Opinion
1-24-0683B
06-28-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTIAN BASABE, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 20241100820 Honorable William Fahy, Judge Presiding
JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment. Presiding Justice Oden Johnson specially concurred.
ORDER
TAILOR JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's petition to deny pretrial release.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Defendant Christian Basabe appeals under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023) from the circuit court's order entered on March 7, 2024, denying him pretrial release under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act.
¶ 4 On March 5, 2024, Basabe was charged with two counts of unlawful dissemination of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(2) (West 2022)) and two counts of possession of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2022)). On March 7, 2024, the State filed a petition for pretrial detention indicating that Basabe had committed a detainable offense, posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons or the community based on specific, articulable facts of the case, and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risk.
¶ 5 At a hearing on the petition, the State proffered the following facts: Basabe is a 23-year-old male. In October of 2021, Chicago Police detectives received a cyber tip of the uploading of potential child pornography from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Detectives reviewed the tip and determined that the tip provider, the KIK messaging application, had 11 files of child pornography associated with an account. Detectives found five additional cyber tips linked to the same account through both the Snapchat and KIK messaging applications that were linked to the same user. They were all linked to an email address that contained Basabe's first and last name, and that used the same phone number and same two internet protocol (IP) addresses. Information obtained pursuant to a subpoena and warrant revealed the two IP addresses were registered to Basabe's mother at her address and a business address for Cash Drop, where Basabe worked.
¶ 6 Search warrants were executed on Snapchat and KIK between August 2021 and August 2023, that revealed Basabe disseminated approximately 30 videos and 11 images containing child pornography through both Snapchat and KIK. The majority of the videos depicted the oral and vaginal penetration of pre-pubescent girls under 13 years of age. The search warrant also revealed that Basabe was in possession of over 50 images and videos containing child pornography. Amongst the evidence recovered were self-taken images of Basabe, videos of him engaging in sex acts with females, and photos of Basabe's workplace, Cash Drop.
¶ 7 After Basabe was arrested on March 5, 2024, his phone was recovered and forensically examined pursuant to another search warrant. The forensic examination revealed evidence of both emails contained in the cyber tip and evidence of the phone number from the cyber tip. His phone also contained videos of himself engaged in sex acts, some of which were the same videos that were obtained pursuant to the Snapchat and KIK search warrants. Detectives also discovered that Basabe disseminated approximately nine videos and five images of child pornography by text message. Those videos and images, included but were not limited to, videos of Basabe orally penetrating a girl under the age of 18, and images of other pre-pubescent girls being orally penetrated by unknown men. The videos where Basabe is identifiable involve an unidentified victim who appears to be under the age of 18, but it cannot be determined if she is under the age of 13.
¶ 8 This was Basabe's first arrest. He scored a one for new criminal activity and a one for failure to appear on his pretrial assessment. Based on his scores, pretrial services recommended pretrial monitoring.
¶ 9 Basabe argued neither was the proof evident nor the presumption great that he was linked to these accusations; that "none of us" have seen the videos or photographs proffered; and that the State did not indicate whether he was under the age of 18 when the videos were taken. Basabe further argued it was likely that the videos were taken years prior and are just currently being circulated, because the investigation started in 2021. He also argued that he was not charged with criminal sexual assault, abuse, or predatory criminal sexual assault, and that the absence of such charges indicates he was underage at the time the videos were recorded. Basabe stated that the actions depicted were possibly consensual, though Basabe admitted that the actions would not be legally consensual.
¶ 10 Basabe argued that while the IP address is linked to his mother's residence, other people have lived at that address. Basabe argued that he is not a real and present threat to people or the community because there was no named victim, and he was not accused of downloading the material from a website of "all underage children." Basabe also argued the images appear to be taken by himself and disseminated, which "change the risk of danger to other people."
¶ 11 In mitigation, Basabe argued that he has strong ties to the community and his father was present in court. He lived at the same address with his mother for the past four years and had been a resident of Illinois since he was six years old. Basabe is a high school graduate and had some HVAC trade training, did community service, and attended church. He had been working for Cash Drop for 3 years. We note that on its website Cash Drop describes itself as a mobile commerce platform that helps businesses create and manage an online storefront from a smartphone. Basabe asked that he be released under the condition that he be precluded from internet usage with limited exceptions.
