Opinion
B300388
04-24-2020
In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VJ46350) APPEAL from a dispositional order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kevin Brown. Affirmed as modified. Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
This appeal is from a dispositional order sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 wardship petition and ordering minor A.C. (minor) to remain in the custody of his parents. The crux of minor's argument is that it was unreasonable and inconsistent for the trial court to sustain the petition against him and dismiss a petition against his alleged coparticipant in the robbery. Minor argues that because of this inconsistency, there was insufficient evidence to support the order sustaining the petition and that the inconsistent verdicts require reversal of the order sustaining the petition.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Minor fails to show that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order. The victim testified that minor held a knife to the victim; demanded money; took the victim's money; and fled. That evidence was sufficient to support the order sustaining the petition. Minor's contrary argument ignores the standard of review, which requires this court to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order. (In re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605 (Sylvester C.).)
Additionally, minor fails to show an inconsistency between the order sustaining his petition and the order dismissing the petition against his alleged coparticipant. The evidence against minor and the alleged coparticipant was not the same. The coparticipant had an alibi; minor did not. Additionally, the knife used during the robbery was found in minor's home. No similar physical evidence was found in the alleged coparticipant's home. Further, even if minor demonstrated an inconsistency in the two orders, minor fails to show that such inconsistency requires the reversal of the order sustaining the petition.
Finally, minor persuasively argues that the trial court erred in setting a maximum term of confinement. Setting a maximum term does not apply to minor whom the trial court ordered to remain in the custody of his parents. We strike the maximum term of confinement and otherwise affirm the trial court's dispositional order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 602 Petition
The People alleged that minor, a 14 year old, committed the second-degree robbery of Edgar. The People further alleged that minor used a knife in the commission of robbery, bringing the offense within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23).
No petition with respect to Jesus is included in our record. However, it appears that the People alleged that Jesus robbed Edgar as part of the same incident with minor.
B. Trial
Minor and Jesus were tried together.
1. Edgar's Testimony
Edgar identified minor and Jesus in court. He knew both as students in his school. On May 2, 2018, Edgar was at school, and showed a friend money. Approximately 15 other students nearby could have seen Edgar holding the money. Jesus was nearby when Edgar showed his friend the money. Edgar previously had posted on Instagram pictures of himself holding large sums of money.
On May 2, 2018, school ended at 12:05 p.m. About five minutes later, Edgar started to walk home. Edgar generally spent 10 to 12 minutes walking home. Based on Edgar's testimony, the robbery occurred at approximately 12:20 or 12:22 p.m.
When Edgar was about to open his apartment door, minor and Jesus approached him. Jesus placed a knife to Edgar's stomach and took his backpack. Then minor placed the same knife to Edgar's stomach. Minor and Jesus said, "[W]here's the money?" Edgar was scared because the minors held a knife to his stomach. Minor ordered Edgar to empty his pockets. Edgar pulled $560 out of his pockets; minor and Jesus grabbed it from Edgar's hand.
2. Jesus's Defense
Martha, Jesus's mother, testified that on May 2, 2018, she picked Jesus up from school between 12:10 and 12:15 p.m. Martha testified she would pick Jesus up from school at the same time every Wednesday. On May 2, 2018, Jesus was outside school waiting for her with Ricardo, Jesus's cousin, whom Martha also would pick up from school. After picking up Jesus and Ricardo, Jesus was with Martha the rest of the day.
Ricardo, Jesus's cousin, testified that school was released at 12:05 p.m. every Wednesday. Ricardo testified that Martha picked him and Jesus up from school on May 2, 2018. He and Jesus waited about five minutes after school was released for Martha to arrive. They had the same routine every Wednesday.
3. Minor's Defense
Minor's mother Lizeth testified that she did not work on May 2, 2018. Wednesday was her regular day off work. She had an appointment with minor scheduled at their home at 1:00 p.m. on May 2, 2018. Lizeth did not know exactly what time minor arrived home, but she "guess[ed]" between 12:35 and 12:45 p.m. Lizeth testified that minor arrived home before 1:00 p.m. Lizeth never saw a large sum of money in minor's room and never observed that he purchased new items.
4. Evidence about the Knife
The parties stipulated that police reported "the victim [Edgar] described the knife as a black folding knife approximately 8 inches in length." The parties also stipulated that "[l]aw enforcement executed a valid search warrant on the home of [minor] and recovered a knife matching a description of the knife previously provided by the victim."
