Opinion
H046398
10-10-2019
In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.C., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV43124)
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the trial court sustained a wardship petition alleging the minor A.C. engaged in conduct constituting first degree burglary. The trial court expressly set forth a finding of liability on a theory of aiding and abetting. The court placed A.C. on probation for six months under the custody of his parents with no wardship.
On appeal, A.C. contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of first degree burglary on a theory of aiding and abetting. On the same ground, he contends the trial court erred by denying his motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 775 to set aside the order sustaining the petition. We conclude these claims are without merit and we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
The prosecution charged A.C. in a wardship petition with two counts: Count 1—first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)); and count 2—accessory to a felony (§ 32). After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained count 1 and dismissed count 2. The court placed A.C. in the custody of his parents on probation for six months without wardship.
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
B. Facts of the Offense
William S., Carol R., and their daughter A. lived in a house with a garage in Palo Alto. They had two bicycles, among other things, stored in their garage. Around 5:00 p.m., they saw three boys riding three bikes away from their house. Two of the bikes they were riding—a blue Trek and a red Schwinn—had been taken from the garage. William and his daughter ran after the boys, while Carol pursued them in her car. William caught up with A.C. and recovered the blue Trek. Another one of the boys fled with the red Schwinn.
We refer to the witnesses by their first names or by initials to protect their privacy, as well as that of the minor. --------
William testified as follows. He was working on a motorcycle in the driveway when he went inside to tell his wife, Carol, about his progress. When he came back outside five or ten minutes later, his daughter A. said to him, "Dad, aren't those your bicycles?" William saw three people riding away on three bikes, including his blue Trek and red Schwinn. All three people were within five feet of each other, in front of William's house. A.C. was riding the blue Trek. The two bikes were worth about $5,000 total. William yelled out an offer to pay money to get the bikes back, but the boys did not stop.
William and his daughter pursued the boys on foot to a nearby park. His wife followed in the car and picked up William on the way while his daughter continued on foot. The boy riding the red Schwinn "peel[ed] off" towards a pedestrian underpass while William pursued A.C. on the blue Trek. When A.C. got to a parking lot next to the park, he jumped off the blue Trek and got onto another bike in attempt to flee. William got out of the car and physically detained A.C. in the parking lot until the police arrived.
Carol testified similarly. She was in the kitchen when William came inside, excited to tell them about the work he had accomplished on his motorcycle. Carol was looking out the window when she saw the three boys riding away on bikes. One of the boys she saw was A.C., but she was not paying attention to which bike he was on. She got in her car and gave chase, picking up her husband on the way. After her husband jumped out, she pursued the boy on the red Schwinn to try to block his escape, while her husband went after the other boys in the parking lot. However, the boy on the red Schwinn eluded her. The third boy ran away on foot while her husband detained A.C. in the parking lot.
A police officer arrived a short while later and found William holding A.C. by his backpack in the parking lot. A.C. was in possession of his own bike at that point, while the blue Trek was elsewhere in the area. A.C. told the officer he was riding his own bike together with the two other boys, but A.C. did not know their names. He admitted he had been in the driveway of the relevant residence, and that he was with the other two boys before they went into the garage. He said he was about 50 feet away at the time. He saw the other two boys go into the garage and take the bikes, after which they all rode away together.
William's daughter A. was called to testify for A.C. She saw A.C. riding one of the bikes, but she did not know which bike he was on.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A.C. contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's order finding him liable for first degree burglary. He does not challenge the trial court's factual findings. He points out that the trial court relied solely on an aiding and abetting theory of liability, and he argues that theory is unsupported because there is no evidence he had advance knowledge of the crime. The Attorney General contends that substantial evidence supports a finding that A.C. was either a principal or an aider and abettor.
1. Legal Principles
" 'The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court 'must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]" ' [Citation.] Substantial evidence is 'evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . .' [Citation.]" (In re Gary F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1080 (Gary F.).)
"The crime of burglary consists of an act—unlawful entry—accompanied by the 'intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.' (§ 459.)" (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041 (Montoya).) The intent of an aider and abettor must be formed before or during the commission of the burglary. (Id. at p. 1038; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) For the purpose of assessing the liability of an aider and abettor, a burglary is considered ongoing during the time the perpetrator remains inside the structure. (Montoya, at p. 1045.) Accordingly, "if an individual happens upon a scene in which a perpetrator unlawfully has entered with intent to commit a felony or theft, and, upon learning of that circumstance, forms the intent to facilitate the perpetrator's illegal purpose in entering, that individual incurs the liability of an aider and abettor, commensurate with the liability of the perpetrator." (Id. at pp. 1044-1045.)
2. Procedural Background
At the close of the prosecution's case, A.C. moved to dismiss the charges for insufficiency of the evidence under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. The trial court denied the motion, citing William's testimony that he had seen A.C. riding the blue Trek.
In sustaining the petition, the trial court made detailed findings of fact consistent with the summary of the facts as set forth above. The court specifically credited William's testimony that he saw A.C. riding the blue Trek. The court noted A.C.'s statement to police admitting that he knew the other two boys and that he was present when they entered the garage to steal the bikes. The court found there was no evidence that A.C. himself entered the garage or took one of the bikes out of the garage.
