Opinion
A164278
07-17-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GINA RAE BEAN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUK-CRCR-2019-33411-1.
Jackson, P. J.
This is an appeal from judgment after the trial court, sitting as trier of fact, found defendant Gina Rae Bean guilty of leaving the scene of an accident that caused injury to a person. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) On appeal, defendant contends substantial evidence did not support the trial court's necessary finding that she had actual or constructive knowledge that a person was injured in the accident. In addition, defendant challenges the court's admission of a prosecution witness's lay opinion testimony and rejection of the opinions of a defense accident reconstruction expert. We affirm.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Vehicle Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 27, 2019, defendant was charged with one count of being the driver who left the scene of an accident that caused the death of Calum Pulido (victim) in violation of section 20001, subdivision (a). After defendant waived her jury trial rights, a bench trial was held. The parties stipulated that the victim was at fault for the collision because he failed to yield to a red light. They further stipulated that he died due to the collision itself and not due to defendant's failure to stop and render aid.
Defendant's boyfriend, Ricky Santos, was charged with, but later acquitted of, one count of being an accessory after the fact to defendant's crime.
I. The Prosecution's Case.
A. The Accident.
In the evening of July 18, 2019, the young victim and his friend Keillan M. were skateboarding in the town of Mendocino. Starting at the fire station on Little Lake Road, the young men rode down the hill to the Highway 1 intersection. Keillan went first, stopping at the intersection to wait for a vehicle to pass before crossing the highway. After crossing, Keillan heard "a crack" from behind. He turned to see a dark-colored truck accelerating north on the highway, toward Fort Bragg. Keillan then saw the victim lying about 10 feet off the road, with Spencer Y., a familiar Mendocino resident, attending to him. Realizing the victim had been hit, Keillan called 911.
While the pair waited for emergency personnel to arrive, a passerby, Heather H., pulled her black truck to the roadside about 15 to 20 feet north of the victim. Keeping her headlights on and illuminating her hazard lights, Heather helped until emergency responders arrived.
About this time, Adam L., an acquaintance of defendant, was driving south on Highway 1 when he passed defendant driving north on Highway 1 in her silver Toyota Tundra. Adam then saw defendant slow down and pull off the highway at the Larkin Road exit, less than a half-mile from the Little Lake Road intersection. As Adam continued south, he noticed a red truck with a camper shell parked near the Little Lake Road intersection with its driver side door open and lights on.
Defendant, after turning off at the Larkin Road exit, placed three calls to her boyfriend, Ricky, between 10:47 and 10:52 p.m. At 10:53 p.m., she then texted him:" 'I just got into a wreck. I need your help.'" Minutes later, she placed two additional calls to Ricky.
At 10:56 p.m., a Mendocino Fire Department emergency medical technician arrived in a medium-sized fire truck and unsuccessfully administered aid to the victim for about 15 minutes.
B. Defendant's Subsequent Actions.
At 11:07 p.m., defendant texted her supervisor at a local supermarket," 'Mini, I just got into a wreck. I'll be there A.S.A.P. I'm sorry. Will be there as fast as I can.'" At 11:08 p.m., defendant texted Ricky," 'I need you to hurry right now!!!" About 11:10 p.m., Ricky responded," 'I was in bed already,'" and," 'Pull to front of shop.'" Ricky worked at Schlafer's Auto Repair, an automobile repair shop where he had after-hours access.
Early the next morning, on July 19, 2019, at 3:38 a.m., defendant texted Ricky," 'What's up?'" Minutes later, she texted him," 'Fucking deer. I have the worst luck.' "
At 2:19 p.m. that afternoon, Ricky ran an Internet search for "Mendocino hit-and-run." At 9:00 p.m. that evening, Ricky accessed an article on a local news Web site entitled "21-year-old left dead after last night's hit-and-run near the town of Mendocino." Three minutes later, defendant accessed a different local news Web site, mendocinosports.plus. She accessed this site again at 9:05 p.m.
