Opinion
No. B160627.
10-28-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EVELYN CAROL BAKER, Defendant and Appellant.
Diane E. Berley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William T. Harter, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Jonathan J. Kline, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Evelyn Carol Baker appeals a judgment of conviction after the trial court found her guilty of receiving public assistance by misrepresentation, a felony. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2).) The court placed her on 60 months probation and ordered her to pay $200 fine to the State Restitution Fund and $18,531.40 restitution to the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA). We conclude, among other things, that (1) her conviction was not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) a bankruptcy court order which discharged her debts did not prevent the trial court from imposing the $200 fine and restitution order. We affirm.
FACTS
Baker received Aid to Families With Dependent Children (aid) from the HSA for herself and her four children from May 1990 to April 1995 and April 1996 to June 1996. She signed monthly income reporting forms from May 1990 to June 1993 stating, under oath, that she had not received child support.
Between July 1990 to September 1992 Bakers former husband, Elden Pherry Baker (Elden), paid her $402 a month for child support from his military salary.
The District Attorneys Child Support Division Action
On August 28, 1990, the County of Ventura filed a civil action on behalf of Bakers children for support and aid reimbursement, against Elden,. On October 1, 1990, Elden moved to stay proceedings under the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1940, United States Code Annotated Title 50 Appendix, sections 520, 523. He did not mention that he was currently paying child support to Baker.
On July 6, 1992, the court appointed counsel for Elden. On December 10, 1992, the court-appointed attorney informed the court that Elden had not responded to his letters. On March 4, 1993, the court permitted counsel to withdraw and ordered Elden to answer the complaint within 30 days. On April 28, 1993, the court entered a default judgment against Elden for $29,586.40 past child support, and ordered an assignment of his wages. On April 9, 1999, Elden moved to set aside his default stating, "I have supported my children since [Baker] and I separated . . . ."
The Anonymous Call
On June 29, 1993, an anonymous caller told the HSA that Baker was receiving aid for a child not living at home. On November 16, 1993, the HSA determined that Baker was overpaid $3,078 in aid because she did not report that fact.
The Bankruptcy
On December 3, 1997, Baker filed a petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court. On September 1, 1998, the court discharged her debts, including a debt for $9,300 that Baker claimed she owed to HSA.
The Disclosure By Eldens Current Wife
On June 17, 1999, Eldens "current" wife told Leo Ferreria, a district attorneys welfare fraud investigator, that Elden had been paying Baker child support in 1990 through 1992, when Baker was receiving aid. A warrant for Bakers arrest was issued on September 21, 1999.
Ferreria testified that he reviewed HSA and district attorney child support division files. He said there were no documents in those files prior to 1999 indicating that Elden sent support money to Baker from 1990 to 1992.
The trial court found that Bakers prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations and that "June 17, 1999, was the date that the district attorney became aware that the child support had been paid and [was] on notice."
DISCUSSION
I. The Statute of Limitations
Baker contends that her prosecution and conviction are barred by the running of the four-year statute of limitations under Penal Code section 801.5. Penal Code section 803, subdivision (c) states, "A limitation of time prescribed in this chapter does not commence to run until the discovery of an offense . . . ." Discovery occurs ". . . after one has knowledge of facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. . . ." (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 561.) We review the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial courts findings regarding the date of discovery. (Id. at p. 565.)
Ferreria testified he discovered Bakers fraud when Eldens wife told him about it on June 17, 1999. Baker contends that the HSA should have known about the fraud in 1993. We disagree.
The 1993 incident involved Bakers failure to report to HSA that one of her children was no longer living in her home. This was fraud of a different character. It did not involve the receipt of child support money. The agency discovered it had overpaid Baker grant money for the absent child. But "it is the discovery of the crime, and not just a loss, that triggers the running of the statute." (People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 246, fn. 4.) Baker submitted monthly certifications under oath stating she did not receive child support. County welfare agencies rely on these certifications to calculate the monthly grant. (Berlin v. McMahon (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 66, 76-77.) Ferreria said there were no documents in Bakers aid file which indicated that Elden had sent support money to her from 1990 to 1992. Baker has not shown that in 1993 HSA knew or should have known that she falsified the portion of the certifications which involved child support.
Baker contends that the districts attorney child support division obtained information that Elden had been supporting her before Ferreria discovered it. But that was on April 9, 1999, when Elden moved to vacate his default in the child support case. Even if that was the discovery date, it fell within the statute of limitations deadline.
Baker contends that the district attorneys child support staff had a duty to give Elden credit for the support he had paid. She argues that if they had contacted the military in 1993, they would have discovered Eldens prior support payments to her. But the issue is whether they "had sufficient information to put [them] on notice" that Baker committed this offense. (People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 333.) Ferreria testified that he reviewed the district attorneys child support divisions file. He saw no "evidence that [anyone] had notified" it about Eldens 1990 to 1992 payments prior to 1999. His testimony was uncontradicted.
Moreover, Elden did not put them on notice because he did not dispute the allegations in the child support complaint that he had not paid child support. He made a general appearance and the court appointed counsel for him. But he did not advise the support division or the court that he had made the payments until 1999. The support division staff could reasonably expect that if Elden had been paying support, he or his attorney would have promptly notified the court to reduce his liability. Because he did not do that, the court could reasonably infer that they properly relied on the information they had in their file, the HSAs file, and Bakers monthly income certifications. They could properly consider Eldens default as an admission that he owed the amount of support alleged in the complaint. They could also reasonably rely on the April 28, 1993, judgment which found that Elden had not paid support.
Baker did not present evidence showing that she put the child support division on notice that she had received support from Elden. Instead, she falsely reported under oath that she had not received support payments which misled the county agencies. Because her conduct contributed to the delay in discovery of her offense, she "should not now be heard to complain [she] would have desired to have been tried sooner." (People v. Kronemyer, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 331.)
II. The Bankruptcy Discharge
Baker contends that the bankruptcy courts order discharging her debts to the county prevented the trial court from entering: (1) a judgment of conviction; (2) the $200 fine; and (3) the restitution order to the HSA. We disagree.
The United States Bankruptcy Code neither bars nor restricts state criminal court proceedings or judgments. (Kelly v. Robinson (1986) 479 U.S. 36, 50-53; see also People v. Moser (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 130, 133, 136.) Moreover, "there is no rationale for concluding the Bankruptcy Code bars a state court from ordering the defendant in a criminal case to pay restitution to a victim . . . ." (Moser, at p. 136.) This is true even where the victims "civil claim against the defendant for the damage covered by the restitution order has been discharged in bankruptcy. [Citation]" (Ibid.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COFFEE, J., PERREN, J.