Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWF020013. Mark E. Petersen, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster, Acting P.J.
I
INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 2007, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Michael Claire Allison with: (1) committing continuous sexual abuse upon a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5 (count 1); and (2) failing to register as a sex offender in violation of Penal Code former section 290, subdivision (f)(1) (count 2). As to count 2, the complaint also alleged that defendant is a habitual sexual offender within the meaning of section 667.71. The complaint further alleged that defendant had been convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a).
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. References to Penal Code section 290 are to the version of the statute in effect at the time the charged offenses were committed.
On April 23, 2009, the prosecution orally moved to amend the complaint to allege that defendant had been convicted of a violent or serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1). The defense did not object to the amendment. That same day, defendant pled guilty to both counts and admitted the serious felony enhancement and the strike allegation in exchange for a sentence of 18 years four months in state prison. The remaining enhancement allegation was dismissed. Defendant also admitted to probation violations in five misdemeanor cases: SWM0041078, PEM027021, RIM390101, RIM425742 and SWM0029399. In exchange, it was agreed that the misdemeanor cases would be dismissed when defendant was sentenced in the felony case.
On June 22, 2009, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion. On August 21, 2009, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The sentencing hearing occurred the same day. The trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of six years in state prison for count 1, which was doubled to 12 years due to the strike conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of eight months for count 2, which was doubled to 16 months. The trial court also imposed a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony enhancement. Therefore, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 18 years four months in state prison. He was awarded 117 days of custody credits and ordered to pay a restitution fine of $200 and a parole revocation fine in the same amount, which was stayed pending the successful completion of parole. Defendant was also ordered to pay a $60 court security fee and a $60 conviction fee.
On September 2, 2009, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. He requested a certificate of probable cause, which the trial court denied.
II
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record on appeal does not contain the incident report which served as the factual basis of defendant’s plea. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant admitted to committing continuous sexual abuse on Jane Doe, a child under the age of 14, between August 2002 and February 2006; and failing to register as a sex offender as required under former section 290.
III
ANALYSIS
After defendant appealed, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have conducted an independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Richli J., King J.