Opinion
C099012
04-15-2024
In re A.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. A.H., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 52-009490
EARL, P.J.Minor A.H. appeals from the juvenile court's grant of probation to challenge two conditions of his probation-one that requires him to participate in psychoeducation and the other that permits warrantless searches of his person, home, and vehicle at any time. He contends that both conditions are unreasonable and violate People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). We conclude that A.H.'s challenge to the psychoeducation condition has been forfeited. But we agree with A.H. that the search condition is invalid and must be stricken. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to consider whether a more narrowly drawn search condition is appropriate.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2023, A.H. fought with E.R. on their high school campus over a girl they both liked. While they were fighting, A.H.'s brother intervened and punched E.R. in the back of the head several times. E.R. lost consciousness and afterwards complained of difficulty breathing and head pain. A.H. subsequently admitted to battery on school property (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a)) as a misdemeanor and the juvenile court placed him on probation without wardship (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a)).
At disposition, A.H. challenged two proposed probation conditions. He first objected that the condition requiring him to participate in "psychoeducation addressing ADHD" was vague. The court ultimately imposed this condition, explaining that it had "a sufficient enough degree of particularity." A.H. next argued that probation condition No. 18, which required him to submit to warrantless searches, was unreasonable and violated Lent and Ricardo P. That condition states in full: "You shall submit your person/residence/vehicle/area over which you have control to search and seizure by Probation or any Peace Officer at any time, day or night, with/without notice, with/without search warrant, and with/without reasonable cause, for purpose of determining compliance with conditions of probation." While acknowledging the decision was "a close call," the juvenile court imposed the condition.
A.H. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A.H. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the probation conditions requiring psychoeducation and permitting warrantless searches. More specifically, A.H. argues these conditions run afoul of Lent and Ricardo P. because they have no relation to the circumstances of the offense or to future criminality.
As to the psychoeducation condition, A.H.'s claim has been forfeited because it was not raised below. While A.H. challenged this condition on vagueness grounds in the juvenile court, he did not argue it was unreasonable under Lent and Ricardo P. The failure to object on the specific grounds raised on appeal forfeits his appellate argument. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 [holding "that failure to timely challenge a probation condition on 'Bushman/Lent' grounds in the trial court waives the claim on appeal"].) But as to the condition permitting warrantless searches, we agree with A.H. that the juvenile court abused its discretion.
In Lent, the California Supreme Court held that a "condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.'" (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) This three-part test "is conjunctive-all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) This standard "governs in juvenile and adult probation cases alike." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.)
Our Supreme Court applied this standard in Ricardo P. to invalidate an electronics search condition imposed on a juvenile defendant. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1128-1129.) That case turned on whether the probation condition satisfied Lent's third prong that it be"' "reasonably related to future criminality." '" (Id. at p. 1119.) The court explained that this requirement "contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition." (Id. at p. 1122.) The search condition at issue "provide[d] probation officers full access, day or night" to the minor's electronic devices and thus "significantly burden[ed] privacy interests." (Id. at p. 1123.) Yet there was only a "very limited justification" for imposing the condition. (Id. at p. 1124.) The minor had not used electronic devices in connection with criminal conduct and the only reason offered by the juvenile court for the search condition was that minors" 'typically will brag about their marijuana usage'" online. (Id. at p. 1122; see id. at pp. 1122-1123.) Based on the record before it, our Supreme Court held that the search condition was "not reasonably related to future criminality" and was "therefore invalid under Lent." (Id. at p. 1128.)
The same result obtains here. The parties do not dispute that the first two prongs of the Lent test are satisfied as the search condition has no relationship to A.H.'s offense and does not relate to conduct which is itself criminal. Regarding the third prong, the People contend that the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality because "permitting probation officers to inspect [A.H.'s] home and property unannounced would enable them to determine whether [A.H.] had been contacting the victim." But it is entirely unclear how permitting such warrantless searches would facilitate this determination. Against this tenuous justification we must consider the burden imposed on A.H. by the sweeping search condition, which would subject him to warrantless searches of his person and home at any time without any limitation as to what would be searched for. This would be a significant burden on A.H.'s privacy. (Cf. In re Rudy F. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132 [" 'private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant' "].)
The People more broadly suggest that the condition prevents future criminality by ensuring effective supervision of the probationer. As the People acknowledge, however, Ricardo P. rejected the notion that this general justification is sufficient to render any probation condition reasonable: "If we were to hold that any search condition facilitating supervision of probationers is 'reasonably related to future criminality,' we might be obligated to uphold under Lent a condition mandating that probationers wear 24-hour body cameras or permit a probation officer to accompany them at all times. Such conditions would enhance supervision of probationers and ensure their compliance with other terms of probation. But they would not be reasonable because the burden on the probationer would be disproportionate to the legitimate interest in effective supervision." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) The People also point to Ricardo P.'s clarification that its holding regarding electronic search conditions does" 'not impair juvenile courts' ability to impose traditional search conditions in future cases when warranted.'" But such search conditions must still be warranted. As Ricardo P. expressly states, "a property or residence search condition is likewise subject to Lent's three-part test . . . a juvenile court imposing such a condition must consider whether, in light of 'the facts and circumstances in each case' [citation], the burdens imposed by the condition are proportional to achieving some legitimate end of probation." (Id. at p. 1127.)
In short, this case involves a probation condition that imposes a heavy burden on privacy with a very limited justification. Given these circumstances, we find that the necessary proportionality is lacking and, as such, the challenged search condition is invalid. In reaching this conclusion, we share the concern raised in Ricardo P. that "[i]f we were to find this record sufficient to sustain the probation condition at issue, it is difficult to conceive of any case in which a comparable condition could not be imposed." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1123.)
DISPOSITION
We strike probation condition No. 18 and remand to permit the juvenile court to consider whether a revised search condition consistent with this opinion should be imposed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
We concur: HULL, J., WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.