Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BA320295, Michael M. Johnson, Judge.
Robert E. Courtney; Law Offices of James T. Duff and James T. Duff; Musick, Peeler & Garrett, and Cheryl A. Orr for Defendants and Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Susan S. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, P. J.
This appeal arises from a criminal case which highlights the tension between the civil law authorizing the acquisition of title to real property by adverse possession, and the criminal law prohibiting trespass. The case began when the People filed a 22-count indictment related to four properties against Jesus and Sofia Aguayo. At trial, 11 counts were submitted to a jury. In the end, the jury found the Aguayos guilty of the following crimes connected with two of the properties: misdemeanor vandalism (count 15); trespass of a dwelling (counts 17 & 18); theft from an elder or dependent adult (count 21); and conspiracy to commit counts 15, 17, 18 and 21 (count 22).
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and ordered the Aguayos to be placed on probation for three years subject to a series of conditions not relevant to their current appeal. We affirm the judgments.
FACTS
Counts 15, 17 and 22 Involving Victim Richard Infante
Up to the time of her death in 1993, Isabel Infante owned and lived in a house on Gillig Avenue in Los Angeles. Following Isabel’s death, her son, Richard Infante, lived at the Gillig Avenue property, but was often in-and-out of custody due to drug and mental health problems.
Sometime in 2004, Richard’s adult daughter, Michelle Amaro, noticed workers cleaning the Gillig Avenue property. When Amaro inquired about what was happening, one of the workers told her that her dad had died, and that Jesus Aguayo “got the house.” The worker gave Amaro a suitcase with her father’s social security card, some pictures and some other papers. The worker also gave Amaro a phone number for Jesus Aguayo. When Amaro called Aguayo, he said that he had bought the house from an auction. Amaro thought this was unusual and talked to a friend who worked for a real estate company. He told her that the Gillig Avenue house was still in Isabel Infante’s name, but that Jesus Aguayo’s name “was under [Isabel Infant’s] name.” A relative later helped Amaro obtain a quitclaim deed (People’s Exhibit No. 19) which showed the Gillig Avenue property had been conveyed from “Jesus Duran, a married man, ” to Jesus and Sofia Aguayo. Amaro retained a lawyer, and, at a meeting at her lawyer’s office, Jesus Aguayo asserted that he owned the property, and had paid all of the back taxes on the property.
At different times over the next few months, Amaro replaced locks on the Gillig Avenue property, only to later find the locks had been rechanged. On another occasion, Amaro left her dog at the property, only to later find the dog had been taken to the pound. During one visit to the property during this period, Amaro found Isabel Infante’s piano outside. She pushed it back inside the house. Amaro also discovered that a bathtub, sink and toilet were missing from a bathroom, and that the hot water heater, refrigerator, stove, and other items of furniture were also missing. At some point during this same time frame, Amaro learned from Jesus Aguayo that her father was not dead, but in jail.
At the Aguayo’s trial during summer 2008, Richard Infante testified he never gave any interest in the Gillig Avenue house to the Aguayos, never received any money from the Aguayos, and never sold his house to any other person. Infante denied that he signed a document dated August 24, 1999, which indicated that he borrowed $2,000 from Jesus Aguayo (People’s Exhibit No. 3.), or that he had signed a rental agreement dated January 1, 2000, which indicated that he had agreed to rent the Gillig Avenue property from Jesus Aguayo for $400 per month. Infante also denied he had agreed to transfer all of his title and interest in the property to the Aguayos in exchange for the $2,000 he was allegedly given on April 24, 1999, in addition to a credit of 54 months of rent, for a total $23,600. (People’s Exhibit No. 4.)
Counts 18, 21and 22 Involving Victim Eddie Tarango
From a date unknown into the 1990s, Eddie Tarango owned and lived in a house on Woolwine Drive in Los Angeles. In May 1996, Tarango began living in a nursing home. In June 1996, the Public Guardian of Los Angeles County recorded a certification pursuant to Probate Code section 2901 indicating it had determined that the requirements for appointment of a guardianship or conservatorship over Tarango were satisfied, and that, without a court order, the Public Guardian was authorized to take possession or control of property belonging to Tarango. (People’s Exhibit No. 20.) The recorded certification specifically referred to Tarango’s real property on Woolwine Drive. At some point in time, Tarango’s assets, including the Woolwine Drive property, may actually have been placed in the charge of the Public Guardian. According to Jesus Aguayo’s testimony at the criminal trial, the Aguayos took possession of Tarango’s Woolwine Drive property in March 1999.
