Opinion
2-22-0308
05-14-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTORYUS L. ALMASI, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 21-CF-1846 Honorable Elizabeth K. Flood, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
KENNEDY, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We dismiss as moot defendant's appeal of the trial court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive appropriate means of restoring him to fitness. Defendant has been restored to fitness, and the exceptions to the mootness doctrine do not apply given the fact-specific basis of the trial court's judgment.
¶ 2 Defendant, Victoryus L. Almasi, appeals an order of the circuit court of Kane County finding him unfit to stand trial and committing him to inpatient fitness restoration treatment. He contends that the trial court should have instead ordered outpatient treatment because it was the least restrictive appropriate means of restoring him to fitness. We dismiss this appeal as moot.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On October 26, 2021, the State charged defendant with resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2020)), and resisting or obstructing a peace officer and thereby causing injury, a Class 4 felony (id. § 31-1(a-7)). The charges were based on an incident on October 16, 2021. At the time of his arrest, defendant was 26 years old. On October 29, 2021, bail was set at $25,000 and defendant was released on personal recognizance.
¶ 5 On March 30, 2022, the trial court found a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness to stand trial or plead, and it ordered the Kane County Diagnostic Center in St. Charles (KCDC) to conduct a fitness evaluation. On August 2, 2022, the court held a fitness hearing. The sole witness was Dr. Ellis O'Connor. We summarize her testimony and the documentary evidence from the hearing.
¶ 6 O'Connor testified that she had examined defendant and prepared a report on his fitness. Her June 15, 2022, report was admitted into evidence. In the report, she noted that she had examined defendant in person for 70 minutes at the Ecker Center in Elgin on May 9, 2022, and by telephone for 20 minutes on June 2, 2022. Her report concluded that defendant was unfit based on a mental disorder, and she recommended inpatient treatment for him.
¶ 7 O'Connor testified that she based her recommendation for inpatient treatment on four factors. The first was transportation. Defendant had been unable to get to the KCDC for an inperson interview, so O'Connor arranged to meet him at the Ecker Center, a court services provider in Elgin near his home. Defendant walked to the Ecker Center, and O'Connor conducted the inperson interview. O'Connor later attempted to schedule a second appointment with defendant. She left four phone messages for him, but he did not return her calls until the trial court prompted him. Eventually, O'Connor was able to have a phone session with defendant. O'Connor testified that "[defendant's] limited transportation would create difficulty for him to transport himself to outpatient treatment."
¶ 8 The second factor was defendant's history of substance use, primarily alcohol. O'Connor testified that defendant "discussed recent substance use with [her] but would not specify his most recent use of alcohol." O'Connor explained that alcohol use can interfere with psychiatric medication, which is typically prescribed in cases such as defendant's. Thus, being in a restricted setting could expedite defendant's restoration. O'Connor's report noted that defendant told her that he consumed "one 'tall can' of beer 'a couple times a month, maybe every day for a week.'" He could not specifically recall when he had last consumed alcohol.
¶ 9 The third factor was defendant's history of noncompliance with treatment. In her report, O'Connor noted that defendant successfully underwent outpatient treatment under Kane County's Treatment Alternative Court (TAC) program between November 6, 2017, and October 10, 2019. However, she added, there were instances of noncompliance before and after that period. In May 2016, defendant underwent inpatient mental health treatment but, after he was discharged, he discontinued using the prescribed psychiatric medication. In December 2016, defendant voluntarily went to a hospital emergency room, but he refused treatment and was discharged a few days later. In August 2020, he voluntarily went to the emergency room, but, against medical advice, he declined further treatment and left the hospital. On November 28, 2020, defendant "presented at the emergency department with aggressive behaviors including threats to harm his neighbors." He reported at the hospital that he had been" 'off his medications for multiple years.'"