The next day, July 20, 2019, defendant visited mendocinosports.plus at 7:43 and 7:44 p.m., and called Ricky at 7:44 p.m. At 11:42 p.m., defendant then accessed the Web site for the Mendocino Beacon. A minute later, she searched the Web site for "Calum Hunicutt," the victim's name. In the next few minutes, defendant ran several additional searches including "hit-and-run in Menfocino [sic]" and "skateboarder struck and killed by hit and run driver in Mendocino."
On July 21, 2019, at 8:35 a.m., after learning her Toyota Tundra had been seized by the police, defendant ran an Internet search for the words "I was involved in a hit-and-run accident causing the death of another" followed minutes later by "sentence for hit-and-run causing death."
C. The Investigation.
Officer Travis Haury and his colleagues collected numerous items at the accident scene, including a broken skateboard with its wheels missing, glass, plastic, front bumper pieces and the quarter panel of a vehicle. Pieces of this debris had silver paint and markings indicating that it was the right front piece of a Toyota, model year 2000 to 2006.
In the early morning hours of July 20, 2019, Officer Haury located defendant's 2006 Toyota Tundra inside the paint shop of Schlafer's Auto Repair. The truck was damaged on the lower front passenger side and was missing several parts. About 20 pieces of the truck were strewn around the shop, including the headlight section; the front bumper that matched the bumper found at the accident scene; and the grille, which was cracked where it met the bumper. Officer Haury determined the impact occurred on the truck's right front side, closer to the headlight than the wheel well. He also noticed streak marks on about a third of the truck's front right hood that could have been caused by someone wiping the area with a rag.
II. The Defense Case.
Defendant testified that on July 18, 2019, she was driving to work, northbound on Highway 1, when she heard a noise. Feeling nothing unusual, she continued driving. However, a short time later, she felt that her tire was rubbing against something on her truck. Defendant pulled over at Larkin Road, concerned that she had a flat tire. When defendant looked at the front of her truck, she saw that her right headlight was broken and a piece of her bumper was dangling. Defendant believed she may have hit a deer. She never saw a skateboarder. The area is quite rural and surrounded by forest. A cautionary road sign warns drivers to be alert to the presence of deer.
Defendant, concerned that she would be late for work, immediately called Ricky for help with "remov[ing] the piece of the bumper and the liner that was hitting the tire ...." She called and texted him several times because her cellular reception was problematic. Defendant believed it was not safe to continue driving to work. Eventually, defendant made contact with Ricky and arranged to meet him at Schlafer's Auto Repair. Defendant turned around and drove south on Highway 1 toward the shop. When she crossed back through the Little Lake Road intersection near where she heard a noise, defendant saw a truck pulled over with its headlights on. She did not notice any pieces of her truck in the intersection and assumed the driver of the stopped truck was moving the deer that she hit.
Once at the shop, Ricky opened the gate and drove her truck to the paint shop behind the repair shop to work on it because all the service bays in the repair shop were full. About two hours later, Ricky left to drive defendant to work. When they reached the Little Lake Road intersection, an emergency vehicle was blocking it. A fireman approached and advised them to take another exit. Defendant did not think this was strange. She did not learn about the fatal accident until reading the online news after work on the evening of July 19, 2019.
Defendant told several work colleagues that she hit a deer, damaging her truck.
Daniel Mahoney testified as a defense expert in accident reconstruction. Mahoney opined that it was more likely than not defendant did not see the skateboarder before impact. Based on the truck's speed of 47 miles per hour and the skateboarder's speed of 14 miles per hour, he would have been visible to her for only about one and a half seconds. Mahoney assumed based on the lack of skid marks that defendant did not brake at impact. Moreover, according to the truck's event data recorder, defendant's truck only slowed about one mile per hour due to the impact. The skateboarder, who was dressed in dark clothes and may have been crouching, contacted the truck's right front corner below the hood with his chest and thigh. After impact, defendant would not have seen the skateboarder because it took longer for his body to travel forward 120 feet and come to rest than it took for the truck to travel the same distance.
III. The Verdict, Sentencing and Appeal.
On August 30, 2021, the trial court found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant received a three-year suspended sentence with 210 days in jail and 24 months of probation. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends (1) substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that she had knowledge the accident caused injury to a person; (2) the trial court erred by admitting lay opinion testimony from a prosecution witness regarding streak marks found on the Toyota Tundra's front right side; and (3) the court erred by rejecting the opinions of the defense accident reconstructionist. We address each issue in turn.