At trial, it was stipulated that People’s Exhibit No. 42 was in the Aguayos’ possession at the time of their arrest in October 2006. People’s Exhibit No. 42 was a printed notice, roughly three by five inches in size, with a hand-written date of February 19, 1997, which read as follows:
According to Tarango’s testimony before the grand jury, which was read at the Aguayos’ trial in summer 2008, Tarango never met or heard of the Aguayos, and did not give permission to the Aguayos to enter his house, or to remove anything from his house.
Trial
In October 2006, the People filed a 22-count indictment charging the Aguayos with crimes from trespass of a dwelling, to burglary, to vandalism, to forgery, to theft from a dependent adult. The counts related to four separate properties, including the Infante property on Gillig Avenue, and the Tarango property on Woolwine Drive. In March 2007, the trial court granted the Aguayos’ motion to dismiss counts 2 through 11 for lack of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 995.) At a jury trial in mid-summer 2008, the People presented evidence establishing the facts summarized above. At the close of the People’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the Aguayos’ motion to dismiss count 19, which alleged trespass of a dwelling not belonging to Infante or Tarango. (Pen. Code, § 1118.1.)
The Aguayos testified in their own defense, explaining that their connections to the Infante property on Gillig Avenue, and the Tarango property on Woolwine Drive property arose from the Aguayos’ business investment practice of trying to acquire title to real properties by adverse possession. According to Jesus Aguayo, he learned about the law of adverse possession while he was buying properties at tax sales, probate sales, and trust deed sales. Sometime in the late 1980s to the late 1990s, he started attempting to gain title to properties by adverse possession by employing the following model: the Aguayos looked for a property with tax problems, tried to find its owner, and conducted research. When the property’s tax sale was imminent, the Aguayos redeemed the property by paying its back property taxes and thus stopping the property’s tax sale.
The Aguayos then placed a small fence on the premises, sometimes in the middle of the lot. If the property was a house, they enclosed the property, took possession of the house, and made improvements. For some properties, the Aguayos created and recorded a quitclaim deed to give notice that they were claiming an interest in the property, and to show their hostile intent. In order to show the beginning of the five-year period for adverse possession, the Aguayos took pictures of the fencing they erected, and retained the receipts for the fencing. The Aguayos would not reside at a targeted property themselves, but they sometimes rented the property to tenants. If a property’s true owner returned to the property at any time during the five-year period of adverse possession, the Aguayos would relinquish their claim to the property to the owner. The Aguayos had paid the back property taxes on about 40 or 50 properties, but abandoned many of these properties because they had no value. The Aguayos kept possession, maintained, and paid taxes on about 20 properties, and they completed adverse possession of four to six properties.
With regard to the Tarango property on Woolwine Drive, the Aguayos admitted that they found the notice from the Public Guardian on the property while doing plumbing work. They testified that they had tried to verify the existence of a guardianship at a local courthouse, but did not find any court records.
On August 15, 2008, the jury returned verdicts finding the Aguayos guilty of the following crimes connected with the Infante property on Gillig Avenue, and the Tarango property on Woolwine Drive: count 15 (misdemeanor vandalism); count 17 (trespass of a dwelling); count 18 (trespass of a dwelling); count 21 (theft from a dependent adult); and count 22 (conspiracy to commit counts 15, 17, 18 & 21). The jury further found the Aguayos not guilty of six other counts, some of which related to the Infante and Tarango properties, and others of which were not related to those properties.
DISCUSSION
I. Irregularities in the Grand Jury Proceedings
The Aguayos contend all of their convictions must be reversed because they were indicted in violation of their constitutionally guaranteed due process rights. We disagree.