¶ 12 In rebuttal, the State argued that Basabe is charged with a class X felony of dissemination of child pornography, which is non-probational and carries a term of 6 to 30 years imprisonment. The State reiterated that the IP addresses associated with Basabe's dissemination of child pornography were tied to his mother's house, where he lives, and his work site. Therefore, the State argued, Basabe was a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons or the community because the offense was one of supply and demand of child pornography, where Basabe shared child pornography on multiple social media platforms, and the images were taken by him with a person he presumably knew. The State also argued that Basabe was a danger to children because he engaged in sexual acts with children, spread the images and videos of children around the internet, and text messaged the images to other people. The State argued against placing Basabe on electronic monitoring because Basabe would be confined to his residence, the same location where this crime probably took place based on the IP address that was linked to his residence.
¶ 13 The trial court determined the petition was properly filed and that Basabe was charged with a detainable offense. The court found that the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Basabe committed the offenses of dissemination of child pornography and possession of child pornography. The court based its findings on the totality of the State's proffer, Basabe's argument, and his mitigation. The court found that Basabe posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community if he were to be released. The decision was based on the nature of the Class X, non-probational offense, which the court considered to be a crime of violence because it involved children and "creates a market for further crimes against children."
¶ 14 The court then found that there was no condition or combination of conditions of release that could mitigate the real and present danger Basabe posed to other children and issued an order to detain Basabe. The court reasoned that despite the scores Basabe received on his pretrial assessment, and the fact that Basabe had strong ties to the community, was a high school graduate with some trade school training, and volunteered in this community and attended church, it could not overlook the nature and circumstances of the offense, especially considering that at least one of the videos showed Basabe orally penetrating a girl under the age of 18. The court stated that it "considered the defense's argument that the Defendant could be banned from social media sites, not have any internet access and possibly not have any contact with anyone under 18 years of age." However, the court ultimately determined that it could not "impose any conditions that would alleviate any concerns that the Court has. With regards to the Pretrial monitoring recommendation, that's woefully inadequate" given that the crimes occurred either at home or at work.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Basabe's notice of appeal filed in this case indicates that he is appealing his detention on two bases. First, Basabe argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Second, he argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that that there were no conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case, or defendant's willful flight.
¶ 17 Under the Code, a defendant's pretrial release may be denied only for certain charged offenses. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. In Illinois, all defendants are eligible for-and we presume all defendants are entitled to-pretrial release. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e). At any detention hearing, the State and defendant may present evidence "by way of proffer based upon reliable information." Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2).
¶ 18 To deny a defendant pretrial release, the trial court must find the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)), (2) defendant's pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)), and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or prevent the defendant's willful flight from prosecution (id. §§ 110-2(b), (c), 110-6.1(e)(3), (f)). In determining the second of these prongs, a court may consider various statutory factors bearing on a defendant's "dangerousness." Id. § 110-6.1(g). If the court finds that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community (and/or the defendant's likely willful flight to avoid prosecution), the court must then determine which pretrial release conditions, "if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release." Id. § 110-5(a). In making this determination, "the court shall, on the basis of available information, take into account" various "matters" listed in section 110-5(a). Id. Even when a defendant is found to pose a real and present threat, in order to detain the defendant, the State must also prove that no condition or combination of conditions "can mitigate" that threat. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3).
¶ 19 Section 110-6.1(h)(1) of the Code requires the court to "make a written finding summarizing the court's reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant's willful flight from prosecution." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). Where the court fails to incorporate its detailed findings that form the basis of its order to detain in a written order, as in this case, we read its written findings in conjunction with its oral pronouncements. People v. Andrino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19 (section 110-6.1(h)(1) of the Code is satisfied by looking at the court's written findings in conjunction with its oral pronouncements); see also People v. Vance, 2024 IL App (1st) 232503, ¶ 29 ("the court's oral rulings, if reduced to writing in a transcript of proceedings (as is typical), should be considered along with the written order and may suffice, by itself, to satisfy the written-findings requirement, as long as the oral findings are explicit and individualized, thus explaining to defendant the basis for detention and providing sufficient detail for appellate review.") We review the circuit court's findings of fact under the manifest weight standard, but the ultimate decision regarding pretrial detention is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240154, ¶ 16. An abuse of discretion occurs "when the circuit court's decision is 'arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable,' or where 'no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court.'" People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Becker, 239 Ill.2d 215, 234 (2010)).
