Opinion
1-24-0407B
06-25-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAJUAN BARNES-HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 24 MC1105267 01 The Honorable William Nicholas Fahy, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
OCASIO, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's order denying pretrial release was reversed, and the cause remanded for a hearing on whether conditions of release could mitigate the threat posed by the defendant, where the facts of the charged offense did not themselves establish that no set of release conditions could mitigate the threat to safety posed by the defendant and the State did not proffer additional information tending to show that conditions of release would not be effective.
¶ 2 Defendant, Rajuan Barnes-Harvey, appeals an order of the trial court denying him pretrial release in accordance with section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). Because we agree that the State failed to carry its burden of proving that no conditions of release could mitigate the threat that Barnes-Harvey's release would pose to the safety of another person or persons or the community, we reverse and remand.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Barnes-Harvey was arrested and charged by complaint with armed robbery. At his initial appearance, the State asked the court to detain him on the basis that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community.
While this appeal was pending, the original charge was superseded by an indictment, under case number 24 CR 01485 01, charging him with armed robbery and aggravated unlawful restraint.
¶ 5 At the ensuing hearing on the petition, the State proffered that the victim had advertised an Xbox video-game console for sale on Craigslist. Barnes-Harvey contacted him and arranged, through an exchange of text messages, to buy it. When the victim arrived at the appointed time and place, Barnes-Harvey's codefendant, Derrick Bearden, walked past, ostensibly to verify that the victim was not armed. Barnes-Harvey then came outside and met with the victim at the back of the latter's car, which is where the Xbox was. He asked the victim whether he could have his brother join them to make sure that the Xbox had all its proper working parts. The victim agreed. At that point, Bearden came up, stuck a gun in the victim's chest, and told him to give up the Xbox. While the victim was at gunpoint, Barnes-Harvey searched his coat for valuables and came up empty. He next went to the victim's car and found his wallet sitting on the ground near the front driver's-side door. The victim moved to stop Barnes-Harvey from taking the wallet, but Bearden pointed the gun at him again and warned him to stop, at which point Barnes-Harvey ran away with the wallet and Bearden ran in the other direction with the Xbox. The victim called the police, who determined that the supposed buyer's phone number was registered to Barnes-Harvey, whose picture the victim then picked out of a photo array. The police then identified Bearden by comparing pictures of people "associated with" Barnes-Harvey's Facebook account to video captured by a surveillance camera of Bearden and Barnes-Harvey in the vicinity moments before the robbery took place. Bearden was arrested during a required probation check-in, and he ultimately identified himself and Barnes-Harvey in the surveillance footage.
¶ 6 The State also informed the trial court that Barnes-Harvey was 18 years old, that this case represented his "first adult arrest," and that he had "no juvenile history."
¶ 7 The defense proffered that Barnes-Harvey was a lifelong resident of Cook County who lived with his mother and his brother and was in his senior year of high school. Both of his parents were involved in his life, and they were both present in court to support him. He was also expecting his first child about two months later, and he wanted to continue attending prenatal appointments.
¶ 8 Pretrial services presented a public safety assessment for Barnes-Harvey. Based on his risk factors, he was given scores of two out of six for new criminal activity and one out of six for failure to appear. He did not merit a flag for new violent criminal activity. The recommendation was that, if he was released, it should be with maximum conditions.
¶ 9 During argument, the State contended that Barnes-Harvey's "cold and calculated" conduct during the charged offense showed that he posed a clear and present threat to the community. It also asserted that no set of release conditions could mitigate that threat. Specific to this case, the State, noting that Barnes-Harvey had used a cell phone to set up the robbery, contended that he would "continue to have access to a mobile phone if he is released." As a general matter, the State also argued that electronic monitoring allows movement two days per week and that it is not "proactively restrictive" in that it provides no way to control defendants who choose to violate the terms of their release unless and until law enforcement is able to locate them.
¶ 10 The defense contended that Barnes-Harvey was not a real and present threat to anybody. Counsel noted that he was not the one who allegedly had the gun and that there was no evidence showing that he was aware that Bearden would be armed. The defense also emphasized that there was no basis for finding that Barnes-Harvey would not comply with conditions of release or that no set of conditions could adequately mitigate any threat he might pose. Counsel suggested that the court "could craft conditions around phone or social media usage" if it was concerned about his access to methods of communicating with potential victims.
