Opinion
B230491
09-26-2011
In re B. T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B. T., Defendant and Appellant.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JJ17795)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Donna Q. Groman, Judge. Affirmed.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUMMARY
B.T., a minor, appeals from the order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following a finding that he received stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). (All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.) B.T. contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he knew the property had been stolen. We disagree.
BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2010, B.T.'s teacher, Tameka Fisher, stepped out of the classroom for a few minutes, leaving her cell phone on a computer table. A few minutes after she returned the bell rang and most of her students, including B.T., left the classroom. Several students stayed behind, however, and told Fisher that B.T. had taken her phone. Fisher contacted a security officer and together they located B.T. and asked about the phone. B.T. returned the phone, offering no explanation for his possession of it.
The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that B.T. received stolen property. (§ 496, subd. (a).) After Fisher testified to the above facts at the adjudication, B.T. moved for nonsuit on the ground that no evidence suggested he knew the phone was stolen. The trial court denied the motion.
B.T. then took the stand. He testified he had been sitting in class listening to his iPod when a fellow student came up to him and offered to trade a cell phone for the iPod. When B.T. declined the trade the student said, "'Keep the iPod. I'll just give you the cell phone.'" The student then gave him the phone. B.T. testified he assumed the phone belonged to the student and did not know it was stolen. On cross-examination, B.T. testified that he and the student had been classmates for five months, since the beginning of the school year, but he did not know the student's name. He later went back to the school with police and tried to find the student, but could not.
The juvenile court sustained the petition, declared B.T. a ward of the court, placed him on home probation, and ordered him to complete 100 hours of community service. The court stated it would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor if B.T. successfully completed probation.
DISCUSSION
Section 496, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who . . . receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year." "Thus, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the prosecution must prove (1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and, (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property." (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223.)
B.T. contends that at the close of the People's case there was insufficient evidence to establish that he knew the phone had been stolen.
To resolve this issue, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding, so that a reasonable fact finder could find the allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) We also presume in support of the juvenile court's finding the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence and make all reasonable inferences that support the finding. (Id. at p. 1089.)
Knowledge that property was stolen may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Schroeder (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 217, 225.) Knowing possession by the accused of recently stolen property "raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendant's knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial that only 'slight' additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty. [Citation.]" (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421.) "'[Possession] of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation, or an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession, or by suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference that the goods were received with knowledge that they had been stolen. The rule is generally applied where the accused is found in possession of the articles soon after they were stolen.'" (People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 258, citation omitted; People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019-1020 ["the knowledge element is inferred from the defendant's failure to explain how he came to possess a stolen item"].)
Here, the phone was uncontrovertibly stolen and was found in B.T.'s possession. He gave no explanation to Fisher as to why he had it. The juvenile court reasonably found that B.T.'s possession of the phone without explanation sufficed to show a consciousness of guilt and justified an inference that he received the phone with knowledge that it was stolen.
B.T. argues the juvenile court could not consider the unsatisfactory nature of his testimony for having the phone when ruling on his pre-testimony motion for nonsuit. The People argue the court was entitled to consider all evidence, even B.T.'s post-motion testimony, when deciding whether to grant nonsuit. We need not reach this issue because we find the prosecution's evidence sufficed of itself to support the juvenile court's order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
JOHNSON, J.