¶ 10 O'Connor's report further noted that the October 16, 2021, incident that led to the present charges occurred at the hospital after defendant had come to the emergency room. There, he admitted experiencing auditory hallucinations" 'all the time'" and said that he had not used his psychotropic medication since February 2021. He said he was" 'looking to be hospitalized as an inpatient to get help.'" About four hours after he arrived, the staff prepared and showed him a petition to commit him involuntarily. Defendant then tried to leave the hospital, but police officers who had been called told him that he could not leave. When defendant said he intended to leave anyway, the officers arrested him. He resisted arrest and was handcuffed and restrained.
¶ 11 The fourth basis on which O'Connor recommended inpatient treatment was defendant's lack of insight into his mental health symptoms and how they affected his overall functioning. O'Connor testified that, although defendant had admitted that his problems with mental health impaired his employment stability, education, and personal relationships, he also said that he did not believe he needed to be medicated and that he did not want treatment. In her report, O'Connor noted that, during the in-person interview, defendant reported hearing "multiple voices" of" 'actual people' who were present in the room," even though only he and O'Connor were there. Defendant indicated that he had not been taking his prescribed psychotropic medication and did not believe that it would benefit him. He "repeatedly asserted that he was not in need of mental health treatment." Thus, he "consistently demonstrated a lack of insight pertaining to his mental health symptoms."
¶ 12 O'Connor's report diagnosed defendant with bipolar disorder with psychotic features and depression. During the in-person interview, he admitted symptoms such as hallucinations. He was also fixated on the belief that he was being persecuted. In O'Connor's view, defendant's condition prevented him from assisting counsel in his defense.
¶ 13 O'Connor's report concluded:
"The mood-related psychotic symptoms [defendant] experiences are typically addressed with psychotropic medication. Although he previously used such medication, he reported he did not take psychotropic medications for more than one year prior to this evaluation. Therefore, it is my opinion [defendant] can be restored to fitness within one
year with appropriate treatment, including psychotropic medication. Given his repeated noncompliance with previously prescribed medications, lack of transportation, and ongoing psychotic symptoms, an inpatient treatment facility represents the least restrictive appropriate treatment environment for [defendant]."
¶ 14 On cross-examination, O'Connor testified that she had been unable to contact defendant's family about providing transportation for him. She acknowledged that the Ecker Center offered outpatient treatment but noted that its wait list "can be lengthy." Although O'Connor had difficulty contacting defendant for a follow-up interview, he did call her after the trial court admonished him to do so.
¶ 15 O'Connor acknowledged that the TAC program, which defendant successfully completed in 2019, was an intensive outpatient program that, in its first phase, required weekly appearances in court, random drug tests up to three times a week, testing for compliance with medication requirements, weekly counseling, meetings with a probation officer, and participation in support groups. To graduate successfully from the TAC program, a person must comply with medication and treatment requirements. Defendant reported to O'Connor that, during his time in the TAC program, he regularly attended outpatient treatment, "although he believed this treatment was not helpful to him." Defendant told O'Connor that he "would not enjoy attending treatment," although he did not explicitly say that he would refuse to attend. Also, even though he told her that he did not believe that he needed psychotropic medication, he did not specifically say that he would refuse to take it.
¶ 16 O'Connor testified that defendant's psychotic symptoms during the in-person session, combined with his lack of insight into how those symptoms affected his functioning, represents "a barrier to the treatment adherence and motivation." She opined that several factors would determine whether placing a mentally ill person in jail for several months would harm his mental health. For instance, a person who had not engaged in treatment while in the community could benefit by receiving medication in jail. However, she recognized that, if defendant were given recommended medication while in jail, he could simply refuse to take it.
¶ 17 The State rested. The parties stipulated that (1) O'Connor was qualified as an expert witness, (2) defendant was unfit to stand trial based on a mental disability, and (3) there was a substantial probability that he could be restored to fitness within 12 months.
