Opinion
Indictment No. 70950-22
02-22-2023
The People of the State of New York v. Arlin Aguilera, Defendant.
ADA Stephanie Dellinger Nassau County District Attorney's Office Taryn Shechter, Esq. Attorney for Defendant
Unpublished Opinion
ADA Stephanie Dellinger Nassau County District Attorney's Office Taryn Shechter, Esq. Attorney for Defendant
Robert A. Schwartz, J.
Defendant was indicted for aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, aggravated vehicular assault, vehicular assault in the first degree, vehicular assault in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree, two counts of assault in the second degree, three counts of assault in the third degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, two counts of driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, and speeding. The People allege that on December 11, 2021, at 10:54 p.m., on Peninsula Boulevard in Nassau County, defendant drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated and at an excessive rate of speed, and crashed into another vehicle, causing the death of one person, serious physical injury to another person, and physical injury to three other people.
Defendant has now filed an omnibus motion seeking 1) dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the evidence was legally insufficient, and the prosecution impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings; 2) suppression of statements made by defendant; 3) suppression of physical evidence; and 4) a Sandoval/Molineux hearing.
In support of his motion to dismiss, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he committed reckless driving as defined in section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, or that he operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused death and injuries to other persons as a result of his intoxicated condition, or that he caused death and injuries to other persons by acting recklessly as that term is defined in section 15.05 of the Penal Law. Defendant further argues that the prosecution impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding by failing to present evidence that one of the testifying police officers made some observations of defendant that were not indicative of intoxication, by failing to present a less inculpatory interpretation of the evidence obtained from the event data recorder in defendant's vehicle, and by failing to present evidence that the other vehicle failed to stop at a stop sign at another intersection prior to the crash.
The People argue that the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish the charges in the indictment. They argue that the evidence established that defendant acted recklessly by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and driving in a residential area at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour, in a 30-miles-per-hour zone, at nighttime, on a wet roadway. And as a result of his intoxication and reckless driving, he caused death and injuries to the occupants of another vehicle. The People also argue that they did not impair the integrity of the grand jury proceedings and that they were not obligated to present the evidence defendant claims was exculpatory.
In his reply, defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he operated his motor vehicle in a manner that caused death and injuries to other people as a result of his intoxicated condition, and that his alleged intoxication affected his ability to perceive and react to his surroundings as he drove. Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence that he consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his actions could result in the death of another person, because there was no evidence that he knew that the speed limit at the location of the crash was 30 miles per hour. Defendant further contends that the People's failure to present potentially exculpatory evidence or a favorable interpretation of the evidence deprived the grand jury of the means to rebut the presumption that as a result of his intoxication he operated the vehicle in a manner that caused death or serious physical injury.
"To dismiss an indictment based on insufficient evidence before a Grand Jury, a reviewing court must consider 'whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by a petit jury.'" People v Bello, 92 N.Y.2d 523, 525 (1998), quoting People v Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 114 1986); see also People v Castaldo, 146 A.D.3d 797 (2d Dept 2017). Legally sufficient evidence means "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged." CPL § 70.10(1); see also Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 525-526. "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526. "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to 'whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes,' and whether 'the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference.'" Id., quoting People v Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976, 979 (1987). Upon a review of a grand jury proceeding for legal sufficiency, that the grand jurors could have drawn "other, innocent inferences" from the proven facts is irrelevant to the court's inquiry, provided they could have rationally drawn the guilty inference. Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526; see also People v Jiminez, 148 A.D.3d 723 (2d Dept 2017).
A person commits the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide when he engages in reckless driving as defined by section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, and causes the death of one person and serious physical injury to at least one other person. Penal Law § 125.14 (5). Similarly, a person commits the crime of aggravated vehicular assault when he engages in reckless driving as defined by section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, commits the crime of vehicular assault in the second degree, and causes serious physical injury to more than one other person. Penal Law § 120.04-a (4). Both vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and vehicular assault in the second degree have as an element that defendant operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. Penal Law §§ 125.12(1); 120.03(1). In addition, if the People establish that the person operating the vehicle caused the death or serious physical injury while intoxicated, then "there shall be a rebuttable presumption" that as a result of such intoxication the person operated the vehicle in a manner that caused the death or serious physical injury. Penal Law §§ 120.03; 120.04-a; 125.12; 125.14.