A. Instructional Error
The Aguayos first contend the People improperly instructed the grand jury on the law of adverse possession as it related to the offenses of trespass of a dwelling (counts 17 and 18) and theft (count 21). More specifically, the Aguayos maintain that the People’s instructions effectively told the grand jury that “one may only file a quitclaim deed if one has actual title to the property, ” and that “one is not acting in good faith in filing a quitclaim deed without actual title.” The Aguayos’ assert that the mere filing of a quitclaim deed, without any fraudulent intent, is not part of a criminal act. They also maintain that that the grand jury was not instructed that a person may lawfully claim real property by adverse possession under a claim of right based on physical possession of the property, and that color of title under a recorded deed is not required. Thus, the People instructed the grand jurors that “one who does not have actual title cannot adversely possess property, ” leaving the grand jurors with the incorrect legal understanding that a person who attempts to claim property by adverse possession based on its actual physical possession may be indicted for the crime of trespass. In sum, the Aguayo’s claim is that the People’s instructions did not allow the grand jury to consider the interplay between the law of theft and trespass, and the law of adverse possession.
We agree with the Aguayos that the People’s instructions to the grand jury may have been problematic. The People concede as much in their respondent’s brief on appeal. At the same time, however, we disagree with the Aguayos that the jury’s verdicts at trial must be reversed. “Although irregularities in grand jury proceedings may give rise, without more, to appellate relief by pretrial writ, a conviction after trial will not be reversed for such error without a showing that the error actually prejudiced the defendant or deprived him of a fair trial.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 936; citing People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 123, and People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529-530 [which addressed issue in the context of a preliminary hearing].) Given this standard of review on appeal, our task is limited to determining whether the instructions to the grand jury somehow flowed through to and adversely affected the Aguayo’s trial.
The Aguayos argue they were prejudiced by the faulty instructions to the grand jury because they were convicted at trial. We reject the Aguayo’s argument because their conception of prejudice is tantamount to a rule of per se reversible error, which the published cases reject. Where the evidence produced at trial supports the jury’s finding, any question whether the evidence produced at the grand jury proceeding supported the finding of probable cause is rendered moot. (Cf. People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 137 [preliminary hearing irregularity].) In the Aguayo’s current case, the instructional errors in the grand jury proceedings were not repeated at trial. Thus, we find no prejudice.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Aguayos argue the instructional errors in the grand jury proceedings were exacerbated by prosecutorial misconduct. More specifically, the Aguayos assign misconduct to a series of comments by the prosecutor during her opening statement and closing argument. The Aguayos claim the comments were designed to appeal to the grand jurors’ passion and prejudice, rather than to implore them to render a valid probable cause determination based on the facts. Among the cited incidents of misconduct are the prosecutor’s statement that the Aguayos had been engaged in a “Squatter’s Scam.” The Aguayos also cite the prosecutor’s comments about facts which were not supported by evidence presented during the course of the grand jury proceedings.
Assuming without deciding that any one, or even all, of the prosecutor’s allegedly objectionable comments to the grand jury exceeded the bounds of proper advocacy (see, e.g., People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026 [a prosecutor may not refer to matters outside the record]), we find, for the reasons explained above, that there are no grounds for reversing the guilty verdicts rendered at the Aguayo’s trial. To the extent that the prosecutor’s comments to the grand jury are deemed to constitute an irregularity contributing to the grand jury’s probable cause determination, the Aguayos have not demonstrated that the verdicts rendered at their trial were contaminated by the prosecutor’s prior arguments to the grand jury, which the trial jury never heard.
II. Probable Cause Showing at the Grand Jury Proceeding: Count 21 Theft from a Dependent Adult
The Aguayos contend their conviction on count 21 –– the theft of property from a dependant adult, Eddie Tarango –– must be reversed because the trial court erred when it denied their motion to dismiss the count pursuant to Penal Code section 995. The Aguayos argue there was no evidence presented to the grand jury supporting a probable cause finding that Tarango’s furniture and possessions were in his house when he left his house. They Aguayos also argue there was no evidence supporting a probable cause finding on the requisite element of knowledge –– i.e., that they knew Tarango was a dependent adult. We disagree that the Aguayos’ conviction on count 21 must be reversed based on the denial of the section 995 motion.
Assuming the Aguayos’ section 995 motion was well taken, its denial by the trial court does not justify reversal of their ensuing conviction. As we have noted, where the evidence produced at trial supports the jury’s finding, any question whether the evidence produced at the grand jury proceeding supported the finding of probable cause is moot. Thus, a denial of a section 995 motion, even though erroneous, will not justify reversal of the verdict of guilt returned at trial. (Cf. People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 137 [preliminary hearing]; and see People v. Gaio, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 936 [same rule in context of indictment by grand jury].)
