Opinion
A159876
07-19-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRANDELL LUCAS BAKER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 2-330668-5
Wiseman, J. [*]
Defendant Brandell Baker appeals a court order granting victims restitution for various economic losses related to his breaking into their vehicles on two separate occasions. (Pen. Code § 1202.4.) Baker argues section 1202.4 does not authorize restitution for residential security systems or car alarms where, like here, the defendant is not convicted of a violent felony. He further claims the trial court abused its discretion by granting restitution for items that he did not damage-car alarms-or for losses he did not proximately cause-lost wages. He also challenges awarding a victim the cost of replacing a laptop bag, even though the victim retained the returned, damaged laptop bag. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding restitution for lost wages since that loss was not a reasonably foreseeable result of Baker's crime. We reverse that portion of the trial court's decision, but otherwise affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
In September 2019, Baker pled no contest to second degree burglary of a car belonging to Christopher Roderick (§ 459), and vandalism of property belonging to Melody Shaeffer causing over $400 in damage (§ 594, subd. (a)). In a December 2019 victim restitution hearing, Shaeffer and Roderick testified about their losses resulting from Baker's conduct. Shaeffer stated that in August 2019, she parked her car outside of the business where she was providing contract computer services. She later found one window of her car smashed. There was nothing stolen or damaged aside from the broken window. She reacted angrily to the vandalism to her car and, as a result, lost her employment. Her existing car alarm system was not triggered by intrusions through the glass window, and she later bought a glass alarm to alert her of future break-ins. The trial court awarded her restitution for, among other things, $649.45 in lost wages and $718.00 in invoice expenses, and partial costs for a car alarm.
Roderick testified that on August 20, 2019, he found the rear window of his car smashed. A laptop bag containing his laptop, passport, and other personal belongings was stolen. Later that day, his laptop bag was returned to his home, but it did not include his laptop. The bag had multiple scratches and the satchel strip and clip were damaged. After this incident, Roderick purchased a home security system, finding it unnerving that someone stole an item from his car and later returned it to his residence. He also purchased a car alarm. The trial court awarded him restitution for, among other things, a new laptop bag, car alarm, and one-half of the cost of a home security system.
DISCUSSION
Victims have the right to receive restitution from convicted defendants for losses resulting from their criminal acts. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b); People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652 (Giordano).) Section 1202.4 provides “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The party seeking restitution must demonstrate an “adequate factual basis for the claim” by a preponderance of the evidence. (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 664; People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 469.) The trial court's restitution order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion-whether the ruling “ ‘ “falls outside of the bounds of reason”' ” under the law and facts. (Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663.) An order based on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26 (Millard).)
I. Residential Security System and Car Alarms
Baker argues victim restitution for a residential security system under section 1202.4 is only authorized if a defendant is convicted of a violent felony identified in section 667.5. Because Baker's conviction is not a violent felony, he claims restitution for Roderick's home security system was erroneous under the statute. He similarly argues that section 1202.4 does not specifically authorize restitution for car alarms. After reviewing the plain language of the statute, “giving [the words] their ordinary meanings and construing them in context, ” we disagree. (People v. McCarthy (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1104 [rules governing statutory interpretation].)
The People concede, and we agree, that Baker's conviction does not qualify as a violent felony as identified in section 667.5, subdivision (c).
A. Statutory Interpretation
Section 1202.4 contains a nonexclusive list of victim losses that must be compensated. (People v. Henderson (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 467, 471 (Henderson), review dismissed December 12, 2018, S247716; § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3) [nonexclusive indicated by phrase “including, but not limited to”].)Relevant here, section 1202.4 states: “To the extent possible, the restitution order... shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the following....” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) The statute then proceeds to list eleven items, including “Expenses to install or increase residential security incurred related to... a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5....” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J).) Under this plain language, the trial court shall award a victim expenses incurred by installing a residential security system if a defendant is convicted of an enumerated violent felony. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J); Henderson, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 471.)
That provision does not limit or “preclude restitution for such installation under other circumstances, ” as Baker insists. (Henderson, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 471; but see People v. Salas (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 736, 744 .) “ ‘[B]ecause [section 1202.4] uses the language “including, but not limited to” these enumerated losses, a trial court may compensate a victim for any economic loss which is proved to be the direct result of the defendant's criminal behavior, even if not specifically enumerated in the statute.' ” (Henderson, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 472-473.) The subdivisions in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) merely “identify[] common types of restitution and provid[e] guidance for calculating the proper measure of damages.” (People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 944 (Brooks).)