Defendant is also charged with manslaughter in the second degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, for which the People are required to prove that defendant acted with the culpable mental state of recklessness. Penal Law §§ 120.00(2); 120.05 (4); 120.20; 125.15 (1). "A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists." Penal Law § 15.05(3). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. A person also acts recklessly when he creates such a risk but is unaware of that risk solely by reason of his voluntary intoxication. See id.
"Reckless driving," as defined in section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, is distinct from the culpable mental state of recklessness. A person commits the crime of reckless driving when he operates a motor vehicle "in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway." VTL § 1212. "[D]espite the name of the charge, the culpable mental state of recklessness, as set forth in Penal Law § 15.05(3), is not an 'element' of the offense of reckless driving.'" People v Badke, 21 Misc.3d 471, 479 (Suffolk County Ct 2008), quoting People v Ackroyd, 144 Misc.2d 149, 154 (Supreme Court, Albany County, 1989); see also People v Walton, 70 A.D.3d 871, 874-875 (2d Dept 2010) (in prosecution for reckless driving, instructions on the culpable mental state of recklessness were superfluous); CJI2d(NY) VTL § 1212, https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/3-VTL/VTL_1212/1212.pdf (last accessed). Where a defendant is charged with reckless driving or reckless driving is an element of another crime, the People must prove the defendant engaged in some conduct more egregious than a simple traffic infraction. S ee People v. Goldblatt, 98 A.D.3d 817, 819 (3d Dept 2012). But they are not required to prove he acted with the culpable mental state of recklessness, just that he operated a motor vehicle in a manner that unreasonably interfered with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangered users of the public highway. See, e.g., CJI2d(NY) Penal Law 125.14(4), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/125/125-14%284%29.pdf (last accessed).
The culpable mental state of recklessness, by contrast, is similar to the culpable mental state of criminal negligence, and the two differ only in that "recklessness requires that the defendant be 'aware of' and 'consciously disregard' the risk while criminal negligence is met when the defendant negligently fails to perceive the risk." People v Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677, 684 (2013). In the context of automobile accidents, both mental states require that the defendant engage in some blameworthy conduct contributing to that risk. Id. But the Court of Appeals has made it clear that moral blameworthiness is not required for a conviction of reckless driving. See People v McGrantham, 12 N.Y.3d 892 (2009) (dismissing count of criminally negligent homicide for lack of morally blameworthy conduct but allowing conviction of reckless driving to stand). Therefore, evidence can be sufficient to support a charge of reckless driving even if it is insufficient to support a charge that requires the culpable mental state of recklessness.
. The Appellate Division, Second Department's decision in People v Cardona, 207 A.D.3d 737 (2d Dept 2022) seems to muddy the water on this issue. To the extent that Cardona suggests that reckless driving requires the same type of morally blameworthy conduct necessary for a finding of recklessness or criminal negligence, that holding is contrary to McGrantham, 12 N.Y.3d 892, and its own decision in Walton, 70 A.D.3d 871.
A person causes the death of another when that person's conduct is a sufficiently direct cause of their death. See generally People v DaCosta, 6 N.Y.3d 181 (2006); People v Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509 (1994); People v Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407 (1974). A person's conduct "constitutes a sufficiently direct cause of death when the People prove (1) that [the person's] actions were an actual contributory cause of the death, in the sense that they forged a link in the chain of causes which actually brought about the death; and (2) that the fatal result was reasonably foreseeable." People v Li, 34 N.Y.3d 357, 369 (2019), quoting People v Davis, 28 N.Y.3d 294, 300 (2016). "Death is a reasonably foreseeable result of a person's conduct when the death should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the actor's conduct[; it] is not required that the death was the inevitable result or even the most likely result." CJI2d(NY) Cause of Death, https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/125/AC.125.Causation.pdf (last accessed). It is not necessary for the defendant's actions "to be the sole cause of death" or for the defendant to "commit the final, fatal act to be culpable for causing death." Li, 34 N.Y.3d at 369, quoting Matos, 83 N.Y.2d at 511; see also People v Hart, 8 A.D.3d 402, 405 (2d Dept 2004) ("since the defendant's actions need not be the sole cause of death, the fact that [the victim's] own reckless actions contributed to his death does not absolve the defendant of liability."); People v Ricardo B., 130 A.D.2d 213, 218 (2d Dept 1987), affd, 73 N.Y.2d 228 (1989).