At trial, Edgar described the knife as brownish with gold and a silver blade. Edgar identified a photograph of a knife as the knife that minor used. During cross-examination, Edgar confirmed that the knife was brown with gold and the blade was silver. In court, Edgar denied telling officers that it was a black knife.
5. Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court believed that Edgar "was robbed." "I believe the testimony that he [Edgar] gave is largely true." The court also indicated: "I find that the mother of Jesus was quite believable, and she testified to a timeline, and more important than the timeline, she never lost sight of him." The court therefore had "a reasonable doubt regarding Jesus." The court found the People "have not met their burden regarding Jesus."
With respect to minor, the court stated, "The knife was found in [minor's] home. That makes a big difference. The mother gave testimony which, as I understand the timeline, does not, even if true, exonerate [minor] from what happened." "I do believe the victim was truthful in that he was robbed, and was robbed by [minor]." The court sustained the petition, finding both the robbery and enhancement true. The court permitted minor to remain in his parents' home. The court indicated the maximum term of confinement was six years, and counsel agreed. The court's dispositional order provides: "Minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period to exceed 6 years." (Capitalization and underlining omitted.)
DISCUSSION
Minor argues: (1) No substantial evidence supported the finding that he committed a robbery; (2) the trial court rendered inconsistent verdicts by sustaining the petition against minor and dismissing the petition against Jesus; and (3) the trial court erred in stating a maximum term of confinement. We address his arguments seriatim.
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding that Minor Committed a Robbery
We review the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining a section 602 petition with the same standard applied to review a criminal conviction. (Sylvester C., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.) The reviewing court must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings to determine "whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Ibid.) This court does not reweigh evidence or conflicts in testimony. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60; In re E.L.B. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 780, 788.) "It is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends." (In re E.L.B., at p. 788.)
Robbery is the "taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." (Pen. Code, § 211.)
Applying the appropriate standard of review, substantial evidence supported the finding that minor committed a robbery. Edgar testified that minor held a knife to his stomach, demanded money, and took money from Edgar. The trial court found this portion of Edgar's testimony credible. The testimony established all the elements of robbery and was sufficient to support the order sustaining the petition. Testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) The events Edgar described in his testimony were neither physically impossible nor inherently improbable.
Additionally, the trial court found that the weapon used in a robbery was found in minor's home. The finding was supported by substantial evidence. Minor correctly points out that there was a discrepancy in the color of the knife between the police report's description of Edgar's statement that the knife was black and Edgar's testimony at trial that the knife was brown and gold. Notwithstanding the color discrepancy, the following stipulation supported the trial court's finding: "Law enforcement executed a valid search warrant on the home of [minor] and recovered a knife matching a description of the knife previously provided by the victim." The trial court necessarily found the evidence that the knife used in the robbery was found in minor's home credible. This court does not reweigh the trial court's credibility determinations. (In re E.L.B., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 788.) Minor's argument that there was only a possibility the knife found in Edgar's home was used during the robbery ignores this court's standard of review.
Although minor characterizes his claim as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the crux of minor's argument was that "[t]here is no rational reason for the court to reject Edgar's identification of Jesus, but to find it reliable as to [minor]." However, the trial court identified two rational reasons for that result. First, the trial court found persuasive evidence that the knife was found in minor's home. Second, the trial court found persuasive Jesus's alibi; minor did not have an alibi. Jesus's mother provided an alibi for Jesus at the relevant time. In contrast, minor's mother did not know what time minor arrived home, but guessed that it was about 12:35 or 12:40 p.m., after the time Edgar testified the robbery occurred.
Minor's argument that the trial court could not accept Edgar's identification of minor and simultaneously reject minor's identification of Jesus lacks merit. The trial court as the trier of fact could credit portions of Edgar's testimony and reject other portions. (People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 364.) Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court found Edgar's identification of minor credible and Edgar's identification of Jesus not sufficiently persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. The Alleged Inconsistent Verdicts Do Not Require the Reversal of the Order Sustaining the Petition
Minor argues that the alleged inconsistent verdicts between Jesus and minor require the reversal of the court's assumption of jurisdiction over minor as a ward of the court. Minor's argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, minor does not show that the verdicts were inconsistent. Second, even if the verdicts were inconsistent, minor does not demonstrate that reversal is required.
