Yet, courts have observed that the use of handcuffs in a particular detention is indicative of an arrest, rather than a Terry stop, because it heightens the degree of intrusion and is not, generally, part of such a stop. People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 70. 914 N.E.2d 1143, 1150 (2009). Importantly, concerns for officer safety and the safety of the public can, in certain limited circumstances, justify handcuffing during a brief investigatory stop.

¶ 38 “ ‘[T]here is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a lawful Terry stop and an illegal arrest.’ ” People v. Arnold, 394 Ill.App.3d 63, 70, 333 Ill.Dec. 331, 914 N.E.2d 1143 (2009) (quoting United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir.1989)). “[A] restriction of movement that is brief may amount to an arrest rather than a Terry stop if it is accompanied by use of force usually associated with an arrest, unless such use of force was reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the stop.”

" '[T]here is no bright-line test for distinguishing between a lawful Terry stop and an illegal arrest.' " People v. Daniel, 2013 IL App (1st) 111876, ¶ 38 (quoting People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 70 (2009)). " '[A] restriction of movement that is brief may amount to an arrest rather than a Terry stop if it is accompanied by use of force usually associated with an arrest, unless such use of force was reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the stop.' "

Our supreme court has explained that "[i]n Terry, the Supreme Court held that an officer may, within the parameters of the fourth amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a citizen when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and such suspicion amounts to more than a mere 'hunch.' " People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 177 (2003), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 70 (2009) (pursuant to Terry, an officer may briefly detain a person, whom the officer reasonably suspects to be recently or currently engaged in criminal activity, so as to verify or dispel those suspicions). ¶ 12 To justify a Terry stop, a police officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

Under Terry, a police officer may briefly detain a person, whom the officer reasonably suspects to be recently or currently engaged in criminal activity, so as to verify or dispel those suspicions. People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 70 (2009). To justify a Terry stop, a police officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion."

The Illinois Supreme Court has already applied the new Gant rule retroactively to a case that was pending on appeal ( People v. Bridgewater, 235 Ill. 2d 85, 92 (2009)); and several appellate court opinions have applied it retroactively as well. People v. Frias, 393 Ill. App. 3d 331, 333 (2009) (applying Gant retroactively to a pre-Gant search where the case was still pending on direct review); People v. Estrada, 394 Ill. App. 3d 611, 626 (2009) ("[f]ollowing the dictate of Gant"); People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 79-80 (2009) (finding that under Gant "there was no justification for the [ pre-Gant] search of the defendant's car"). In Bridgewater, as in our case, the search at issue occurred before Gant was decided.

Although the use of handcuffs is ordinarily associated with an arrest, it likewise does not necessarily turn a stop into an arrest. People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 71 (2009). Where the police conduct a stop, and there is a reasonable belief that the driver is armed and dangerous, concerns for officer safety support the use of handcuffs during the stop.

Legitimate interests in using handcuffs during a Terry stop include protecting law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect from the undue risk of harm. People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 72 (2009). ¶ 30 In this case, the record demonstrates that Officer Walker had information that an individual fitting respondent's description and location was carrying a handgun. After observing respondent bend over behind the couch (where respondent could not be viewed) and make furtive movements despite Officer Walker's commands to step away from the couch, it was reasonable for Officer Walker to handcuff respondent, perform a protective pat-down and to investigate further.

Legitimate interests in using handcuffs during a Terry stop include protecting law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect from the undue risk of harm. People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63, 72 (2009). ¶ 35 Here, the record establishes that the officers had information that an individual fitting respondent's description and location had a gun in his pocket.

They were, in turn, authorized to search the vehicle for further evidence of the crime of drug possession. See People v. Arnold, 394 Ill.App.3d 63, 79, 333 Ill.Dec. 331, 914 N.E.2d 1143 (2009) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)). They could do so irrespective of whether defendant was handcuffed at the time.