Opinion
D072313
05-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ACCREDITED SURETY AND CASUALTY CO., Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of John Rorabaugh, John Mark Rorabaugh and Crystal L. Rorabaugh for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Darin L. Wessel, Jennifer M. Stone, Deputy County Counsel; and Per Hellstrom, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No 37-2017-00019327-CU-EN-NC) APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert Kearny, James Mangione, Robert P. Dahlquist, Harry M. Elias, and William S. Dato, Judges. Affirmed. Law Office of John Rorabaugh, John Mark Rorabaugh and Crystal L. Rorabaugh for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Darin L. Wessel, Jennifer M. Stone, Deputy County Counsel; and Per Hellstrom, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Accredited Surety and Casualty Company, Inc., acting through its agent Golden Boy Bail Bonds (together, the Surety), posted a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of Hiram A. Novoa who later failed to make a required court appearance. The trial court forfeited the bond under Penal Code section 1305 and later entered summary judgment against the Surety. The Surety appeals from the order denying its motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bond, and the subsequent judgment. The Surety contends that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the bond when it failed to enter summary judgment as required by section 1306 within 90 days of the expiration of the statutory appearance period provided by section 1305. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2016, the trial court ordered the bond forfeited after Novoa failed to appear in court. On Friday, July 29, the 185-day appearance period expired with no motions pending. On Monday, August 1, the Surety filed a motion to extend time. The Surety erroneously claimed that its last day to file a motion was Saturday, July 30, and therefore the motion to extend time could be filed the next business day, Monday, August 1.
Undesignated date references are to 2016.
The People responded to the motion to extend time, noting that the Surety untimely filed its motion three days after the appearance period had elapsed. Nonetheless, the People took no position on the timeliness argument. After the Surety failed to appear, the trial court denied the motion to extend time without prejudice and allowed the Surety to recalendar the extension motion within 30 days of the denial. The Surety filed a new motion requesting an extension of time. The court granted an extension of time through March 29, 2017.
The Surety then filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The Surety argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to extend the time and thus the 90 days to enter summary judgment began to run on July 30 and expired 90 days later on October 28. The People opposed that motion, asserting that the Surety was estopped from challenging the court's authority to extend time because the Surety received the time extension that it had requested. The Surety disagreed that estoppel applied in this situation, claiming the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to make the order extending time "however much it might have benefited the Surety." The trial court denied the motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bond, holding that the Surety was "estopped from complaining about the fact that [its] request [to extend time] was granted." The Surety timely appealed from the order denying its motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bond.
The trial court later entered summary judgment against the Surety on the bond. The Surety filed an amended notice of appeal from the prior order and the judgment
DISCUSSION
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Statutes govern the forfeiture and exoneration of bail. (§ 1305 et seq.) When a defendant who has been released on bail fails to appear in court as required without a sufficient excuse, the trial court is required to declare bail forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a)(1).) Within 30 days of the forfeiture, the court clerk must serve notice of the forfeiture on the surety and its bail agent and, if the bond amount exceeds $400, the notice of forfeiture must be served by mail. (§ 1305, subd. (b)(1).) The surety has 185 days from the date the notice of forfeiture is mailed (180 days plus five days for service by mail), to obtain relief from the forfeiture on any of the grounds set forth in section 1305. (§ 1305, subd. (b); People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 999.) The 185-day period is known as either the "exoneration period" or the "appearance period." (People v. United States Fire Ins. Co., at p. 1000.) The trial court may extend the original 185-day appearance period up to 180 additional days, on motion supported by a showing of good cause. (§ 1305.4.)
The appearance period is calculated using weekdays, weekends, and holidays, with the exception that if the last day of that period is a holiday, then the last day of the period is extended to the next day. (See, e.g., People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 605, 608-609.) --------
If the surety fails to obtain relief from the forfeiture within the appearance period, including extensions, the court shall enter summary judgment against the surety on the bond, plus costs. (§ 1306, subd. (a).) "If, because of the failure of any court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated." (Id. at subd. (c).)
II. ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that the Surety's motion to extend the appearance period was late. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the Surety's requested extension and the Surety benefited from the extension by receiving additional time to produce Novoa, avoiding summary judgment and paying the forfeited amount. (§ 1306, subd. (e)(1) [Payment on a bail bond is due when the People "[d]emand immediate payment of the judgment within 30 days after the summary judgment becomes final."].) The Surety now claims that because its motion to extend the appearance period was untimely, the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to grant the extension order, rendering the extension order void.
As a result, the Surety claims that the 90-day period to enter summary judgment began to run on July 30, 2016, and expired 90 days later on October 28, 2016. Because the trial court did not grant summary judgment until May 25, 2017, the Surety claims the order granting summary judgment was also untimely and void. Thus, the Surety claims we must reverse the order granting summary judgment, discharge the forfeiture and exonerate bail.
The People argue that the extension order was not void. Rather, the People assert the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting the requested extension. Thus, the extension order and subsequent judgment are merely voidable, and the trial court properly applied principles of estoppel to prevent the Surety from challenging the extension order and benefiting from the mistake it caused. We agree with the People.
A judgment is void when a court lacks fundamental jurisdiction, meaning it has no authority over the subject matter or the parties, or it lacks any power to hear or determine the case. (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339 (Kabran); People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660 (American Contractors).) An act beyond the fundamental jurisdiction of a court is null and void and cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. (Kabran, at p. 339.)
In contrast, when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction by violating procedural requirements, ordering unauthorized relief, or failing to act in the manner prescribed by the law, a judgment is voidable, not void. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 339-340.) "Because a court that acts in excess of jurisdiction still has 'jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense' [citation], any such act is 'valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.' " (Id. at p. 340.)
The question here is whether the trial court had jurisdiction in the fundamental sense—over the subject matter—when it granted the untimely extension and later entered summary judgment. The question is one of law subject to de novo review. (People v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 146, 151.)
We conclude that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction, and not outside its fundamental jurisdiction, when it granted the extension. It is well settled "that where a statute requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, follow a particular procedure, or subject to certain limitations, an act beyond those limits is in excess of its jurisdiction." (Burtnett v. King (1949) 33 Cal.2d 805, 807.) Where the provisions of sections 1305 and 1306 are not followed the court acts in excess of its jurisdiction. (People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 348, 354.)
When the trial court granted the untimely extension motion, in violation of the provisions of the bail bond statutes, it acted in excess of its jurisdiction. The Surety cited no authority that such a violation effected a fundamental loss of jurisdiction, " ' i.e., "an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties." ' " (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 662.) Rather, when the Surety presented the motion and renewed motion to extend time on the bail bond forfeiture, the trial court had jurisdiction over the bond and the statutory authority to enter summary judgment on the bond forfeiture. (§ 1306, subds. (a) & (c).)
The trial court had fundamental jurisdiction, making its act in excess of that jurisdiction merely voidable, not void, and thus subject to principles of estoppel. (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 347 ["When, as here, the court has jurisdiction of the subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction."]; People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 609 ["[C]ase law uniformly holds that [the surety] would be estopped from asserting a jurisdictional defect, because [the surety] itself moved to extend time of forfeiture at a time when, [the surety] now asserts, the court lacked jurisdiction."].) Here, the Surety's untimely motion to extend the appearance period resulted in an extension beyond the authority of the trial court to grant. As a consequence, summary judgment was entered, contrary to the statutory prescription, more than 90 days "after the date upon which it may first be entered. . . ." (§ 1306, subd. (c).) The Surety is estopped from challenging the order extending the appearance period because the trial court ordered the extension at the Surety's request. Since the Surety's challenge to the summary judgment is premised on the invalidity of the extension order, that challenge also fails.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the Surety's motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond and the summary judgment on the bond are affirmed. The People shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
NARES, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. O'ROURKE, J.