III. The Motion For Acquittal: The Tarango Property
The Aguayos contend their convictions on counts 18 (trespass), 21 (theft from an elder or dependent adult) and 22 (conspiracy), each involving Eddie Tarango’s property, must be reversed because they were entitled to a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1. We disagree.
When a defendant moves pursuant to section 1118.1 at the close of the People’s case in chief, the trial court examines the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain a conviction at that point. On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the trial evidence to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212-1213.)
We agree with the People that the Aguayos did not preserve a challenge to any purported ruling on a motion for acquittal on counts 18 and 21 involving the Tarango property because they never made such a motion in the trial court. (See People v. Ceja (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1296, 1303-1304.) The trial record discloses that the Aguayos moved for acquittal as to several other counts, but not as to counts 18 and 21.
Assuming the Aguayos’ argument on appeal is actually that the jury’s guilty verdicts on counts 18 and 21 are not supported by substantial evidence, we reject the argument. The Aguayos’ assertions that Tarango’s house “appeared for all intents and purposes to the outside world as having been abandoned, ” focuses on the evidence in support of the defense which they presented at trial. This is not the proper focus when examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [the evidence is examined in the light favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict].)
IV. The Motion For Acquittal: The Infante Property
The Aguayos contend their convictions on counts 15 (vandalism) and 17 (trespass) and 22 (conspiracy) involving the Infante property on Gillig Avenue must be reversed because they were entitled to a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1. We disagree.
The evidence presented during the People’s case-in-chief showed that Richard Infante never told the Aguayos that they could have the house on Gillig Avenue, and that, when Infante’s daughter, Amaro, entered the house in 2004, a bathtub, toilet and sink had been removed from the house. A worker at the property told Amaro that Richard Infante was dead, and that the Aguayos’ owned the property. Jesus Aguayo directly told Amaro that the Aguayos’ owned the property. The Aguayos’ argument that no one directly saw them on the property, or saw them do anything to the property, ignores the circumstantial evidence that they entered and altered the Infante property, and that they removed items from the property. The trial court did not err when it denied the Aguayos’ section 995 motion as to counts 15, 17, and 21.
V. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Damage to Property: Count 15 Vandalism of the Infante Property
The Aguayos contends their conviction on count 15, for vandalism of the Infante property on Gillig Avenue, must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence of actual property damage. We disagree.
Penal Code section 594 provides that every person who maliciously damages any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism. The word maliciously means with an intent to do a wrongful act. (Pen. Code, § 7.)
The Aguayos argue there was no evidence presented at trial to show that they damaged any real property belonging to Richard Infante. We disagree. The evidence at trial established that a bathtub, toilet and sink had been removed from a bathroom in the house on Gillig Avenue, and that a water heater, refrigerator, stove and other furniture had been removed. None of the authorities cited by the Aguayos supports their argument that more was needed.
VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Grant of Permission: Counts 15 and 17 Vandalism and Trespass
The Aguayos contend their convictions on counts 15 (vandalism) and 17 (trespass) involving the Infante property on Gillig Avenue property must be reversed because the evidence showed that Richard Infante granted them permission to enter the property. More specifically, the Aguayos claim the jury’s not guilty verdicts on two forgery charges, namely, count 12 regarding a lease agreement and count 13 regarding a loan document, both purportedly signed by Richard Infante, necessarily determined that the documents were in fact signed by Richard Infante. Since the jury found that they had permission to enter the Infante property via the lease, they cannot be convicted of vandalizing or trespassing of the property. We disagree that the jury’s not guilty verdicts on counts 12 and 13 mean the jury’s guilty verdicts on counts 15 and 17 cannot be sustained.
When an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on another, effect is given to both because it is possible that the jury arrived at inconsistent conclusions through mistake, compromise, or lenity. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 600.) Stated another way, when a defendant is given the benefit of an acquittal on one count, it is neither irrational nor illogical to require him to accept the burden of conviction on another count. (Ibid.) In short, a jury might acquit for reasons having nothing to do with the sufficiency of the evidence showing guilt. (People v. McCann (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 347, 354.)