First, as discussed above, the verdicts were not inconsistent. The evidence pertaining to Jesus was not the same as the evidence pertaining to minor. Specifically, Jesus had an alibi; minor did not. Additionally, the knife used in the robbery was found in minor's home. The trial court expressly identified these distinctions when it announced its findings.
Even if the verdicts were inconsistent, our Supreme Court has held: "[T]he rule of consistency is a vestige of the past with no continuing validity. Many reasons may explain apparently inconsistent verdicts: lenience, compromise, differing evidence as to different defendants, or, possibly, that two juries simply viewed similar evidence differently. If substantial evidence supports a jury verdict as to one defendant, that verdict may stand despite an apparently inconsistent verdict as to another defendant." (People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 858.) Palmer involved a jury trial, but Palmer's principles apply as well to when a trial judge has rendered arguably inconsistent verdicts. (Harris v. Rivera (1981) 454 U.S. 339, 347 (Harris).) Whether the inconsistent verdicts result from the judge's observation of everything "that transpired in the courtroom" an error of law, or the exercise of lenity, the inconsistent verdict may stand. (See id. at pp. 347-348; see also In re E.R. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 466, 470 [inconsistent verdicts generally permitted to stand].) Therefore, even assuming minor's verdict was inconsistent with the verdict as to Jesus, the inconsistency does not require reversal of minor's verdict.
Finally, minor argues that the above principles do not apply to him because the trial court's ruling was "arbitrary." Harris, supra, states: "[I]nconsistency . . . might constitute evidence of arbitrariness that would undermine confidence in the quality of the judge's conclusion." (44 U.S. at p. 346.) The Harris court, however, cautioned, that other explanations are "more likely." (Id. at p. 347.) For example, "the judge's actual observation of everything that transpired in the courtroom created some doubt about the guilt of one defendant that he might or might not be able to articulate in a convincing manner." (Id. at p. 347.) The record in this case demonstrates no arbitrariness. The trial court here reached differing conclusions based on different evidence. The judge also convincingly articulated why he found there was a reasonable doubt as to Jesus's participation in the robbery but not as to minor's participation.
Contrary to minor's argument, People v. Newman (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 420, 423-424 (Newman) is consistent with affirming the trial court's order sustaining the petition against minor. In Newman, the People charged two defendants with bookmaking, in violation of Penal Code section 337a. The trial court as trier of fact convicted Elijah Newman of the charges and acquitted the codefendant Helen Hendrix. (Newman, at p. 421.)
At trial, Hendrix testified that she was not in the bookmaking business. (Newman, supra, 192 Cal.App.2d at p. 423.) Newman did not testify. (Ibid.) An officer testified that he entered a residence, found Newman and Hendrix inside, and expressed a desire to place a bet. (Id. at p. 421.) Newman provided the paper for the officer to identify his bet. When the officer asked Hendrix for recommendations, she said that she did not have any. (Ibid.) The officer gave Newman money to cover his bet. (Id. at pp. 421-422.) Hendrix told another officer that Newman was her boyfriend and she had rented him a telephone, but she did not know how he was using it. (Id. at p. 422.)
The Newman court applied the following principle: " 'When there is the slightest difference in the evidence as between two persons jointly tried the trier of facts may weigh the evidence and make allowance for such difference, and when that is done and one is acquitted and the other convicted, the fact that the evidence involves the acquitted person to some extent will not require the exoneration of the other.' " (Newman, supra, 192 Cal.App.2d at p. 423.) The court therefore affirmed the conviction against Newman even though the trier of fact did not convict Hendrix. (Ibid.)
As in Newman, here, as previously described, the evidence against minor was not the same as the evidence against Jesus. The trial court properly considered that difference when it found minor guilty and Jesus not guilty of the robbery. In short, minor fails to demonstrate an inconsistency in his verdict and that of Jesus. Assuming such an inconsistency existed, minor fails to demonstrate any error.
III. The Juvenile Court Erred in Setting a Maximum Term of Confinement
Minor argues that the trial court erred in setting a maximum term of confinement. Section 726, subdivision (d)(1) provides: "If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."
Here the trial court did not remove minor from the physical custody of his parents, and therefore was not required to set a maximum term of confinement. "[W]here a juvenile court's order includes a maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term." (In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592.)
DISPOSITION
The maximum confinement term is stricken from the juvenile court's order. In all other respects, the dispositional order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J. We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------