Opinion
B307460
04-18-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLAYTON RUBEN ADDLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KA111467, Robert M. Martinez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C.
Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MANELLA, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted appellant Clayton Ruben Addleman of numerous crimes committed when he was 24 years old, including attempted murder, and found a firearm enhancement allegation to be true. The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison, plus 26 years. In his initial appeal, we affirmed appellant's convictions, but remanded the matter for the trial court to consider exercising its newly granted discretion to strike the firearm enhancement under intervening legislation. On remand, the court declined to strike the enhancement. Appellant appealed this ruling, and we affirmed.
The California Supreme Court then granted appellant's petition for review, and transferred the matter to this court, with directions that we vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of new legislation that made ameliorative changes to sentencing law: (1) Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 695) (AB 124); (2) Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess; Stats. 2021, ch. 719) (AB 1540); and (3) Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 731) (SB 567). As particularly relevant here, AB 124 made the low-term sentence for an offense presumptively appropriate if the court finds that the defendant's youth was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense. After reconsidering the cause, we conclude that AB 124 requires appellant's resentencing. Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand.
Given our conclusion, we need not consider whether AB 1540 and SB 567 independently require appellant's resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall consider all retroactive amendments to sentencing law, as applicable to appellant.
BACKGROUND
In 2017, a jury found appellant guilty of numerous crimes -- including attempted murder, residential robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition -- committed during a 48-hour crime spree in 2015, when appellant was 24 years old. The jury also found true a firearm enhancement allegation under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison, plus 26 years. Among other sentencing decisions, the trial court imposed the middle term (or one third thereof) on counts relating to robbery, burglary, and three different theft-related offenses. The court imposed a high-term sentence for the firearm- and ammunition-possession offenses, and stayed the punishment for them.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In appellant's initial appeal, we affirmed his convictions, but remanded the matter for the trial court to consider exercising its newly granted discretion to strike the firearm enhancement under intervening legislation. (People v. Addleman (Feb. 18, 2020, No. B285290) 2020 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 1107, at *45-*46.) On remand, appellant's counsel asked the trial court to strike the enhancement, noting appellant's young age at the time of his offenses, as well as his good conduct in prison. However, based on appellant's criminal history and the circumstances of his current offenses, and after giving the matter "a lot of thought," the court declined to strike the enhancement, concluding that appellant posed "a significant danger to society." Nevertheless, acknowledging appellant's progress in prison, the court stated, "[I]f [appellant] progresses as he has and continues, I would hope that the Department of Corrections would consider initiating a motion for a reconsideration of sentencing." Appellant challenged the trial court's ruling on appeal, and we affirmed. (People v. Addleman (Oct. 7, 2021, No. B307460) 2021 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 6377, at *1, review granted and cause transferred (Dec. 22, 2021).) Following our decision, our Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for review and transferred the matter to this court, with directions that we vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of AB 124, AB 1540, and SB 567.
Among other things, the trial court noted that in committing the attempted murder, appellant fired three shots at an occupied vehicle, and that he had committed the residential robbery in the early morning hours, while disguising himself. It does not appear that these circumstances were either stipulated to by appellant or found by the jury.
At the time of the hearing on remand, section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), provided that on the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's recommendation, the court could, at any time, recall a sentence and resentence the defendant. AB 1540 has since amended this provision and moved it to new section 1170.03. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.) The new statute preserves the department's authority to recommend a recall of sentence. (§ 1170.03, subd. (b)(1).)
DISCUSSION
After reconsidering the matter in light of the intervening enactments, we conclude that AB 124 requires appellant's resentencing. Effective January 1, 2022, that legislation amended section 1170 to make a low-term sentence presumptively appropriate where any of certain specified circumstances was a "contributing factor in the commission of the offense," including where the defendant was a "youth" at the time of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6) & (B); Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.3.) Where the presumption applies, the court may impose a higher sentence if it finds that "aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice." (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) For purposes of this provision, a youth includes any person who was under the age of 26 at the time of the offense. (See §§ 1016.7 [defining youth as person under 26 at time of offense], 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B) [incorporating § 1016.7's definition of "youth"]; Stats. 2021, ch. 695, §§ 4, 5.) As the Attorney General concedes, under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, AB 124 applies retroactively to appellant's judgment, which was not final when that enactment became effective. (See In re Estrada, supra, at 744 [ameliorative amendment applies to nonfinal judgments].)
Appellant was 24 years old -- a "youth" -- when he committed his offenses. At the time of appellant's sentencing, the trial court had no statutory reason to make, and appellant had no reason to seek, an express finding that youth was a contributing factor to appellant's commission of the offense. Because the court might have found that appellant's youth played a role in his commission of the offenses, thereby triggering the new presumption that a low-term sentence should be imposed, it is appropriate to remand the matter for resentencing in accordance with AB 124's requirements.
In a supplemental brief filed following the Supreme Court's transfer of the matter to this court, the Attorney General argues that remand for consideration of AB 124 is unnecessary. The Attorney General contends that the record clearly indicates the trial court would not have selected a low-term sentence for any of appellant's convictions even under AB 124's presumption. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, 273 [remand unnecessary where record clearly indicated trial court would not have exercised newly granted discretion to strike enhancement].) In support, the Attorney General asserts that in declining to strike the firearm enhancement following the prior remand, the trial court implicitly found that aggravating circumstances -- appellant's criminal history and the circumstances of his offenses -- outweighed mitigating ones, including appellant's youth. According to the Attorney General, this implicit finding establishes that the court similarly would have found that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, overcoming AB 124's presumption that a low term is appropriate. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6).) We are unpersuaded, and conclude the record does not clearly indicate remand would be futile.
The court's finding that aggravating circumstances counseled against striking the firearm enhancement does not reflect a finding that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones for all purposes. Indeed, as noted, for most of appellant's convictions, the court chose not to impose the high term. Although the court declined to strike the firearm enhancement, it did so after giving the matter "a lot of thought," and in doing so, highlighted appellant's progress in prison, suggesting that a more lenient sentence could be appropriate in the future, if appellant's progress continued. The record therefore suggests the court might have been open to consider lower sentences consistent with AB 124 for at least one of appellant's convictions. (See People v. Smith (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 46, 48-49, 50 [record was mixed as to whether court would have exercised discretion to strike prior strike; although court expressed doubt that it would exercise such discretion if it were available and emphasized defendant's criminal record, it also spoke sympathetically of defendant's circumstances and opined that people like him should not be turned into criminal outcasts].) Moreover, while the court presumably considered appellant's youth in declining to strike the enhancement, the legislature's new emphasis on this factor's importance and the presumption in favor of the low term could have affected the court's exercise of its discretion. (Cf. People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [where trial courts imposed presumptive sentences of life without parole for certain juvenile offenders, despite having discretion to impose lesser sentences, removal of presumption affected scope of courts' discretion, requiring remand; "we cannot say with confidence what sentence [the courts] would have imposed absent the presumption"].) Finally, even if the court had been disinclined to impose low-term sentences for any of appellant's convictions, the new presumption might have persuaded it to impose mid-term sentences for appellant's firearm- and ammunition-possession offenses, instead of the high-term sentences it imposed. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that remand for resentencing under AB 124 would be futile.
In light of our conclusion, we need not decide if aggravating circumstances neither stipulated to nor found by the jury could rebut AB 124's presumption. (See generally Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 275 [elevation of permissible sentence based on judicial factfinding violated petitioner's right to jury trial].)
DISPOSITION
Our prior decision is vacated. The sentence is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with the intervening ameliorative changes to sentencing law.
We concur: WILLHITE, J., COLLINS, J.