¶ 20 Basabe argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. We quote from Basabe's argument in his notice of appeal:
"The State failed to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Basabe poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community. There are no identifiable complaining witnesses in this case, thus the Defense argued that the court only needed to consider Mr. Basabe's risk of danger to the community. "Clear and convincing evidence" is that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the fact finder's mind about the truth of the proposition in question. In re Tiffany W., 2012 IL App (1st) 102492B, ¶ 12. In its reasoning, the Court argued that Mr. Basabe had been charged with a crime of violence and that is part of the reason why Mr. Basabe poses a threat to the community. However, 725 ILCS 120/3 (A)(3) defines which crimes are violent offenses and [neither] possessing nor disseminating child pornography is not one of them. This was a misstatement of the law and incorrect reasoning as a basis for the Court finding Mr. Basabe dangerous. The Defense proffered in its argument that it is highly likely that Mr. Basabe
was underage himself in these videos. The allegations are that Mr. Basabe sent videos and pictures of underage girls that he videotaped on four separate occasions and that he was in some of these media forms. These videos are not alleged to have been taken nonconsensually, just sent without consent and the State believes the females in the videos and photos were under 18 at the time they were created. The Defense argued that this was important for the Court to take into consideration when evaluating Mr. Basabe's dangerousness. This is not a situation where Mr. Basabe was exploiting minor children while he was an adult. There are no allegations Mr. Basabe has contact with minor children. Furthermore, child pornography possession and dissemination does not immediately make Mr. Basabe a danger to the community because "logically, the bare allegations that defendant has committed a[n] [ ] offense are not sufficient to establish" dangerousness. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18. Mere possession and dissemination is not an individualized consideration, and if the legislature intended for these offenses to be automatically detainable, they would have listed them as such. See id.
While it is understandable that this is a serious offense, and the nature of it being conducted online makes it difficult for the Court to monitor, those factors alone do not immediately make an individual dangerous. The other factors such as mitigation and circumstances of the offense ought to be considered. This is especially where the Defense argues the Court erred in deciding Mr. Basabe poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community. This is Mr. Basabe's first arrest. He is 23 years old, has resided at the same address with his mother for the past 4 years and had his father present in court on the day of the hearing. He graduated from high school and has been gainfully employed since graduating. He also participates in volunteer programs for the Pilsen area including "Suited
for Cause Alliance 98" which is an organization that provides suits and clothing to children in the neighborhood for them to wear for job interviews. The scores created by Pre-Trial were the lowest possible with a "1" for new criminal activity and failure to appear scales, no new violent criminal activity flag raised, and pretrial recommended for Mr. Basabe to be released with no conditions. Thus, it is the Defense's continued belief that Mr. Basabe does not pose a real and present threat to the safety of the community and the Court erred in finding so."
¶ 21 We find that the State's proffer showed by clear and convincing evidence that Basabe posed a real and present threat to a person, persons or the community. The State proffered that Basabe disseminated pornographic materials of children over the internet on the Snapchat and KIK messaging platforms, and also sent pornographic materials of children to multiple third parties by text message. Although the identity of the children are unknown to law enforcement, the pornographic images show young girls engaged in sexual acts with Basabe, which establishes that he had personal contact with them, putting them at risk for further exploitation.
¶ 22 As the court found, the crimes Basabe is charged with are those of supply and demand. The court's decision that Basabe constituted a real and present threat to a person, persons or the community was based on the nature of the Class X, non-probational offense, which the court considered to be a crime of violence because it involved children, and its deleterious effect that by supplying child pornography Basabe simultaneously increased the demand for child pornography. As this court held in People v. Schulz, 2024 IL App (1st) 240422, ¶¶ 25-26, the possession and dissemination of child pornography revictimizes the child victims every time the "vile material" is viewed or shared, and the crime also causes additional sexual assaults of children by fueling the demand for more child pornography. Id. The court's finding here was not arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, and we cannot say that no reasonable person would agree with the circuit court's decision.