Here, the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish each of the charges in the indictment. The evidence established that approximately 10:50 p.m., defendant was driving north on Peninsula Boulevard. Defendant's vehicle struck another vehicle as it turned left to go south on Peninsula Boulevard. Medical records and testimony established that the other driver suffered serious physical injury in the crash. Additionally, one passenger in the other vehicle was killed and three other passengers suffered physical injuries.
Police Officer Alberto Del Rosario, who had received training in recognizing intoxication in motorists, noticed an odor of an alcoholic beverage on defendant's breath, and observed indicia of intoxication when he administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to defendant. Defendant admitted to Officer Del Rosario that he had drank wine before driving. Officer Del Rosario concluded that defendant was intoxicated. A sample of blood drawn from defendant more than two hours after the collision contained a blood alcohol concentration of.09 of one percent. Elizabeth Spratt, a forensic toxicologist, concluded that the results of the toxicological analysis, together with the observations of Officer Del Rosario, were consistent with intoxication. Moreover, Spratt testified that defendant's blood alcohol concentration would have been higher than.09 of one percent at the time of the collision, and that defendant's intoxication would have affected his ability to perceive and react to what was happening around him as he drove.
Detective Thomas Roche testified that information pertaining to the collision was recovered from event data recorders in both vehicles, and that the speed limit on Peninsula Boulevard at the location of the collision was 30 miles per hour. Detective Investigator David McCarthy, a collision reconstructionist, testified that according to the event data recorder in defendant's vehicle, defendant was driving at speeds of more than 70 miles per hour seconds before to the crash. In addition, witness testimony and a video recording established that it had been raining and that the road was wet at the time of the crash.
Contrary to defendant's arguments, this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, established that defendant operated his motor vehicle while intoxicated and that his intoxication would have affected his ability to perceive and react to what was happening around him as he drove. This evidence was sufficient for the grand jury to draw the "rebuttable presumption" that as a result of defendant's intoxication, he operated his vehicle in a manner that caused death and serious physical injury to other persons. See Penal Law §§ 120.03; 120.04; 120.04-a; 125.12; 125.14; see also People v Serrano, 196 A.D.3d 1134, 1136 (4th Dept 2021) (since the prosecution established that the defendant operated a vehicle while intoxicated and that the operation caused a crash which resulted in death to another person, a rebuttable presumption arose that the defendant's intoxication caused the death); People v Davis, 112 A.D.3d 959, 961 (2d Dept 2013); People v Mojica, 62 A.D.3d 100, 111 (2d Dept 2009). Moreover, the evidence further established that defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk brought about by his morally blameworthy conduct: driving at excessive speed, while intoxicated, at nighttime, on a wet road, in a residential area. This conduct also "unreasonably interfere[d] with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangere[d] users of the public highway." See McGrantham, 12 N.Y.3d at 894 (quoting VTL § 1212); see also, e.g., People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 143 (1932); People v Earley, 121 A.D.3d 1192, 1193-94 (3d Dept 2014); People v Bohacek, 95 A.D.3d 1592 (3d Dept 2012); People v Brown, 44 Misc.3d 129 (A) (App Term 2d Dept 2014). That the grand jurors could have drawn "other, innocent inferences" from the proven facts is irrelevant to the court's inquiry, provided they could have rationally drawn the guilty inference. Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526; see also Jiminez, 148 A.D.3d 723.
Defendant's reliance on Goldblatt, 98 A.D.3d 817, in support of his argument that the evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain the charges in this indictment, is misplaced. That court did not reverse the conviction on the grounds that the evidence was legally insufficient, it merely held that the trial court should have instructed the jury that intoxication, without more, does not constitute reckless driving in violation of section 1212 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Id. at 822. The court further reasoned that evidence of a defendant's intoxication and how such condition may have affected his ability to drive can be relevant to establish that the defendant drove recklessly. 98 A.D.3d at 822. Here, given the evidence of defendant's intoxication, his excessive speed, in a residential area, at nighttime, on a wet road, and the expert testimony that defendant's intoxication would have affected his ability to perceive and react to what was happening around him, the grand jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant drove recklessly. Defendant's reliance on People v Devoe, 246 NY 636 (1927), People v Cardona, 207 A.D.3d 737 (2d Dept 2022), and People v Rosario, 205 A.D.3d 581 (1st Dept 2022), is similarly misplaced, as these cases are readily distinguishable. Unlike the present case, Rosario did not involve a charge of reckless driving, and Cardona did not involve allegations that the defendant drove while intoxicated and at more than twice the posted speed limit. In any event, defendant's intoxication and excessive speed at nighttime on a wet road in a residential area satisfies even a heightened standard for reckless driving. See, e.g., People v Dudley, 169 A.D.3d 1059 (2d Dept 2019) (conviction for reckless manslaughter not against weight of evidence where defendant drove while intoxicated in excess of posted speed limit).