I. Substantial evidence supported the count one verdict.
"The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in . . . death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004." (§ 20001, subd. (a).)
"Section 20001 has long been deemed to impose a knowledge requirement which requires proof the accused knew or was aware that (1) he or she was involved in an accident and (2) the accident resulted in injury to another." (People v. Harbert (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 42, 45.) "Constructive knowledge of injury satisfies the statute. '[C]riminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.'" (People v. Kidane (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 817, 825; accord, People v. Harbert, at p. 45.)
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence in this case to meet section 20001's knowledge requirement. "When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] 'Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.' [Citation.] Unless it describes facts or events that are physically impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction." (People v. Elliot (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585; accord, People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87 [reversal unwarranted unless it appears" '" 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support'" the . . . verdict' "].)
Applying this standard here, we conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that her accident resulted in injury to a person. Without fully rehashing the evidence set forth at length ante (pp. 3-6), the court saw photographs and heard testimony regarding the damage to defendant's truck in the accident, including a broken headlight, cracked grille and dangling bumper. While defendant claimed to have heard only a small noise when her truck hit the victim, this damage was significant enough to cause her to pull over less than a half-mile later. As defendant turned around minutes later to drive to Schlafer's Auto Repair so Ricky could help repair her truck, she saw someone in a truck stopped with its headlights illuminated just north of the intersection where she heard a noise. Defendant testified that she believed this driver may have been removing the deer she hit. And defendant still claimed not to have thought anything unusual had occurred when, less than two hours later, she and Ricky returned to the intersection only to be told by emergency personnel to proceed to another exit because the intersection was closed. The trier of fact was entitled to view the significant damage to defendant's vehicle, coupled with the presence of vehicles and emergency personnel at the intersection in the accident's aftermath, as evidence of her constructive knowledge" 'that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.'" (People v. Kidane, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 825; People v. Harbert, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 ["The extent of damage to the defendant's vehicle is routinely treated as particularly probative"].)
The court also heard testimony regarding defendant's attempts to conceal her involvement in the accident, including calling upon Ricky to get out of bed at 11 p.m. to meet her at the automobile repair shop, where they pulled her truck inside the paint shop rather than leaving it outside in the lot. The next day, Officer Haury found streak marks on the right front portion of defendant's truck that appeared to have been caused by someone's wiping down the area. Defendant denied having done so and explained she washed her truck the previous day. Yet, Ricky told Officer Haury that defendant rarely washed her vehicle. Defendant also ran numerous online searches in the 24-hour period after the accident related to the accident and its resulting fatality. The trier of fact was entitled to consider defendant's postaccident conduct as probative of her consciousness of guilt. (People v. Harbert, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 56.)
On this record, notwithstanding defendant's repeated denials, the court, acting as trier of fact, had ample evidence before it upon which to find she knew, or reasonably should have known, she was in an accident that caused injury or death to another. (People v. Nordberg (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238 ["defendant's knowledge . . . may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a defendant's simple denial of the requisite knowledge is not determinative"].)
II. Officer Haury's lay opinion testimony was proper.
Defendant next contends the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting Officer Haury's testimony that streak marks he observed on the front right portion of the Toyota Tundra were likely caused by someone's wiping the truck with a rag. Defendant reasons, "Although not probative of the relevant issue [of whether she knew she hit a person] or helpful to the factfinder, Officer Haury's opinion was . . . used to raise a suspicion that the truck had been cleaned to conceal evidence of a crime."
A lay witness may give opinion testimony if it is "rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.)" (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 601.) We review a trial court's decision to admit lay opinion testimony for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 600.) Reversal is warranted only if the trial court's exercise of discretion was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, such that it resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.) For the following reasons, we find no abuse of discretion.