¶ 23 We reject Basabe's argument that "section 120/3(A)(3)" of the Code (725 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 2022)), which defines violence offenses, does not include disseminating or possessing child pornography, and therefore the trial court erred when it determined that Basabe committed a crime of violence and was therefore dangerous to persons and the community. According to the Code, a violent crime is: "(2) any offense involving sexual exploitation, sexual conduct, or sexual penetration." Id. "The purpose of the child pornography statute in Illinois is to prevent the sexual abuse and exploitation of children." (Emphasis added.) People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 18 (citing People v. Geever, 122 Ill.2d 313, 326 (1988). Although not specifically listed in the definition of violent offenses, the crimes of possessing and disseminating child pornography are, by their very nature, crimes of exploiting children and therefore violent in nature. See People v. Jackson, 2024 IL App (4th) 240441-U, ¶18 (recognizing that possession of child pornography is a crime of violence).
¶ 24 Even if possession and dissemination of child pornography are not crimes of violence under the Code, the trial court nevertheless correctly focused on Basabe's threat to children in determining his dangerousness under the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022) (listing numerous factor to consider in determining dangerousness including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed to pose a threat, and the nature of the threat, the age and physical condition of any victim and any other "factor deemed by the court to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendant's propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior.") The circuit court here did not err in finding that Basabe was dangerous based on the nature of the offense and the threat he posed to others and the community. See also People v. Phillips, 2024 IL App (4th) 240372-U (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a defendant charged with possession of child pornography was dangerous); People v. Collins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230577-U (no abuse of discretion occurred where a defendant charged with possession of child pornography was found dangerous under the factors listed in section 110-6.1(g) of the Code); People v. Schulz, 2024 IL App (1st) 240422 (the trial court correctly focused on the defendant's threat to children in determining his dangerousness under the Code, where the defendant was charged with possession and dissemination of child pornography). Moreover, Basabe's argument that no victims have been identified overlooks that the unidentified children and other potential child victims are the community that require protection. The children's anonymity does not mitigate the danger and risk to them in light of the personal contact.
¶ 25 We similarly reject Basabe's contention that he was a minor at the time of the alleged crimes. The record reflects he disseminated child pornography in 2021 on to 2023, when he was, as defense counsel conceded, between the ages of 19 and 20 years old. So even if he was a minor at the time of the acts as he appears to claim, he was not a minor at the time he allegedly possessed and distributed the pornographic materials of children.
¶ 26 Basabe next argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination or conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of a person or persons or the community, based on specific articulable facts of the case. The basis of Basabe's argument is set forth in his notice of appeal, which states in full:
"Detention was not the least restrictive condition that could be imposed for Mr. Basabe. The decision regarding his release was not individualized and there was not a
single factor used exclusively to order his detention, both of which violate 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7). The Court reasoned that there were no conditions that it could craft to mitigate the perceived dangerousness it felt Mr. Basabe posed. The Court reasoned that "pre-trial services is woefully inadequate" without giving the required explanation to substantiate that belief. The Court also reasoned that EM [electronic monitoring] is not suitable because that would require Mr. Basabe to be at home and that's where the offenses took place. This is an offense that was committed with technology, which does create a level of difficulty for the Court to monitor with conditions. However, this is not an automatically detainable offense. When the Pre-Trial Fairness Act was codified, the legislature decided on conditions that would be suitable for any criminal offense. Thus, it follows, regardless of how and where this offense of possessing or distributing child pornography is done, the conditions available at the Court's discretion are suitable on a case-by-case basis. As previously mentioned, Mr. Basabe has no background, has never been arrested, and has the lowest pre-trial assessment scores one can have. Pre-trial recommended release with no conditions. Mr. Basabe was cooperative with officers during his arrest. There is nothing in Mr. Basabe's background or actions during his arrest that would indicate that Mr. Basabe is incapable of following court orders. In addition, if Mr. Basabe were to continue committing the offenses of possessing or disseminating child pornography, it would trigger a report from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) via a CyberTipline, which was how Mr. Basabe's current charges were discovered. There are greater security measures surrounding the nature of these categories of offenses than many other criminal offenses. That is additional, ensured protection in conjunction to the Court's conditions of release. Therefore, the Court erred in determining there were no conditions
it could craft to release Mr. Basabe."
¶ 27 We find that the State met its burden to prove that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of persons or the community, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. The State proffered that Basabe disseminated various child pornography images, at least one of which Basabe appears in while engaged in a sex act with a child, over the internet from both his residence and his place of employment. The State further argued that if Basabe were to be released he would be a danger to children not only because he engaged in sex acts with children, but because he "spread it around the internet, he text messaged it to people." The State also argued that there are no less restrictive conditions where Basabe's access to the internet would be completely curtailed.
