply its holding here. Appellants’ failure to object at sentencing to noncompliance with section 1203.1b forfeited their claim on appeal.
V. The trial court’s ruling on the Pitchess motion was not an abuse of discretion.
On April 9, 2009, the trial court granted appellants’ motion to examine the personnel files of Kern County animal control officers Julie Dunlap-Sugg and Steve Eirich and sheriff’s deputy Dennis Gagnon pursuant to Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531. On April 15, 2009, the trial court conducted an in camera hearing and concluded there was no discoverable evidence.
Appellants ask this court to conduct an independent review of the documents examined by the trial court in response to their Pitchess motion. By order dated August 13, 2010, we directed the trial court to augment the record relevant to the Pitchess motion. Because the augmented record did not include the personnel records of Dunlap-Sugg and Eirich reviewed by the trial court, by order dated October 20, 2010, we directed the trial court to prepare a settled statement and to submit the settled statement and a copy of the animal control officers’ personnel records to this court under seal.
The statutory scheme for Pitchess motions is contained in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1047 and sections 832.5, 832.7 and 832.8. When a defendant seeks discovery from a peace officer’s personnel records, he or she must file a written motion that satisfies certain prerequisites and makes a preliminary showing of good cause. If the trial court determines that good cause has been established, the custodian of records brings to court all documents that are “‘potentially relevant’ to the defendant’s motion.” (People v. Mooc (2001)26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) The trial court examines these documents in camera and, subject to certain limitations, discloses to the defendant “‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The ruling on a Pitchess motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.)
Having independently reviewed the transcript of the Pitchess proceeding and the records examined by the trial court and submitted under seal, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that none of the records were relevant to the issues presented in this case. Accordingly, we uphold the ruling on the Pitchess motion. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1286; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 330.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: CORNELL, J., DETJEN, J.