¶ 11 In rebuttal, the State argued that Barnes-Harvey's release would put the victim in danger because Barnes-Harvey knew what he looked like and how to contact him and contended that the notion that Barnes-Harvey did not know that Bearden had a gun beforehand "strain[ed] credibility." The State also asserted that, "given all the circumstances described," there were no release conditions that could mitigate the risk of danger he posed to the community.
¶ 12 The trial court summarized the State's proffer and found that it clearly and convincingly showed that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Barnes-Harvey committed armed robbery. As to dangerousness, the court observed that it could not "think of anything more dangerous than pointing a firearm at the chest of another individual and robbing them" and found that "[a]nyone who participates in this does pose a real and present threat to the safety of others, including the safety of the victim." As to release conditions, the court acknowledged the information about Barnes-Harvey's personal circumstances contained in the defense proffer, but it explained that it also could not "overlook[] the nature and circumstances of this horrendous crime that is alleged to have been committed." It then explained why it believed that home detention and electronic monitoring would not be adequate:
"And then I also have to look at something less restrictive and consider that, something less restrictive than detention. The most restrictive condition that this Court can impose is electronic monitoring. Counsel has made excellent arguments for home confinement, 24-hour home confinement possibly. The problem with either one of those-and I'll start with home confinement. Home confinement, if the defendant were to violate it, no one gets notified until the next court date. That could be 30 days later before it's even notified that-a judge is notified and any action could be taken with regards to any violation of home confinement.
With regard to electronic monitoring, which is the most restrictive condition of release that this Court can impose, electronic monitoring is far from fail safe. We have a whole court call devoted to violations of electronic monitoring. It's called Branch 17. It does not prevent this defendant from having access to phones, to planning, to making other-orchestrating other
offenses. It certainly doesn't prevent this defendant from having access to firearms. It allows the defendant two days of movement by statute.
Obviously, this Court is not comfortable placing this defendant on something less restrictive, such as electronic monitoring or home confinement, given everything that I've heard here today, the totality of it. Therefore, I am going to grant the State's petition to detain."
¶ 13 After the hearing, the court entered a written order denying pretrial release. The written order found that Barnes-Harvey posed a real and present threat because "Defendant planned and orchestrated this armed robbery of [the] victim" and because "Co-Defendant had a firearm pointed at [the] victim while Defendant took property and fled." It further found that no set of release conditions would be adequate because "Defendant would still be able to plan violent crimes and commit violent crimes." It also relied on the "reasons stated on the record."
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Under Illinois law, all defendants are eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2024). Even in circumstances where pretrial release may be denied, there is a presumption in favor of release, which the State has the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence. Id. §§ 110-2(c), 110-6.1(a), (e). "Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question." Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74. In this case, Barnes-Harvey was detained on the basis that he stands charged with committing the detainable offense of armed robbery and that his release would pose a threat to the safety of another person or persons or the community. See id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5). To overcome the presumption in favor of Barnes-Harvey's release, the State was required to prove three propositions by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is evident and the presumption great that Barnes-Harvey committed a detainable offense, (2) that Barnes-Harvey poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and (3) that no set of release conditions can mitigate that threat. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). On appeal, Barnes-Harvey argues that the State failed to carry its burden as to all three elements.
As the trial court did not determine that no set of release conditions would reasonably ensure Barnes-Harvey's appearance or prevent him from committing further crimes, we do not consider the additional challenge to that nonexistent finding. See People v. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 34 n.1.
¶ 16 The standard for reviewing the trial court's findings is not yet settled, but most published decisions utilize the manifest-weight standard, the abuse-of-discretion standard, or some combination of those two. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 21 (collecting cases). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when "the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented." People v. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 17. A trial court abuses its discretion by making a decision that "is arbitrary, unreasonable, or fanciful" or by adopting a position that "no reasonable person would have taken." Id. ¶ 18. Some justices (including the author of this decision) have taken the position that, given the importance of the fundamental liberty interest at stake, orders denying pretrial release should be reviewed de novo except to the extent they are based on findings of historical fact. People v. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 137 (Ellis, J., concurring). For the purpose of this appeal, we do not need to decide which of these approaches to the standard of review is correct.