The court found evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the petition on a theory of aiding and abetting. The court found that A.C. knew the crime was being committed; that he was in the driveway and saw the other two boys take the bikes out of the garage; and that he intended to aid and abet them in committing the crime. As to intent to aid and abet, the court stated: "Now, that is probably the toughest element, but I think a fair inference given his conduct of being in the driveway, riding away with the three, not stopping when the victim was offering to buy the bikes back, and so forth, allows a very strong inference that he knew what was going on and was trying to help his colleagues get away."
After the trial court sustained the petition, A.C. filed a written motion to modify or set aside the order sustaining the petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 775. A.C. again argued the evidence was insufficient to show he was liable for burglary as an aider and abettor. Specifically, A.C. argued that there was no evidence he knew the other two boys intended to commit a crime. A.C. relied on Montoya, supra, for the proposition that an aider and abettor must form the intent to aid the perpetrator of the burglary before the perpetrator leaves the structure that is target of the burglary.
The trial court denied the motion. In doing so, the court addressed A.C.'s argument regarding the lack of intent. First, the court again credited William's testimony putting A.C. in possession of the stolen blue Trek. The court then stated, "Now, I am grateful, however, for the public defender's office because in one way, I was legally wrong. I think my decision stands because I believe [William]. However, my initial statement when I gave my decision was that you can be held as an aider or abetter even if you didn't have proof of advance[] knowledge of the crime. And as I reread the transcript, it's clear there is no evidence of advance[] knowledge of the crime. [¶] So the ultimate proposal by the public defender would be that if I didn't believe [William], then I would have to find fault under Penal Code [s]ection 32, and I think that's a correct statement of the law." The court then reiterated that it believed William's testimony putting A.C. on the blue Trek, and on that ground the court denied the motion.
3. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Order Sustaining the Petition
Quoting out of context, A.C. seizes on the court's statement that it was "legally wrong" to hold A.C. liable because there was no evidence he had advance knowledge the other two boys would take the bikes. But the court made clear this would only be the case "if I didn't believe [William]." The court then reiterated that it found sufficient evidence to hold A.C. liable based on William's testimony putting A.C. in possession of the blue Trek.
Under Montoya, an aider and abetter may be liable even if he or she lacks the intent to aid the perpetrator before the perpetrator enters the structure. (Montoya, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1042.) The aider and abetter is liable as long as he or she forms the intent to aid or encourage the perpetrator before the perpetrator leaves the structure. (Id. at pp. 1044-1045.) It appears the trial court's statement that there was no evidence that A.C. had advance knowledge of the crime was a finding on his state of mind prior to the other boys' entry into the garage. Examining the court's statements in context, it appears the court found A.C. formed the requisite intent to aid, assist, or encourage the other boys while they were in the garage and taking the bikes—that is, before they actually left the garage. Substantial evidence supports such a finding. A.C. admitted he was with the other boys immediately before they entered the garage, that he stood 50 feet away from the garage, and watched while they entered it and took the bikes. William testified that he saw A.C. riding the blue Trek away from the garage. A.C. does not dispute this testimony, and in any event we must credit it: A.C. rode the bike away from a just-completed burglary. That action followed the entry into the garage and the taking of the bikes so closely in time that it supports an inference A.C. formed the intent before the other boys left the garage to aid and encourage them in the offense. If A.C. had no intent to aid, assist, or encourage the crime, it is unlikely he would have remained present in the driveway, admittedly watching the other boys take the bicycles, and then ridden away on one of the stolen bikes immediately after they were stolen.
A.C. relies on Gary F., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 1076, in which we found sufficient evidence to support a finding of aiding and abetting a burglary where the minor was seen circling the burgled structure on his bicycle prior to the offense. Gary F. does not help A.C. While Gary F. involved a finding that the minor had advance knowledge of the offense and formed the intent to aid and abet before it occurred, that case does not hold that an aider and abettor must have the requisite intent prior to the crime. Montoya is clear that the requisite intent may be formed after the perpetrator enters the structure, as long as it is formed before the perpetrator departs. As such, Gary F. is inapposite.
For the reasons above, we find sufficient evidence to show A.C. formed the intent to aid and abet the other two minors in stealing the bikes before they departed the garage. A.C. does not dispute any other aspect of the findings holding him liable. Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court's order sustaining the petition.
B. Denial of A.C.'s Motion Under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 775
As set forth above in section II.A.2, A.C. moved under Welfare and Institutions Code section 775 to set aside the order sustaining the petition. His motion raised the same grounds raised here: He argued the evidence failed to establish he formed the intent to aid and abet before the other two boys took the bikes. The trial court denied the motion for the reasons set forth above.
A.C. now contends the trial court erred by denying his motion. His argument is identical in substance to the argument set forth above asserting insufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we reject this claim for the same reasons set forth above.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Greenwood, P. J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Grover, J. /s/_________
Danner, J.