Opinion
No. 2015-02395 Ind. No. 7905/12
10-06-2021
The People, etc., respondent, v. Vincent Adeyeye, appellant.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Michael Arthus of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Seth M. Lieberman, and Jordan Cerruti of counsel), for respondent.
Argued - September 14, 2021
D67348 Y/htr
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Michael Arthus of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Seth M. Lieberman, and Jordan Cerruti of counsel), for respondent.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX, BETSY BARROS, LARA J. GENOVESI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vincent Del Giudice, J.), rendered March 10, 2015, as amended March 18, 2015, convicting him of murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment, as amended, is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial.
The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Prior to trial, the defendant moved, inter alia, to preclude the People from introducing at trial DNA testing results derived from the use of the Forensic Statistical Tool (hereinafter FST), or alternatively, to conduct a hearing pursuant to Frye v United States (293 F 1013 [DC Cir]) to determine the admissibility of the evidence generated by the FST. The Supreme Court denied that branch of the defendant's motion, finding that FST was generally accepted in the scientific community. We reverse.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in admitting FST evidence without first holding a Frye hearing (see People v Foster-Bey, 35 N.Y.3d 959; People v Williams, 35 N.Y.3d 24; People v Applewhite, 195 A.D.3d 856; People v Pelt, 184 A.D.3d 672, 673). Moreover, the error was not harmless because, without the FST evidence, the proof of the defendant's guilt was not overwhelming (see People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237; People v Applewhite, 195 A.D.3d 856; People v Pelt, 184 A.D.3d at 673 ).
Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
The defendant's remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.