Opinion
15859, 1532/10.
10-13-2015
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Mark W. Zeno of counsel), for appellant. Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Jordan K. Hummel of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Mark W. Zeno of counsel), for appellant.
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Jordan K. Hummel of counsel), for respondent.
TOM, J.P., ACOSTA, RICHTER, KAPNICK, JJ.
Opinion
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Darcel D. Clark, J. at suppression hearing; Caesar D. Cirigliano, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered April 10, 2012, convicting defendant of attempted assault in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of two to four years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant's motion to suppress a statement was properly denied. Although defendant was in custody and had not yet received Miranda warnings, the record supports the hearing court's finding that his statement was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation. Where a defendant's inquiry concerning the reason for an arrest is “immediately met by a brief and relatively innocuous answer by the police officer,” there is no interrogation or its functional equivalent (People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476, 480, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862 [1982] ; compare People v. Lanahan, 55 N.Y.2d 711, 447 N.Y.S.2d 139, 431 N.E.2d 624 [1981] [detailed recital of evidence held equivalent to interrogation] ). The detective briefly responded to defendant's inquiry by referring to an incident that occurred at Richman Plaza in 2008, and pointing to a wanted poster containing defendant's photograph. This constituted an innocuous reply to defendant's question, and it was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (see Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d at 480, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862 ). Moreover, rather than being placed in the room in an effort to encourage defendant to make a statement, the poster had been placed there long before defendant's arrest.
The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. The fact that the jury acquitted defendant of other charges does not warrant a different conclusion (see People v. Rayam, 94 N.Y.2d 557, 708 N.Y.S.2d 37, 729 N.E.2d 694 [2000] ).
Defendant's argument that the court had a sua sponte obligation to disclose certain markings found on the jury's verdict sheet is unavailing (see People v. Boatwright, 297 A.D.2d 603, 604, 748 N.Y.S.2d 541 [1st Dept.2002], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 533, 752 N.Y.S.2d 593, 782 N.E.2d 571 [2002] ; see also Matter of Suarez v. Byrne, 10 N.Y.3d 523, 528 n. 3, 860 N.Y.S.2d 439, 890 N.E.2d 201 [2008] [“Marks on verdict sheets are not verdicts”] ).