Opinion
B298611
04-24-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEMORE AIZENMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Marks & Brooklier and Donald B. Marks for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA089590) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Affirmed. Marks & Brooklier and Donald B. Marks for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After being charged with kidnapping and false imprisonment, Lemore Aizenman pled no contest to the lesser offense of misdemeanor assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. In exchange for accepting a plea, Aizenman escaped prison time for this violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4), and was placed on summary probation for three years.
The trial court imposed three conditions upon Aizenman's probation: 20 days of community labor; one year of psychological counseling; and one year of anger management.
Aizenman was present in court and consented to these conditions. She agreed to appear three months later "to show proof of progress in anger management and psychological counseling."
Yet Aizenman did not show proof of progress on either her anger management or psychological counseling obligations. She also performed only 16 hours of her 20 days of community service.
The trial court terminated probation and sentenced Aizenman to one year in county jail.
Aizenman moved to set aside the probation violation finding. The court denied the motion. Aizenman timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A trial court may revoke probation if it "has reason to believe . . . that the [probationer] has violated any of the conditions of [probation] . . . or has subsequently committed other offenses." (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a).) We have construed this language as giving the trial courts "very broad discretion" when determining whether to revoke probation. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443.)
Both parties fail to indicate the applicable standard of review. Aizenman's brief does not even mention a standard, and the People's brief urges us to apply the incorrect "miscarriage of justice" standard.
We review a decision to revoke probation for substantial evidence. (People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)
Aizenman's argument on appeal is she "clearly made some attempt to comply with the terms of probation." These attempts are "mitigating factors that established good cause for the trial court to set aside the revocation of probation."
These arguments span a single page and are unaided by a single legal citation. Aizenman gives us no authority that we may reverse a trial court's revocation of probation if the probationer shows they made an attempt to comply. This is because there is no such authority.
At her final progress review hearing, Aizenman admitted to being in violation of her probation. "I have no excuses except for offering, again, my apologies . . . ."
This admission alone is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's order revoking probation.
The court was patient with Aizenman. During several court appearances spanning six months, Aizenman failed to provide paperwork to substantiate her claims she was progressing in her court ordered programs. Sometimes she said she "has the paperwork at home." Other times she provided the court with "blurry" copies. The court found Aizenman was repaying its patience by giving it "the runaround." The court explained that to give Aizenman even more time to show up with substantiating paperwork would be futile because it had "no faith that anything brought to me would be truly what it purports to be."
This is not only substantial evidence supporting the court's decision, it is overwhelming evidence the court was right to terminate probation.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying revocation of probation is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
CHANEY, J.