¶ 18 Defendant introduced several exhibits into evidence. The first two were a packet of information about the TAC program and an order stating that defendant had successfully completed the TAC program on October 10, 2019. The information packet set out the requirements for the TAC "Felony Program[,]" which had three phases. The phase one requirements were, inter alia, weekly court appearances, office meetings and additional contact (home visits, employment visits, etc.) with the TAC coordinator as determined by the coordinator or the TAC team, weekly case management/counseling appointments, daily medication compliance, psychiatric appointment compliance, and random drug testing up to three times a week. There were similar requirements for phase two, except that court appearances were bimonthly and random drug testing would be done up to twice a week. Phase three had similar requirements, but with monthly court appearances, random drug screening at an unspecified frequency, and psychiatric appointments at least every 90 days.
¶ 19 The third and fourth exhibits were e-mail exchanges between the public defender and Deborah Giardina of the Department of Human Services in an unrelated case involving a different defendant (M.). In the first e-mail exchange, M.'s attorney informed Giardina that she had received a placement letter for M. two weeks ago, but that M. was still waiting for a bed at Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC). In her reply, dated June 14, 2022, Giardina stated that M. was "26 out of 30 for EMHC and 94 on the state-wide priority list." The second e-mail exchange consisted of an update request from M.'s attorney and Giardina's July 15, 2022, reply, which stated, "[M.'s] about 14th on the EMHC list and about 35 on the statewide list. So he's not on the 'priority list' yet."
¶ 20 The parties' arguments centered on whether outpatient or inpatient treatment was the least restrictive appropriate means of fitness restoration. The trial court found as follows. Defendant was unfit to stand trial. O'Connor was "a credible witness," and the court accepted her conclusion that defendant's mental health problems affected his ability to assist in his defense. Further, there was a substantial probability that defendant could be restored to fitness within 12 months. Thus, the only issue was whether to order outpatient or inpatient treatment.
¶ 21 The trial court considered the factors that O'Connor discussed in her testimony and report. First, there was no specific evidence that defendant could rely on family members for transportation. Second, defendant had told O'Connor that he was currently consuming alcohol regularly, which could interfere with the effects of medication.
¶ 22 Third, although defendant deserved credit for successfully completing the TAC program, he still believed that he did not need medication. Moreover, between 2016 and 2021, he had four emergency room visits, at all of which he either refused medication or tried to leave the hospital. In November 2020, he reported that he had long been off his medication. In the October 2021 incident that led to the present case, defendant reported that he had not taken his medication since February 2021. Although he told hospital staff that he had come there for help with his mental health disorder, he later tried to leave the premises without receiving treatment.
¶ 23 Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that defendant "[was] not sufficiently able to understand the importance of medication to the treatment of his symptoms and to consistently participate in treatment and to consistently align his behavior in a way that is going to minimize his symptoms." He had been given multiple opportunities to comply with requirements for treatment and medication but had refused to take advantage of them. Even after completing the rigorous TAC program, defendant soon stopped taking his medication and ended up at a hospital emergency room, leading to the present charges. The court concluded that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive appropriate means of restoring defendant to fitness within one year. Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 This appeal is moot. On March 21, 2023, the trial court found that defendant was fit to stand trial, and it remanded him to the custody of the Kane County jail. The restoration of a defendant to fitness will typically render moot an appeal from the order finding the defendant unfit to stand trial. People v. Holt, 2014 IL 116989, ¶ 45. That is so here; the trial court's judgment, whether valid or not," 'can no longer serve as the basis for adverse action against [defendant].'" In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 351 (2009) (quoting In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 490, 492 (1998)). As a general rule, we do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues when the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. Id.
¶ 26 There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See Holt, 2014 IL 116989, ¶ 45. We must decide whether any exception applies. We ordered the parties to brief this issue. Defendant contends that we should hear this appeal because (1) it raises an issue of public interest (see id. at 355-58) and (2) the alleged error is capable of repetition yet evading review (see id. at 358-63). We hold that neither exception applies.