¶ 17 Turning to the merits, we have no difficulty concluding that the State met its burden of showing that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Barnes-Harvey committed the detainable offense of armed robbery. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2024). The State's proffer showed that Barnes-Harvey arranged to meet the victim through text messages about the purchase of an Xbox. The victim identified Barnes-Harvey as one of the perpetrators. Surveillance video showed Barnes-Harvey and Bearden in the vicinity of the offense moments before it took place, and Bearden identified both himself and Barnes-Harvey in the footage. We agree with the trial court's finding on this element, which we would affirm under any standard of review.
¶ 18 We also affirm the trial court's determination that Barnes-Harvey poses a real and present threat to the safety of another person or persons or the community. We acknowledge that Barnes-Harvey does not have a prior criminal record, that the victim was not physically harmed during the robbery, and that Bearden, not Barnes-Harvey, was the one who had the gun. However, the charged crime did not involve merely the possession or display of a dangerous weapon. The facts proffered by the State showed that Bearden held a gun to the victim's chest, which was an all-but-explicit threat that the robbers were prepared to kill the victim if he did not cooperate. They also made it clear that Barnes-Harvey and Bearden were equal participants in a robbery where one of them (the supposed buyer) set the bait and then the other sprung the trap. As it was not necessary for both perpetrators to be armed, we find no significance in the fact that Barnes-Harvey happened to play the role of the unarmed buyer. His full and willing participation in a crime that threatened the safety of the victim justified the trial court's determination that he poses a threat to the safety of another person or persons or the community.
¶ 19 Danger alone, however, is not a sufficient basis to deny pretrial release. As noted above, the State must also show, by clear and convincing evidence, that "no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate" that "real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2024). As with all burdens of proof, the State bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. People v Ziltz, 98 Ill.2d 38, 43 (1983) ("The term 'burden of proof' includes both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact."); see People v. Young, 2024 IL App (3d) 240046, ¶ 17 (McDade, P.J., dissenting) (interpreting the detention statute's burden of proof) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 196 (6th ed. 1990)). Even applying the most deferential standard of review-abuse of discretion-we conclude that the trial court erred when it found that the State met its burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that no set of conditions could mitigate the threat to the safety of another person or persons or the community that would be posed by Barnes-Harvey's pretrial release.
¶ 20 In terms of his personal background, the facts proffered at the detention hearing disclosed that Barnes-Harvey was a high-school student who lived with his mother. Both his mother and his father were present in court for his initial appearance, demonstrating that he has a degree of family support. Significantly, Barnes-Harvey had no prior history of criminality or delinquency. Against these mitigating features, the State proffered only the facts of the charged incident in support of its allegation that no set of conditions could mitigate the threat to safety posed by Barnes-Harvey. There are certainly cases in which the specific facts of the charged offense themselves, either on their own or in combination with the particular defendant's criminal history, demonstrate that no conditions of release could mitigate the threat posed by the defendant, but this is not one of them. The proffered facts of the charged incident did not disclose that Barnes-Harvey "present[ed] a greater risk of noncompliance" with release conditions than any other defendant who is alleged to have committed armed robbery. People v Thomas, 2024 IL App (4th) 240248, ¶ 26; see also 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2024) (requiring "individualized" findings at detention hearings). For that reason, under any standard of review, the State's proffer did not show by clear and convincing evidence that no set of release conditions could mitigate the threat that Barnes-Harvey's release would pose to the safety of another person or persons or the community.
¶ 21 As the State failed to satisfy its burden as to the issue of release conditions, it did not rebut the presumption that Barnes-Harvey is eligible for pretrial release on appropriate conditions. Accordingly, the trial court's detention order is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to hold a hearing on whether there are conditions of release which could mitigate the threat to safety posed by Barnes-Harvey. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2024). We express no view on what the determination should be.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The order of the trial court granting the State's petition to detain Barnes-Harvey is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with our decision.
¶ 24 Reversed and remanded.