We reject defendant's procedural due process argument because the trial court actually heard her request for immediate release. As to the substantive due process challenge, we reject it on the same basis as articulated in People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676 (Beck). Accordingly, we affirm the order denying defendant's application for immediate restoration to sanity.
Precedent establishes that it does not offend procedural due process to require an individual who is civilly committed due to a mental illness that renders him dangerous to proceed through two steps before an unconditional discharge. That was the holding in Beck, supra , 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 340. Beck dealt with an individual found not guilty by reason of insanity, and the statutory scheme at issue in that case authorized such an individual's unconditional discharge only after he first spent a year in a community-based outpatient treatment program.
Although McKee I concluded the SVPA did not violate due process, it did not address the issue before us because it preceded the Legislature's 2013 amendment of the SVPA. People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676 (Beck), however, is instructive. In that case, the jury found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, and he was committed to a mental hospital.
Glenn contends that the SVPA violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution because it does not permit an SVP to petition for immediate, unconditional discharge, but instead requires that the SVP first spend at least one year on conditional release. People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676 in instructive. In People v. Beck, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pages 1679-1680, the defendant was found not guilty of kidnapping by reason of insanity, and was committed to a state mental hospital.
Section 1026.2 involves what has been described as a two-step process. ( People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1681; People v. Sword, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 620 citing Barnes v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 969, 973.) The first step in the release process requires the defendant, who has filed a release application, to demonstrate at a hearing that he or she will not "be a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, while under supervision and treatment in the community."
California courts have found "no difficulty in differentiating the circumstances of insanity acquittees and civilly committed persons." People v. Beck, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1676, 1686 (1996). State law on this point is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
At the end of the year, the court shall conduct a trial 'to determine if sanity has been restored, which means the applicant is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder.' " (People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1681 (Beck).) At issue here is the first step of this procedure.
The court may not set the trial before the person has completed a year of outpatient treatment unless the program director recommends an earlier release." (People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1681 (Beck).) Before a person's placement in the outpatient program may be revoked, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the person requires (1) extended inpatient treatment or (2) refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision.
“It comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment.” (Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 366 [77 L.Ed.2d 694, 706]; see People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 624 [imposing burden on insanity acquittee did not violate due process]; People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1684 (Beck).) And, as defendant concedes, he has the “lowest” burden of proof, preponderance of the evidence.
“It comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment.” (Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 366 [77 L.Ed.2d 694, 706]; see People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 622-624 [imposing burden on NGI did not violate due process]; People v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1684 (Beck).) And at a discharge hearing, the defendant need only meet the lowest burden of proof, preponderance of the evidence.