Opinion
B301136
08-13-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL BELLOWS, Defendant and Appellant.
Spolin Law and Aaron Spolin for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA272750) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Craig Richman, Judge. Affirmed. Spolin Law and Aaron Spolin for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________
On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1437, which, effective January 2019, amended Penal Code sections 188 and 189 (stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3), significantly modifying the law relating to accomplice liability for murder. Also enacted was section 1170.95, subdivision (a) which provides in relevant part, "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
In 2007, Michael Bellows was charged with first degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. Foregoing trial, he pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement, which also required him to admit a prior strike conviction and other enhancements. He is currently serving a 42-year sentence of imprisonment.
On May 1, 2019, Bellows filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The People filed their opposition to the petition and attached a copy of the reporter's transcript showing Bellows had pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court denied the petition, stating "Defendant's petition pursuant to P.C. section 1170.95 is summarily denied. This is not a murder conviction." Bellows appeals, contending the trial court erred in excluding defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter where, as here, they originally faced trial for murder under a theory of natural and probable consequences. Bellows argues that he indeed "accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which [he] could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder" as set forth in the statute. (Italics omitted.)
We agree with the trial court that only defendants convicted of murder are eligible for relief under the plain language of the statute. In doing so, we do not write on a blank slate. In People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, Division 6 of this District concluded that the language of the statute unequivocally applies to murder convictions only. "There is no reference to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. To be eligible to file a petition under section 1170.95, a defendant must have a first or second degree murder conviction. The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions." (Id. at p. 887.) Similarly, in People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, the Fourth District held that the plain language of the statute limited relief to only those defendants convicted of murder. (Id. at p. 993; see also People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 436-438 [defendants who plead to voluntary manslaughter to avoid trial for murder on natural and probable consequences theory ineligible for relief]; People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 [statute limits relief to convictions for murder; attempted murder is excluded].)
Bellows argues the plain language of the statute puts no restriction on the type of plea a defendant accepts as long as he or she could have been convicted of murder at trial on a natural and probable consequences theory. We are not persuaded; such an interpretation contravenes the legislative purpose of the statutory amendments. As the caselaw cited above recounts in detail, the legislative history demonstrates the Legislature resolved to limit and reform murder convictions obtained on the theories of felony murder and natural and probable consequences. Bellows had to have been convicted of murder under one of these theories to be eligible for relief. Had he pled no contest to murder as charged, he would have come within the ambit of the statute. However, Bellows did not do so and cannot prevail.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, J. We concur:
BIGELOW, P. J.
GRIMES, J.