Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. VCR180302
Margulies, J.
Following a search of his home pursuant to a search warrant, defendant Stephen Anderson was charged with possession of marijuana for sale and cultivation of marijuana. The warrant application included an affidavit that the magistrate partially sealed in order to protect the identity of a confidential informant. After moving unsuccessfully to unseal the affidavit and traverse and quash the warrant, defendant pleaded no contest to the charge of cultivation of marijuana. He asks this court to review the sealed material, including the in camera hearing transcript, and determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. Having done so, and finding no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rulings, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A complaint was filed on September 14, 2005, charging defendant with possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and cultivation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358). The complaint was filed after the police executed a search warrant at defendant’s home and found a substantial quantity of dried and drying marijuana plants and other evidence of marijuana sale and cultivation.
Much of the information contained in the search warrant affidavit was from a confidential informant, whose statements were included in an attachment to the affidavit, referred to as “Appendix A.” The nonconfidential portion of the affidavit stated only that a detective had visited the residence sought to be searched, had seen in the driveway a truck registered to defendant and his wife, and had noticed that “[i]n the gap between the garage door and the frame” was “some brown backing covering the gaps on the sides and the bottom.” The affiant concluded that “[t]his is indicative of marijuana cultivators as this conceals the light from the grow lights and the odor from the outside.” The remainder of the affidavit, Appendix A, was sealed to protect the identity of the informant.
Defendant moved to unseal the confidential portion of the search warrant and to traverse and quash the warrant. The trial court held an in camera hearing at which it reviewed Appendix A and took testimony from the affiant. On the basis of this hearing, the court held that there were “sufficient grounds” to maintain the confidentiality of the informant and denied the motion to unseal the affidavit. The court later denied the motion to quash.
We have found no record of the court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to traverse the warrant, but the parties treated that motion as having been denied when the court denied the motion to unseal the warrant.
Defendant pleaded no contest to the charge of cultivation of marijuana and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Although we found, in a prior decision, that defendant had waived the right to appeal the motion to suppress ruling, we concluded that defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea and remanded to provide him that opportunity. (People v. Anderson (Oct. 23, 2007, A117005) [nonpub. opn.].)
Following remand, defendant withdrew his plea; the complaint was deemed an information, and defendant again pleaded no contest to the charge of cultivation of marijuana, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation on specified conditions, including 90 days in county jail. The judgment was stayed pending appeal of the motion to suppress.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the corroboration of the confidential informant’s statement was insufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of the search warrant and requests that this court review the sealed appendix accompanying the search warrant affidavit.
“ ‘Probable cause to issue an arrest or search warrant must . . . be based on information contained in an affidavit providing a substantial basis from which the magistrate can reasonably conclude there is a fair probability that a person has committed a crime or a place contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 989.) In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on probable cause, we accept the factual findings of the court if they are supported by substantial evidence, but the existence of probable cause based on those facts is subject to our independent review. (People v. Gotfried (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 254, 262.)
All or a part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed when disclosure will reveal or tend to reveal the identity of a confidential informant. (People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 971 (Hobbs).) Because sealing a portion of the affidavit may prevent the defendant from making the showing normally required to challenge the issuance of a warrant, the Supreme Court has instructed that “certain procedures should be followed” when a confidential informant has been used. (Id. at p. 972.) If the defendant questions the issuance of such a warrant, the trial court must hold an in camera hearing at which the prosecutor may be present, but from which the defendant and defense counsel are ordinarily excluded. (Id. at p. 973.) “The court . . . must take it upon itself both to examine the affidavit for possible inconsistencies or insufficiencies regarding the showing of probable cause, and inform the prosecution of the materials or witnesses it requires. . . . [¶] Furthermore, because the defendant’s access to the essence of the affidavit is curtailed or possibly eliminated, the lower court may, in its discretion, find it necessary and appropriate to call and question the affiant, the informant, or any other witness whose testimony it deems necessary to rule upon the issues. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
If “the defendant has moved to quash the search warrant [citation], the [trial] court should proceed to determine whether, under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ presented in the search warrant affidavit and the oral testimony, if any, presented to the magistrate, there was ‘a fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the place searched pursuant to the warrant. [Citations.] . . . [¶] If the court determines, based on its review of all the relevant materials, that the affidavit and related materials furnished probable cause for issuance of the warrant under Illinois v. Gates [(1983) 462 U.S. 213], the court should simply report this conclusion to the defendant and enter an order denying the motion to quash.” (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 975; see also People v. Galland (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 489, 495 [abuse of discretion not to follow Hobbs procedures when a confidential informant is involved].)
The trial court properly complied with these procedures, reviewing the confidential portion of the affidavit, taking testimony from the affiant, and reporting its conclusion that the warrant was adequately supported by denying the motion to quash.
A few general principles are applicable when the affidavit supporting probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant includes statements of an informant. As noted above, the determination of probable cause must be made on the basis of the totality of circumstances. (People v. Brueckner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1504.) “Under th[at] test, veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are intertwined factors which illuminate the practical question whether there is probable cause to believe evidence or contraband is located in a particular place.” (People v. Rochen (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 684, 688; see People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 601.) The report of an identified informant is entitled to greater weight than an anonymous tip, and a detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, observed firsthand, is entitled to greater weight than vague or hearsay accounts. (People v. Rochen, at p. 688.)
Corroboration of the informant’s story may or may not be necessary, depending upon the apparent reliability of the informant and his or her story. (People v. Brueckner, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1504–1505; People v. Maestas (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1208, 1220.) While corroboration of an informant’s tip through independent police work is important, “ ‘[a]n affidavit relying on hearsay “is not to be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.[”] ’ ” (People v. Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 601.) As noted above, an informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant factors that, together or separately, are clearly relevant to the probable cause determination. “ ‘[A] deficiency in one [of these factors] may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.’ ” (Ibid.)
We have reviewed the sealed portion of the affidavit, the testimony at the in camera hearing, and the other materials submitted to the magistrate. Based on our independent examination of those materials, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable defendant would have prevailed on his motion to suppress.
First, the unsealing of the affidavit would have revealed the identity of the informant. “[A]ll or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to implement the [informant’s] privilege and protect the identity of a confidential informant.” (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 971.) Here, in reviewing the affidavit we find that valid grounds existed for maintaining the informant’s confidentiality and that the sealing of a portion of the affidavit was necessary in order to avoid revealing the informant’s identity. (Id. at p. 973.)
Further, there is nothing in the affidavit that demonstrates that any material misrepresentations or omissions were made. “[I]n order to prevail on such a challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) the affidavit included a false statement made ‘knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,’ and (2) ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’ [Citation.]” (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 974.) We have examined the affidavit for possible misleading statements or omissions and found nothing that leads us to suspect that any material misrepresentations or omissions were made.
Finally, based on our review, we conclude that the affidavit established probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for defendant’s residence. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Because we reach this conclusion, we do not address the People’s alternative argument that the evidence should not be excluded because the officers acted in good faith. (See United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano P.J., Swager, J.