Moreover, defendant's argument in his reply that the evidence did not establish that he consciously disregarded the risk of driving at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour because there was no evidence that he was aware of the speed limit is meritless. Defendant could not have legally driven at such speeds. See generally VTL §§ 1180, 1180-a. Even if defendant was unaware of the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour, the grand jury could have reasonably inferred that it was reckless for defendant to drive at such speeds at nighttime, on a wet road, in a residential area, and while intoxicated.
Furthermore, contrary to defendant's arguments, neither the conduct of the prosecutor, the evidence presented to the grand jury, nor the way the prosecutor presented the evidence, impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceedings such that dismissal is warranted. Dismissal of an indictment is an "exceptional remedy" typically reserved for "rare cases of prosecutorial misconduct" where but for the misconduct the grand jury might not have indicted the defendant. People v Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d 687, 699 (2014), quoting People v Huston, 88 N.Y.2d, 400, 409-410 (1996). This "demanding" standard is generally met "only where the prosecutor engages in an over-all pattern of bias and misconduct that is pervasive and typically willful, whereas isolated instances of misconduct, including the erroneous handling of evidentiary matters, do not merit invalidation of the indictment." Thompson, 88 N.Y.2d at 699 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This standard "does not turn on mere flaw, error or skewing... is very precise and very high." Id., quoting People v Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 455 (1990).
That standard is not met here. The People did not impair the integrity of the grand jury proceedings by failing to present evidence that some of Officer Del Rosario's observations were not indicative of intoxication. See People v Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d 509, 515 (1993) ("the People maintain broad discretion in presenting their case to the Grand Jury and need not seek evidence favorable to the defendant or present all of their evidence tending to exculpate the accused"). Moreover, the mere fact that defendant has an alternative interpretation of how this collision occurred - as detailed in a report which was created after this grand jury presentation - does not create an obligation for the People to present such evidence to the grand jury. See People v Dawson, 91 A.D.2d 713 (3d Dept 1982) (prosecution was not obligated to present potentially exculpatory interpretations of the evidence to the grand jury). Nor was the prosecution "required to present mitigating defenses to a grand jury." People v Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, 475 (2002), citing People v Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 38 (1984).
Furthermore, contrary to defendant's arguments, the People were not obligated to present evidence of whether the other driver stopped her vehicle at a different intersection before the collision occurred. That evidence was only marginally probative of whether she came to a complete stop before this collision occurred. And in view of Investigator McCarthy's testimony that the other vehicle did not stop at the subject intersection, and instead slowed to a speed of six miles per hour before turning left onto Peninsula Boulevard, the additional evidence was irrelevant. Moreover, even if the other driver's failure to stop her vehicle contributed to this collision, the grand jury could have rationally concluded, based on all the evidence and the inferences that logically flowed therefrom, that defendant's intoxication and the manner in which he operated his motor vehicle was a sufficiently direct cause of this collision. See Li, 34 N.Y.3d 357; Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509; Hart, 8 A.D.3d 402; Ricardo B., 130 A.D.2d 213, 218.
Finally, the district attorney's instructions to the grand jury were sufficient. See People v Calbud, 49 N.Y.2d 389, 394-395 (1980). The minutes permit the conclusion that a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence and at the time the district attorney instructed the grand jury on the law. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is denied.
The parties have stipulated to a Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway hearing, which will be scheduled at the next conference.
The court will hear the People's application regarding People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 (1974), and People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), prior to trial. The People should disclose to defendant a list of all misconduct and criminal acts not charged in the indictment they intend to use at trial, if any, no later than fifteen days prior to the date scheduled for trial. CPL §§ 245.10(1)(b), 245.20(3).
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.