The prosecutor presented Officer Haury a photograph of defendant's truck that showed streaking or markings covering about a quarter of the Toyota Tundra's passenger side hood area. Officer Haury personally observed these markings, which were limited to this particular area, during his investigation of the Toyota Tundra. Over defense counsel's objections, Officer Haury offered an opinion based on his personal experience of cleaning dirty cars with a cleaner or solvent that these markings were "lines from a wreck" likely caused by someone's wiping clean a portion of the truck. Officer Haury admitted on cross-examination the marks could have a "multitude" of other possible causes, such as a tree branch brushing the truck. Later, defendant testified that she did not wipe the right front side of her truck, although she did wash her car the day before the accident.
Officer Haury's lay opinion testimony that the markings were likely caused by someone's wiping down the front passenger hood area of the Toyota
Tundra was rationally based on his actual observations of the truck. It also helped to clarify his testimony regarding the nature of the markings seen in the photograph. (Evid. Code, § 800; People v. Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601.) Defendant is wrong to claim this testimony was not relevant. It was probative of defendant's knowledge of whether her accident caused injury. Specifically, testimony that someone wiped down only the portion of the Toyota Tundra near where the truck impacted the victim was relevant to whether defendant or someone on her behalf took actions to conceal the accident in the hours after it occurred.
We also disagree with defendant's claim that this opinion testimony required specialized knowledge. As Officer Haury testified, he was familiar with the type of streak mark found on the Tundra from his own personal experience washing dirty vehicles. Washing a vehicle does not require expertise. (People v. Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 ["' "Lay opinion testimony is admissible where no particular scientific knowledge is required, or as 'a matter of practical necessity when the matters . . . observed are . . . too subtle to enable [the witness] accurately to convey them to court or jury in any other manner'"' "].) Accordingly, the court's ruling stands.
III. The court did not arbitrarily reject expert opinions.
In reaching the guilty verdict, the trial court expressly found defendant's explanation of the event was not credible and many of the opinions of her accident reconstructionist (Mahoney) were unsupported, speculative, or unreasonable. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court arbitrarily rejected Mahoney's testimony, which resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Defendant correctly acknowledges, however, that the trial court, acting as fact finder, had broad discretion to accept or reject expert testimony. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
"A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described as one that is 'so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.'" (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p 773.) For reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this instance.
Mahoney opined defendant "more likely than not" never saw the victim because (1) the victim was traveling 14 miles per hour on his skateboard and was only visible for about one and a half seconds prior to impact; (2) defendant did not brake or significantly decrease her speed at impact and would have passed the victim before he came to rest; (3) the impact occurred at the corner of the lower right passenger side, such that the passenger-side mirror and the A-pillar separating the window from the passenger door would have caused visual obstructions; and (4) it was nighttime and the victim was dressed in dark clothes. Mahoney based these opinions on his review of the case files, police report, and photographs of the accident scene and the Toyota Tundra, and on his own investigation of the accident site and the truck, including its event data recorder.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor pressed Mahoney on the assumptions underlying his opinion that the victim was not visible to defendant. In doing so, the prosecutor got Mahoney to admit the victim, who was estimated to be six feet tall, would have been visible over the Toyota Tundra's hood even if he had been crouching on his skateboard to a height of five feet seven inches. The victim would also have been briefly pinned or stuck to the front of the truck after the impact as the truck moved forward. And, the only evidence Mahoney relied on to opine defendant never braked or accelerated was the lack of skid marks in the accident report. If defendant braked or slowed down at all, she could have seen the victim hit the ground. He also admitted she could have seen something after feeling the impact.
Given these admissions, the trial court could have reasonably rejected Mahoney's opinion that defendant lacked the ability to see the victim as speculative and unsupported by the evidence. Most notably, Mahoney's assumptions for his opinion ignored the fact that given the victim's height while standing on the skateboard, the upper part of his body would have been visible to the driver notwithstanding the fact that the impact occurred below the hood on the Toyota Tundra's right passenger side. In addition, Mahoney admitted that had defendant looked in that direction after feeling the impact, she also could have seen the victim. Under these circumstances, we decline to second-guess the court's ruling. "Although experts may testify about their opinions, the fact finder decides what weight to give those opinions. This is especially important when the witnesses are not neutral court-appointed experts . . . ." (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 823; People v. Gonzales (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 643, 649 ["Expert opinion has no value if its basis is unsound"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Simons, J. Burns, J.