Opinion
G031890.
10-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEREMY MARK ARCHULETA, Defendant and Appellant.
Lynelle K. Hee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jeremy Mark Archuleta pleaded guilty to one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) He was accused of repeatedly kicking the victim. The trial court imposed but suspended a sentence of four years in prison, ordered Archuleta be placed in custody for 180 days, and placed him on probation. On appeal, Archuleta challenges the condition of probation that he submit his person and property to search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer, with or without warrant, and with or without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the warrantless search condition and therefore affirm.
DISCUSSION
Penal Code section 1203.1 vests the sentencing court with broad discretion to impose conditions of probation to foster rehabilitation and to protect the public. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (j), states, in relevant part, "The court may impose and require . . . reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer."
In People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, the California Supreme Court stated: "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it `(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . . [Citation.]" (Fn. omitted.) All three factors must be found to invalidate a condition of probation because the test is written in the conjunctive. (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, fn. 3.) "Insofar as a probation condition serves the statutory purpose of `reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer, ([Pen. Code,] § 1203.1) it necessarily follows that such a condition is `reasonably related to future criminality and thus may not be held invalid whether or not it has any `relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted." (Id. at p. 65.)
A warrantless search condition serves a valid rehabilitative purpose. (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 67.) A warrantless search condition is intended to ensure the probationer is complying with the fundamental condition of all grants of probation that the probationer obey all laws. (Ibid.) "The threat of a suspicionless search is fully consistent with the deterrent purposes of the search condition. `"The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of [the probationer] is to ascertain whether [he] is complying with the terms of [probation]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained under such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the defendant . . . ." [Citations.]" (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752.)
Archuleta contends the warrantless search condition is invalid because it bears no reasonable relation to his criminal conduct. Archuleta did not use a weapon. No alcohol or drugs were involved. Because, as we conclude, the warrantless search condition is justified by its rehabilitative purpose, "it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms." (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 67.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. and OLEARY, J.