Apart from the allowability of inconsistent jury verdicts, we do not agree with the Aguayos’ predicate that the jury actually found that Richard Infante in fact signed the documents involved in counts 12 and 13. The not guilty verdicts on those counts do not necessarily embody a finding that Richard Infante signed the documents. On the contrary, the verdicts merely reflect the jury’s conclusion that the People did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Aguayos had forged the documents. A failure to prove up one fact does not necessarily prove a different fact to be true.
Finally, we reject the Aguayos’ contention that their convictions on counts 15 and 17 must be reversed because Jesus Aguayo testified, without dispute, that he had obtained permission from Alfred Infante to enter the Gillig Avenue property. The jury simply was not required to believe Jesus Aguayo. Moreover, there was a basis in other evidence for disbelieving him. Richard Infante’s daughter, Michelle Amaro, testified that Alfred Infante had not lived at the Gillig Avenue property with Richard Infante and Isable Infante. Further, the assertion that the Aguayos obtained the right to enter the property is inconsistent with their more predominant assertion that they were trying to claim the property by adverse possession.
VII. Prosecutorial Misconduct in Connection with Counts 18 and 21
The Aguayos argue their convictions on counts 18 (trespass) and 21 (theft from an elder or dependent adult) involving the Tarango property on Woolwine Drive must be reversed because they are tainted by prosecutorial misconduct at trial. The Aguayos argue the prosecutor misled the jury when, during both cross-examination and argument, she asserted that People’s Exhibit No. 20 (a recorded document stating that the Public Guardian had determined that Eddie Tarango met the requirements for a guardianship) was known by the Aguayos all along because the document had been found in the Aguayos’ possession. The truth, assert the Aguayos, is that Exhibit No. 20 was retrieved by the prosecution from the Recorder’s Office, and was not found in the Aguayos’ possession at the time of their arrest. The trial court ruled that the Aguayos were not entitled to a new trial based on any errors associated with Exhibit No. 20, and we are not convinced by the Aguayos’ arguments on appeal that their convictions on counts 18 and 21 must be reversed on appeal for prosecutorial misconduct.
First, we must agree with the People’s assertion the Aguayos’ claims regarding People’s Exhibit No. 20 are waived on appeal because the Aguayos’ trial counsel did not make a timely objection at trial, and request an admonition. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447.)
Second, assuming the Aguayos’ claim of misconduct is not waived, we do not believe a reversal of their convictions is warranted because we are not persuaded that their trial was fundamentally unfair, or that they were prejudiced by the prosecutor’s comments. This is not to say that we reject the Aguayos’ assertions that the prosecutor made statements about Exhibit No. 20 which were not correct. Plainly, she did. We have reviewed the record, and we do not find any support for the prosecutor’s statements that the Aguayos’ counsel had stipulated that Exhibit No. 20 had been found in the Aguayos’ possession.
A prosecutor’s misconduct at trial warrants reversal under federal constitutional precepts when it has infected a defendant’s trial with such unfairness as to make his or her conviction a denial of due process. Where the bad conduct is found to constitute a “deceptive” or “reprehensible” attempt to persuade the jury, reversal is justified under state law. The crucial element of any claim of misconduct is the potential injury to the defendant. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 252-253.) A defendant need not demonstrate bad faith on the part of the prosecutor to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823 [when a defendant has suffered prejudice by a deceptive trial tactic, he or she is harmed regardless of whether the tactic occurred inadvertently or intentionally].)
After reviewing the entire trial record, we do not find that any prejudice in connection with count 21 resulted from the prosecutor’s misstatements about where and when People’s Exhibit No. 20 was recovered. On the contrary, we concur with the trial court’s assessment of the situation when it denied the Aguayos’ motion for new trial, and we incorporate those same sentiments for purposes of the Aguayos’ claim on appeal that their convictions must be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct: “[T]here was other evidence to support the jury’s determination on count 21, particularly the Public Guardian notice or certificate that found by the [Aguayos] on the property. They testified that after finding the notice, they made a half-hearted investigation into the status of the guardianship and then hustled down to pay the property taxes to attempt to perfect their rights, obviously never taking the time to call the Guardian’s phone number on the notice to get a clear or definitive answer about the guardianship status or the relationship of the notice to the particular property. [¶] I personally found the [Aguayos’] testimony in regard to this certificate to be phony and unconvincing, and I’m sure the jury saw it the same way. That alone supports the jury’s verdict on count 21.”
