Opinion
February 10, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Miller, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial, due in large measure to a 111-day, pre-indictment delay. The record reveals, however, that during this period of time the People were actively investigating allegations of police brutality which had been made by the defendant during his arraignment on a felony complaint. Although the defendant did not request that his charges of brutality be investigated, the charges provided a legitimate basis for the People to be concerned about the credibility of the police witnesses to the alleged drug sale. An investigation into the allegations of police brutality was thus necessary to properly prepare the case for presentation to the Grand Jury. Accordingly, we find that the period of pre-indictment delay was properly excluded as an "exceptional circumstance" pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (g) (see, People v. Johnson, 167 A.D.2d 422).
We further find that the period of time following the defendant's failure to appear and the issuance of a bench warrant was properly excluded (see, CPL 30.30 [c]; People v Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523, 526, n 2; People v. Bolden, 174 A.D.2d 111; People v. Walker, 122 A.D.2d 654, 655).
Finally, while the court should have charged the People with that portion of the delay following the court's warning of December 2, 1988, to serve an answer to the defendant's pretrial motion (see, People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59), even if that delay is charged to the People, the record demonstrates that they were ready for trial within the statutory period (see, CPL 30.30 [a]). Accordingly, the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated. Thompson, J.P., Harwood, Rosenblatt and Eiber, JJ., concur.