The court in Salas concluded the trial court erroneously awarded restitution for a home security system by improperly treating the defendant's domestic violence offense as a violent felony. (Salas, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 740.) But it does not address the question here-whether the restitution order was permissible “as an exercise of discretion of the trial court's discretion under the broader language portion of subdivision (f)(3).” (Henderson, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 472-473 [distinguishing Salas].) For the same reasons expressed in Henderson, we also disagree with the statement in Salas that “the Legislature intended that residential security expenses remain recoverable via restitution only when they are incurred related to a ‘violent felony.' ” (Salas, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 742; Henderson supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 472.)
This interpretation does not render section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J)'s reference to violent felonies superfluous, contrary to Baker's assertion. That subdivision “remains intact and means what it says-that restitution for home security systems is mandatory in certain cases.” (Henderson, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) But it “does not operate to bar discretionary restitution orders for home security systems where such orders may be otherwise appropriate.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the restitution award for both the residential and car security systems were appropriate under section 1202.4's general language allowing compensation for economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct. It is unnecessary to rely on the more specific subdivisions in subdivision (f)(3) to justify the award for those expenses. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3); Brooks, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 946.)
2. Abuse of Discretion
We further reject Baker's claim his reimbursement obligations only extend to items that he damaged, not security systems the victims voluntarily purchased after Baker's crimes. (People v. Moore (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1232 [“loss” is interpreted broadly, and the only limit on victim restitution “ ‘is that the loss must be an “economic loss incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct”' ”].) The trial court acted well within its broad discretion in awarding restitution for those items.
Baker first challenges Roderick's home security system installation costs because he never burglarized the victim's house. However, the trial court found that Baker or someone else acting under Baker's direction returned some of Roderick's property-stolen from his car-to his home. This demonstrated Baker knew where Roderick lived. As a result, Roderick did not feel secure in his own home. Those sentiments are predictable, and there was a factual and rational basis for the trial court's conclusions that the costs for residential security systems were incurred as a direct result of the burglary of Roderick's car. (See Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663.)
Similarly, the trial court properly ordered restitution for the cost of Roderick's car alarm and half the cost for Schaeffer's car alarm. Both were installed in the cars that Baker damaged. To the extent Baker complains that Shaeffer received a windfall by receiving a new car alarm to replace her existing car alarm, we disagree. Her existing alarm was not triggered by intrusions though the car windows, the circumstances here. She bought a new glass alarm to prevent future break-ins like Baker's. Her purchase was attributable to Baker's conduct. The trial court awarded Shaeffer only half of her requested costs for the new car alarm, indicating that it reasonably considered the facts here in exercising its discretion. We conclude Baker fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion by allowing recovery for these losses.
II. Lost Wages and Expenses
Baker next claims Shaeffer is not entitled to restitution for lost wages because they are only authorized when a victim is unable to work due to injuries resulting from the crime, or for time spent assisting the police or prosecution. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(D)-(E).) He further challenges the restitution for Shaeffer's lost wages and expenses because Shaeffer's overreaction to his offense, not the crime itself, caused her loss of her employment and associated expenses. On this point, we agree.
A. Additional Background
Shaeffer provided internet and information technology support to the owner of a restaurant. Shaeffer generally parked her car in the restaurant's parking lot when meeting with the owner. After one meeting, Shaeffer went to the parking lot and discovered her car window had been broken. She became frustrated and upset because this was the second occasion in the same parking lot that someone smashed her car window. Shaeffer returned to the restaurant to call the police. She was talking loudly because she was upset. When questioned by the police about potential suspects who may have problems with her, Shaeffer stated there was a person in the restaurant who previously shouted at her while intoxicated. This seeming accusation about a customer upset the restaurant owner, who then terminated her business contract with Shaeffer without paying for the information technology services and products already provided. At the restitution hearing, the trial court noted that Shaeffer's emotional outburst appeared to be warranted under the circumstances, and as a result, her professional reputation suffered.