VII. Adverse Possession
The Aguayos contend their convictions on counts 18 (trespass) and 21 (theft from an elder or dependent adult), involving Eddie Tarango’s property, must be reversed because the evidence established that they had “succeeded to title [to the Tarango property] by adverse possession before the indictment was filed.” The Aguayos also contend they “acquired the Tarango property by adverse possession in June 2005, after they paid the property taxes and had satisfied the remaining elements of open, notorious and hostile possession of the property for five years.” Although we find the Aguayos’ argument interesting, they have not persuaded us that their convictions related to the Tarango property must be reversed as a matter of law.
The elements necessary to establish title by adverse possession are tax payment, open and notorious use or possession that this continuous and uninterrupted and hostile to the true owner. (Gilardi v. Hallam (1981) 30 Cal.3d 317, 321.) Adverse possession of property for the statutorily-prescribed period has the practical effect of extinguishing the rights of the party having the prior paper title, and vesting new title in the adverse holder. (Cannon v. Stockmon (1869) 36 Cal. 535, 540.) Where the administrator of an estate is not attentive to its administration, title to the estate’s property may be acquired by a stranger through adverse possession. (Estate of Williams (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 141, 148.)
The title conferred by adverse possession occupancy is not factually inconsistent with the crime of trespass. (People v. Lapcheske (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 571, 575.) “An adverse possessor of the type here in question, i.e., one taking possession under color of right established by physical presence on the property as an occupant, is ‘in possession as a naked trespasser.’ [Citation.] If that trespass is unchallenged by the true property owner for a period of five years, the possession ripens into actual title. [Citations.] In short, an adverse possessor is merely a trespasser, i.e., a person who enters on the land of another with the specific intent of injuring, interfering with or obstructing that other person’s property rights. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
In the Aguayos’ current case, the trial court expressly instructed the jury on the requirements for establishing title to property by adverse possession. In convicting the Aguayos, the jury implicitly found that the Aguayos had not fulfilled those requirements. The Aguayos’ argument on appeal that they acquired title to the Tarango property by adverse possession is more properly a claim that the jury’s finding that the Aguayos’ had not fulfilled all of the requirements for adverse possession is not supported by substantial evidence. When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence presented at trial is not sufficient to sustain a jury’s finding, we follow a well-settled standard of review. We must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s decision, and presume in support of the jury’s decision the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence, and may not substitute our own conclusions for those reached by the jury. (People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1208.)
We have reviewed the trial record, and are satisfied that it discloses evidence in support of the jury’s finding that the Aguayos did not fulfill the requirements for adverse possession of the Tarango property. Jesus Aguayo testified at trial that the Aguayos took possession of Tarango’s property on Woolwine Drive in March 1999, by securing it. In June 2005, the Aguayos paid the property’s delinquent taxes. After that, they began fixing the property, and then they rented it out. During his cross-examination, Jesus Aguayo acknowledged that, while he said they “possessed” the property since 1999, they “didn’t do anything, ... didn’t fix it up, ... didn’t do anything for six years.” Jesus Aguayo conceded that the Aguayos did not live at Tarango’s house in 2005.
It was stipulated that the Aguayos began receiving rent from tenants they had placed in Tarango’s house in January 2006.
The evidence further established that after they had “secured” the property in 1999, they recognized that someone else had come and cleaned up the property. Jesus Aguayo later learned that the County of Los Angeles had been responsible for cleaning the property. Sidney Medina, who lived next door to the Tarango property on Woolwind Drive, testified that about three to four years after 2002, the U.S. Department of Agriculture had cleaned the yard of Tarango’s property and cleared trees and brush, and it appeared others had entered the house and possibly used it as a “drug hangout, ” and that local teenagers would hang around the house.
The evidence summarized above is sufficient to support the jury’s implicit finding that the Aguayos were not in “continuous” and “hostile” possession of Tarango’s house for five years prior to October 2006, when the indictment was filed.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, J. GRIMES, J.
“PURSUANT TO LAW, THESE PREMISES ARE IN THE CHARGE AND CUSTODY OF THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY. ANY PERSON BREAKING INTO OR ENTERING THESE PREMISES WILL BE PROSECUTED TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THE LAW.
SEALED BY: Public Guardian
By [hand written name]”