¶ 27 To invoke the public-interest exception, a party must show that (1) the question presented is public rather than case-specific, (2) an authoritative determination is needed to guide public officers, and (3) the question is likely to recur. Holt, 2014 IL 116989, ¶ 47. We agree with the State that defendant has not met the first prerequisite. The issue in this appeal is purely fact-specific: defendant contends that the evidence in this case did not prove that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive appropriate means of restoring him to fitness. There is no question of law or other questions on which this court needs to or could provide an authoritative determination for the guidance of public officers. Defendant's original appellate brief bears out our conclusion: the brief does not purport to raise any general question that does not turn on the specific facts of this case. We conclude that the public-interest exception does not apply here.
¶ 28 We turn to the capable-of-repetition exception. To invoke it, a party must demonstrate that (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before its cessation and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same party would be subjected to the same action again. Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 491. The State concedes that the first criterion (see id.) applies. Thus, the sole issue is whether defendant satisfied the second criterion.
¶ 29 In contending that he would likely be subjected to the same action again, defendant relies primarily on People v. McCoy, 2014 IL App (2d) 130632, in which the defendant appealed an order finding him unfit to stand trial. Id. ¶ 1. In McCoy, we said this about the capable-of-repetition exception:
"The present action and a potential future action must have a substantial enough relation that the resolution of the issue in the present case would have a bearing on a similar issue presented in a future case involving the defendant. [Citations.] In cases where the defendant challenges the specific facts that were established during the hearing, the exception generally does not apply, because those facts would necessarily be different in any future hearing and would have no bearing on similar issues presented in subsequent
cases. [Citations.] However, when the defendant raises a purely legal question, such as an issue of statutory interpretation, the exception can apply because the court will likely again commit the same alleged errors. [Citation.]" Id. ¶ 13.
¶ 30 In McCoy, we found that the capable-of-repetition exception applied because the defendant claimed that the trial court had erred as a matter of law in denying him his statutory right to a jury trial on fitness. Id. ¶ 1. We determined that it was reasonably likely that the trial court would again have to decide whether the defendant was fit and that, unless we decided the jury trial issue, "the [trial] court would likely continue to ignore any personal jury demands." Id. ¶ 15.
¶ 31 In his opening supplemental brief on mootness, defendant does not explain how McCoy, which involved an issue of law, applies to this appeal, which centers on the trial court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive appropriate means of restoring defendant to fitness. In its supplemental response brief, the State contends that, because this issue depends on evidentiary facts found in August 2022, the facts found at a later hearing would necessarily be different. The State relies on Alfred H.H., in which the supreme court refused to apply the capable-of-repetition exception to the respondent's contention that the trial court's order of involuntary commitment, which had long since expired, was based on insufficient evidence. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 350, 360. That evidence consisted primarily of the respondent's aberrant conduct leading up to the petition for commitment and an expert's evaluation of the respondent's mental health. Id. at 348-49. The State argues that, as the supreme court held in Alfred H.H., so this court should conclude that the facts underlying the trial court's order of inpatient treatment would not bear a sufficient relation to the facts developed in a future proceeding. See id. at 360.
¶ 32 In his supplemental reply brief, defendant argues that, although the trial court's judgment was fact-specific, many of the facts the court relied on would also be central to a future proceeding on fitness. Defendant notes specifically that the trial court relied on (1) defendant's lack of transportation, (2) his past substance abuse, (3) his history of noncompliance with treatment recommendations, and (4) his persistent belief that he did not need treatment. Defendant reasons that a future unfitness finding is a realistic possibility given his history and that the last three considerations are unalterable historical facts that would probably influence the trial court's decision on whether to order inpatient treatment.
¶ 33 We cannot agree with defendant. Undoubtedly, a future fitness proceeding would involve some of the evidence on which the judgment appealed here was based. But it is equally free from doubt that, in a future proceeding (should there even be one), much new evidence would be introduced-and would be crucial to the trial court's decision. Thus, this case does not differ meaningfully from Alfred H. H. and provides no basis to apply the capable-of-repetition exception.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, the appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is dismissed as moot.
¶ 36 Appeal dismissed.