¶ 28 The circuit court's finding that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of persons and the community is supported by the State's proffer. The circuit court considered that Basabe scored "the lowest possible score of 1 and 1 with a recommendation of Pretrial monitoring" as well as the mitigation presented by the defense. The court also considered the defense's suggestion that Basabe could be banned from social media sites, not have internet access, and have no contact with anyone under the age of 18 years of age. However, the court found that given the nature of the offenses, possessing and disseminating child pornography, the most restrictive condition that the court could impose, electronic monitoring, would not protect persons or the community because although Basabe would be "relegated to his house five days a week," there would be two days a week where Basabe "would have access to the world more or less." See 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-4(A), (A-1), (E)(1) (West 2022) (mandating allowance of two-day per week period of movement outside home for those on pretrial home confinement and electronic monitoring, along with access to a telephone). In addition, we agree with the circuit court's reasoning that EM is not suitable because that would require Basabe to be at home and that's where the offenses took place. And Basabe himself acknowledges that an offense committed with technology "create[s] a level of difficulty for the Court to monitor with conditions." This point is further borne out by Basabe's employment by a company focused on mobile technology. Finally, Basabe's suggestion that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children would discover any recidivism should it occur overlooks the 3-year long investigation after the initial tip in this case. We find that the circuit court's finding was not arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, and we cannot say that no reasonable person would agree with the circuit court's decision.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's grant of the State's petition for pretrial detention.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
¶ 32 Justice Oden Johnson, specially concurring:
¶ 33 I concur with the judgment affirming the trial court's order. However, I write separately in order to admonish the trial court of the importance of articulating its findings in its written order, as the statute requires.
¶ 34 Section 110-6.1(h) of the Code requires that the trial "court shall, in any order for detention: (1) make a written finding summarizing the court's reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). In the case at bar, the trial court's detention order did not recite sufficient findings in its written order. See People v. Kimbereley, 2024 IL App (1st) 232170-U, ¶¶ 32-36 (this court reversed and remanded in order to allow the trial court to enter a written order that complies with the Act).
¶ 35 The trial court's order was written on a blank form. The first item on the form states: "The proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant has committed an eligible offense listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)." However, on the blank lines under this item, the court filled in the offense, but said nothing about the proof, which is the key part. The second item on the form states: "The defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. To wit:" On the blank lines under this second item, the court wrote: "Defendant possessed and disseminated mags and videos of child pornography including a video of defendant orally penetrating an underage female; and for reasons stated on the record." This finding is adequate, but not so the third one. The third item asks whether a condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed. On the blank lines under this third item, the trial court wrote: "There are no conditions short of detention that will prevent the defendant from possessing and disseminating child pornography for reasons stated on the record." For the first and third propositions, there was no summary of the court's findings in the written order, as the statue requires.
¶ 36 The purpose of the statute in requiring a written order with findings "in any order for detention" was ultimately to streamline the review process for appellate courts and all participants, and this requirement of the Code should not be overlooked. (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h) (West 2022). To ensure that it is not, I admonish the trial court to enter orders, in the future, with "a written finding summarizing the court's reasons," as the statute so clearly commands. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022); People v. Montano, 2024 IL App (1st) 232481-U, ¶ 30 (P.J. Oden Johnson, specially concurring) ("it is imperative that our judiciary specify its findings in writing, to the fullest extent"); Kimberley, 2024 IL App (1st) 232170-U, ¶ 32 (where the written order failed to indicate that the trial court considered any alternatives to detention, we found that "the written order denying pretrial release was an abuse of discretion and remand[ed] for consideration of detention alternatives and entry of an appropriate written order that complies with the Act"), cited with approval in People v. Snodey, 2024 IL App (1st) 231971-U, ¶ 20 (noting in parentheticals the statute's "requiring" of a written detention order that shows the trial court's consideration of alternatives to detention); People v. Turner, 2024 IL App (1st) 232082-U, ¶ 23 ("Because the trial court's order did not summarize its reasons for concluding that defendant should be detained nor did it specify why alternatives to detention were not suitable, we conclude that its order denying pretrial release was an abuse of discretion.").