The Court has emphasized that collateral estoppel is "not to be liberally applied in criminal cases" ( People v. Hilton, 95 N.Y.2d at 952, 722 N.Y.S.2d 461, 745 N.E.2d 381 ), as there are "[s]trong policy considerations [that] militate against [it]" ( People v. Fagan, 66 N.Y.2d 815, 816, 498 N.Y.S.2d 335, 489 N.E.2d 222 [1985] ). Further, collateral estoppel does not apply in "the same way" in criminal cases as it does in civil cases ( People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 [1993] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). To that end, "[h]istorically, courts have tended to favor defendants in the application of collateral estoppel because of concerns for due process, double jeopardy, the right to a jury trial, fundamental fairness and preventing undue harassment" ( id. at 30–31, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 ; see People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 38–40, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565, 503 N.E.2d 996 [1986] ; People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d at 484–487, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 508 N.E.2d 665 ).

"Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a common-law doctrine that, when applied, prevents a party from relitigating an issue decided against it in a prior proceeding." People v. Aguilera , 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While the principal applies in criminal cases as well as civil cases [seePeople v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565, 503 N.E.2d 996 (1986) ; People v. Sailor , 65 N.Y.2d 224, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 480 N.E.2d 701 (1985), cert denied , 474 U.S. 982, 106 S.Ct. 387, 88 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) ], "in the criminal context ‘it cannot be applied in quite the same way as in civil cases’ " [ Aguilera , 82 N.Y.2d at 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 (quoting People v. Plevy , 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518 [1980] ); People v. Acevedo , 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 508 N.E.2d 665 (1987) ].

For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that collateral estoppel is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Collateral estoppel, also known as "issue preclusion," is a "common-law doctrine rooted in civil litigation that, when applied, prevents a party from relitigating an issue decided against it in a prior proceeding" ( People v. Aguilera , 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 [1993] ) (internal citations omitted). In a criminal context, it is not applied in the same manner as in a civil action ( id. , at 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 ).

The New York Court of Appeals has twice left open the issue whether collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion should never be employed against a criminal defendant at any stage of the case."People v. Aquilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 31 (1993) (emphasis supplied) (citingPeople v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58 (1980)). In each case, the issue was not reached because the doctrine was found inapplicable "in any event."People v. Aquilera, 82 N.Y.2d at 31.

In New York State, the formal prerequisites for application of collateral estoppel are "identity of parties; identity of issues; a final and valid prior judgment; and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior determination[.]" People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29 623 N.E.2d 519, 522 (N.Y. 1993) (citing People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565, 503 N.E.2d 996 (N.Y. 1986) (collecting cases)). Additionally, New York State courts have noted that, for reasons of public policy, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is more sparingly applied in criminal cases than in civil cases.

Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals remanded Aguilera's case to the trial court on the grounds that he had been denied a pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress statements. People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 398, 623 N.E.2d 519, 525 (1993). Presently, the Supreme Court of New York County is poised to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether statements allegedly made by Aguilera during his police interrogation in 1982 should be suppressed.

istinction between which party claims its benefit; for example, neither this doctrine nor any other constitutional provision arguably would prohibit the prosecution from relying on collateral estoppel principles in a successive criminal prosecution to establish an element of the offense that a jury found adversely to a defendant in a prior criminal prosecution); People v. Page, 614 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Ill. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 479 (1993) (permitting the prosecution to invoke collateral estoppel doctrine against criminal defendant in the context of a suppression motion); Vestal, Issue Preclusion And Criminal Prosecutions, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 281, 319-21 (1980) (prosecution can use collateral estoppel doctrine in successive criminal prosecution to establish an element of offense because the defendant previously has had a jury determine this issue). But see, e.g., Page, 614 N.E.2d at 1167 ("special concerns" limit prosecution's use of collateral estoppel doctrine in criminal cases); People v. Aguilera, 623 N.E.2d 519, 522 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993) (in criminal cases collateral estoppel doctrine "cannot be applied in quite the same way as in civil cases"); Reynolds, 4 S.W.3d at 26 n. 5 (Meyers, J., dissenting) (in criminal cases collateral estoppel doctrine should be "modified" into a "one-way street" for the benefit of only criminal defendants). It should initially be noted that this case does not implicate Ashe's rule of collateral estoppel as "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy."

To round out the discussion of generally relevant authorities, we also note the collateral estoppel doctrine in its criminal or quasi-criminal context. Although collateral estoppel is "a common-law doctrine rooted in civil litigation," the principle has some limited overlap into criminal matters ( People v Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29). Notably, however, "collateral estoppel is not as liberally applied in criminal prosecutions as in civil actions" ( People v Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, citing People v Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37; People v Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64; People v Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 344-346; People v Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 285, cert denied 405 U.S. 1041)

We reject that contention. The doctrine of collateral estoppel “prevents a party from relitigating an issue decided against [him or her] in a prior proceeding” ( People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519), and it applies where there is identity of parties and issues, a final and valid prior judgment and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior determination ( see id. at 29–30, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in both criminal and civil cases ( see generally id. at 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519; People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64–65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518). Here, the parties stipulated to the fact that Monroe County Court refused to suppress a photo identification following a Wade hearing in the case against him in that county, and it is undisputed that the parties involved in that determination are identical to the parties involved here.

The New York Court of Appeals has twice left open the issue whether collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion should never be employed against a criminal defendant at any stage of the case." (People v Aguilera, 82 NY2d 23, 31 [1993] [emphasis supplied], citing People v Plevy, 52 NY2d 58 [1980].) In each case, the issue was not reached because the doctrine was found inapplicable "in any event."