Opinion
March 11, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Grajales, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling which denied his motion to preclude the prosecutor from cross-examining him, in the event he testified, as to his convictions and the underlying facts with respect to four of his eight prior involvements with law enforcement officials, was not an improvident exercise of its discretion (see, People v Branch, 155 A.D.2d 475; People v Murray, 144 A.D.2d 498; People v Ortiz, 143 A.D.2d 107).
We find similarly unpersuasive the defendant's contention that he was effectively foreclosed from testifying based upon the Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling. The record reveals that the Supreme Court made its determination after hearing argument presented by both sides as to the factors to be considered (see, People v Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236; People v Byrd, 128 A.D.2d 796; People v Wendel, 123 A.D.2d 410), and there was no improvident exercise of discretion here (see, People v Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142, 147).
Finally, the Supreme Court properly precluded the introduction of the defendant's exculpatory statement as part of the defense case. The statement was made approximately two hours after the defendant's arrest, "at a time when defendant had had an adequate opportunity to reflect upon his situation" (People v Sostre, 51 N.Y.2d 958, 960), and constituted impermissible hearsay evidence (see, People v Booker, 158 A.D.2d 700, 701; People v Dvoroznak, 127 A.D.2d 785). Bracken, J.P., Brown, O'Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.