B. Analysis
At the outset, we reject Baker's claim that restitution for lost wages is limited to instances when the victim attends court, assists the prosecution, or for time spent seeking medical treatment related to injuries inflicted by the crime. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(D)-(E).) As before, the trial court is not limited to ordering restitution for losses expressly identified in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3). (See Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 661-662 [broadly reading section 1202.4 (f)'s restitution for victim's lost wages or profits due to injury to include a spouse's loss of economic support upon the death of a spouse].)
However, we agree with Baker that Shaeffer's reaction to her car window being smashed was an “extraordinary and abnormal occurrence” that relieves Baker of liability for her lost wages. (See Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 [claims for restitution have been analyzed that “in effect, parallels a victim's usual tort civil remedy for economic losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct”].) As Baker correctly points out, an independent intervening cause will generally “ ‘ “absolve a defendant of criminal liability.”' ” (See People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 427 (Jones).) If “ ‘an intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of defendant's original act[, ] the intervening act is “dependent” and not a superseding cause' ” that could relieve the defendant of liability. (Id. at p. 427.)
Here, it was reasonably foreseeable that Shaeffer would react angrily upon finding her car window smashed. But it was unforeseeable that Shaeffer had past negative interactions with a particular customer of her employer, that she would then accuse that customer of the crime, and that accusation would sour her relationship with her contract employer. (See Jones, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 [“ ‘ “intervening cause must be unforeseeable... an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause”' ”].) Shaeffer's accusations were a superseding cause to her loss of wages. (See ibid.) The evidence here does not support the trial court's conclusion that there was a causal connection between Baker's criminal conduct and Shaeffer's loss of employment, and that finding was an abuse of discretion.
III. Laptop Bag
Baker also claims the $795 restitution award to replace the stolen laptop bag was an abuse of discretion because the bag was returned to Roderick, albeit with a damaged strap. Under those circumstances, Baker claims Roderick is only entitled to the replacement value of a new strap, and he complains there was “no evidence that Roderick was unable to order a new strap for his bag.” This argument ignores that the defendant must “ ‘demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim.' ” (Millard, supra, 175Cal.App.4th at p. 30.)
“The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).) Roderick adequately demonstrated the amount of loss he suffered-testimony that the bag was leather, waterproof, ergonomic, designed with a strap for comfort, a gift from his father, and identifying the cost of a comparable replacement based on his father's information. (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543 [prima facie showing of economic loss].) Although Baker was then required “to prove the amount claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of damaged or stolen property, ” he did not offer any such evidence despite being provided the opportunity. (Ibid.) His counsel merely questioned Roderick about whether he still used the returned, damaged bag. And while Baker claims Roderick simply could have repaired the bag by replacing the strap-a claim he makes for the first time in his reply brief-Baker did not present any evidence about the value of the damaged bag or a replacement strap, or that obtaining a replacement strap was even possible. On this record, the trial court's decision to base the restitution award on the costs for a new laptop bag was not arbitrary or irrational.
People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, a case involving restitution for merchandise stolen from a nationwide retail store, does not assist Baker, contrary to his assertions. (Id. at p. 1163.) There, the court found an abuse of discretion by awarding restitution for stolen merchandise based on its full retail value-even though the actual value was substantially less because the merchandise was previously damaged or severely discounted-and further allowing the store to retain the recovered stolen goods “for disposal at its pleasure.” (Id. at pp. 1163, 1180.) The court concluded the store was “not entitled to restitution for the value of property that was returned... except to the extent there is some loss of value to the property.” (Id. at pp. 1180, 1167 [noting the recovered items had some value, demonstrated by the fact that defendant resold some goods for $3000 at various garage sales].)
There is no similar benefit or windfall here. Before his bag was stolen, Roderick had a functioning bag that served his needs of comfortably carrying his belongings while working and walking in a city. After, Roderick had a damaged bag that could hold items-the generic purpose of a bag-but the damaged strap rendered it ineffective for his original needs-carrying his belongings comfortably. (Cf. People v. Erickson (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 243, 247 [awarding victim restitution for full value of stolen goods while allowing victim to retain the damaged property that no longer served its intended purpose].) There was a factual and rational basis for the trial court's decision; it was not an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498 [“ ‘trial court must use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole' ”].)
DISPOSITION
The order of $649.45 in lost wages and $718.00 in invoice expenses for victim restitution payable to Shaeffer is reversed. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Fujisaki, Acting P.J., Petrou, J.
[*] Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.